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Abstract  
Although there is consensus on the increasing role of emerging and developing 
economies in global markets, the literature on the mechanisms contributing to their 
growth remains still limited. The research aims to contribute to knowledge by 
exploring and understanding the process of transformation from a centrally planned 
economy into a market based economy. This transformation process is analysed 
from the perspective of a Venture Capital industry emerging and developing in 
Poland. The research focuses on the dynamics of particular factors and their impact 
on a specific set of stakeholders.  
In order to take a sufficiently broad contextual view, an organizational theory 
approach was employed. The Venture Capital industry was treated as a community 
of organizations which are connected by direct or indirect relationships. The 
interpretative framework was provided by two leading organizational theories: 
Institutional theory and Resource Dependence theory.  
The research is qualitative, and is guided by a specially designed framework for 
collecting and analysing the data. The primary data were collected though semi 
structured interviews with Venture Capital industry stakeholders of different types, 
and with different roles in the process.  
The research contributes to knowledge at three levels. Firstly, it addresses the 
literature gap on emergence of the Venture Capital industry in Poland. Secondly, it 
contributes to an understanding of the process of the emergence of a Venture 
Capital industry and economic transformation. Thirdly, findings may contribute to 
policy recommendations formulated to accelerate effective development in financial 
services.   
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1. Chapter 1 
1.1. Introduction 
In terms of the economic world map, only 34 out of the 188 countries regularly 
monitored by the International Monetary Fund are classified as ‘developed 
economies’. The rest, constituting a sizeable majority, are referred to as ‘emerging 
and developing’ economies (IMF, 2012). The global economic and political 
contributions of emerging and developing economies have been systematically 
increasing over the last twenty years. While the GDP growth of advanced economies 
was oscillating around 3 percent per year in the period of 1994 - 2008, the emerging 
and developing economies were routinely reaching growth levels of 7-8 per cent per 
year. Moreover, during the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 emerging and developing 
economies kept growing in contrast to the most advanced economies (IMF, 
2012:190). Countries such as China or India became world class players on the 
global market. China’s current account surplus is estimated at $305B, whereas the 
United States current account deficit at the same time reached the level of $471B 
(The Economist, 2012).  
The emerging markets are perceived as a source of talent, capital and companies. 
Inhabited by 80% of the world population (The Economist, 2012) they provide 
globally significant sources of both workers and consumers. Due to the increase of 
more consumer oriented industries, and an increasing focus on innovation, they are 
becoming a serious competitor for western corporations (Arindam Bhattacharya, 
2012) as well as an important employer for western workers. For example, in the UK, 
the Indian TATA group employs 50,000 workers in 19 companies1. Five out of the 
                                                 
1
 TATA web page: http://uk.tata.com/tatauk/inside.aspx?sectid=+XTJ2tXAgdE= 
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twenty most innovative companies in the world, according to Forbes2, originated in 
emerging and developing economies. In terms of financial markets’ performance, the 
emerging economies have joined the high performing world class of financial 
providers. In the period of 2006 – 2010 they generated nearly 40 percent of global 
growth of banking assets (in absolute numbers). Also the insurance industry 
recorded significant growth in income through premium payments (World Economic 
Forum, 2012). Economic forecasts indicate this trend of the rising contribution from 
the emerging economies will last for several years to come (Kraemer-Eis, Lang, & 
Gvetadze, 2013). This suggests that the social and economic potential of those 
countries which grow most rapidly, will allow them to catch up quickly with the 
advanced economies (Ernst & Young, 2011). 
Although emerging and developing economies share some characteristics: such as 
steady economic liberalisation as well as introducing business friendly policies and 
attitudes (Ernst & Young, 2011), there are also significant differences between them. 
In this context, the central eastern European countries form a specific category. 
These countries went through a multilevel transformation process in a relatively short 
time, i.e., circa 15 years. They changed from centrally planned socialist systems into 
functioning market economies. Some of them, such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, managed to fulfill both economic and political requirements to 
join international organizations alongside the developed countries. The 
transformation process required not only an economic shift but also fundamental 
societal alteration (Smallbone & Welter, 2001). These societal changes had to 
include new legal frameworks, which allowed and protected private ownership of the 
means of production, thus allowing the principle of a free market to be implemented. 
                                                 
2
 http://www.forbes.com/innovative-companies/list/ (07.02.2013) 
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Additionally a set of behaviours, that cannot be simply regulated by law, but are 
essential for a functioning legal structure, has had to evolve.  
Although there is consensus on the increasing role of emerging and developing 
economies on the global market (Arindam Bhattacharya, 2012; Lamy, 26 November 
2012: World Economic Forum, 2012) the literature on the mechanisms contributing 
to their success remains still limited (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000). This 
research hopes to contribute to the alleviation of this dearth of both data and 
analysis. It is going to concentrate on mechanisms identified at work in the group of 
Central Eastern European3 countries. It aims to explore and understand the process 
of transformation from a centrally planned economy into a market based economy. 
The research focuses on the dynamics of specific changes and their impact on 
identified stakeholders in the transforming economy. One of the fundamental needs 
in the transformation process is the creation of a private sector, where entrepreneurs 
are freely allowed (or more accurately, not frustrated in their actions) to establish 
their own businesses (Smallbone & Welter, 2001). However the emerging economy 
context in which entrepreneurs establish and run their firms differs from that of 
mature western economies. For the former, the economic, political and culture 
environment is distinguished by a high level of ambiguity, uncertainty and turbulence 
(Welter & Smallbone, 2011), which influences the entrepreneurial behaviour 
(Smallbone & Welter, 2006). Therefore, an understanding of the context is crucial for 
a full understanding the whole process. The focus on environment has already 
                                                 
3
 The selection is based on political background rather than strict geography. It refers to the post-
Yalta order which created a ‘strong dichotomy by submitting under the label Eastern Europe all parts 
of historic Central, Easter-Central and South Central Europe that after 1945 came under Soviet 
domination.’ Countries referred to as CCE Europe are: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria Berglund, S., Ekman, J., & Aarebrot, F. 
H. (Eds.). 2004. The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe, Second Edition: Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
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proved to be useful in entrepreneurship studies both referring to the advanced 
economies (Kenney & Burg, 1999; OECD 2009; Saxenian, 1996; Van De Ven, 1993) 
as well as the emerging economies (Smallbone & Welter, 2006; Welter & Smallbone, 
2011).  
For the purpose of the following research, two leading theories are used to provide 
the interpretative framework. The ‘Resource Dependence’ theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978) and the ’Institutional’ theory (North, 1990). Both of the theories concentrate on 
the dynamic aspects of the researched phenomena. The resource dependence 
theory highlights the requirements for organizational survival; the Institutional theory 
provides deeper insight on how those requirements are identified, constructed and 
managed. Use of the latter theory allows the research to bring such ‘softer’ 
contextual issues such as culture, the legal environment, tradition and history into 
the analysis to balance and complement the more highly specified resource centred 
analysis (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Han-Lin, 2010).  
Whether or not an organization will survive depends in part on its ability to obtain and 
maintain resources from the external environment. Although the environment is a 
source of constraints, effective managers are able to actively shape relationships 
with it. Managers’ actions are led by their understanding and interpretation of their 
particular environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). From these assumptions, it follows 
that environment is ‘socially constructed’. To better understand how the environment 
is constructed, Institutional theory is applied. According to this approach all entities 
operate in an ‘institutional environment that defines and delimits social reality.’ 
(Scott, 1987:507).  Institutions are defined as constraints that human beings impose 
on human actions (North, 1990). They might be either formal, expressed as legal 
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rules, or informal, articulated though norms and conventions. Organizations are 
perceived as groups of individuals bound by the same common objective (North, 
1990). According to North (1990) the existing organizations as well as their actions 
are influenced by the set of institutions. However institutions, as human driven 
entities, also change over time and space. Thus, the interaction between institutions 
and organizations shapes economic activities. The existing set of institutions 
depends on learning processes of individuals and organizations. The process of 
creating and reshaping institutions is incremental and path dependent (North, 1990).  
Due to the character of PhD research, the scope of investigation had to be narrowed. 
Therefore the transformation process is analysed from a single country perspective, 
and Poland has been chosen as the case. Poland is the largest economy in the 
Central European region, and it has experienced major institutional changes in the 
last twenty years. Additionally, it has been the first country to start the process of 
transformation, and thus served, to some extent, as a blueprint for other countries in 
the region. By leading the wave of changes in the region, as well as experiencing a 
wide scope of changes, both economic and social, the Polish case is believed to 
provide results that are likely to be mature earlier and provide insight sooner than in 
the case of other countries. The study is helped by the fact that the researcher is a 
native Pole and is resident in Poland. However, it is hoped that the lessons learned 
from the Polish example may be seen as having a wider and more generic relevance 
than to one European country in transition both in theory and practice. 
Further the transformation process is going to be observed from the perspective of 
one industry – that of Venture Capital. This industry has been selected as an 
example of organizations that were uniquely originated and developed in advanced 
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economies, thus are aligned with free market institutions. Venture Capital is a 
complex phenomena, which can be seen as a cycle that processes though the fund 
raising of a venture fund, selecting and supervising deals, and finally exiting the deal 
and returning capital to the investors (Gompers & Lerner, 2004). At each of these 
stages strong institutions are required for its effective operations. The research 
concentrates on the emergence and development of the industry, especially on the 
institutional aspects of this process. The principal lines of inquiry of the investigation 
are related to the changes in the institutional environment. Accordingly, economic 
and performance analyses of Venture Capital firms are only presented in outline in 
order to provide context. The experience of Polish Venture Capital industry is going 
to be contrasted with its genesis and evolution in other countries particularly the US 
and UK, which are seen as world leaders in this financial services sector.  
1.2. Aims and objectives of the study   
It was explained in the previous section how the growing importance of emerging 
economies in the global market justifies a close examination of specific cases in 
these economies, to allow existing theory to be tested, re-evaluated, and modified, 
where necessary. The research aims to analyse aspects of the transformation 
process in Central and Eastern Europe arising from the collapse of the regional 
hegemony of the Soviet Union. Transformation is characterised by a wide range of 
economic, political and social changes. The main elements of the transformation 
process include the creation of a private sector, liberalisation of markets, and the 
establishing of market institutions (Smallbone & Welter, 2001), additionally, there is a 
contemporaneous background of deep, and, often dislocating, social changes. The 
social context inherited from the soviet period affects attitudes and behaviours both 
of the entrepreneurs, and the society at large (Smallbone & Welter, 2001). The 
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research focuses on the dynamics of specific changes and their impact on a specific 
set of stakeholders in the transforming economy. The research applies a single 
country case (Poland) and concentrates on one aspect of transformation, that is, the 
emergence of a Venture Capital industry as a key part of the creation of a Private 
Sector. Venture Capital is a highly specialized intermediary that invests in 
technologically innovative firms. By providing both financial and managerial support 
to new companies Venture Capital indirectly plays a role in technological and 
economic development of a country (Timmons & Bygrave, 1986). Venture Capital 
could be seen and described as an indicator of wider economic change.  
The analysis concentrates on the emergence and continuing development of the 
Venture Capital industry in Poland, with a principal focus on changes taking place in 
the institutional environment. By exploring the emergence of a Venture Capital 
industry it is expected that it will be possible to better understand the impact of 
economic transformation on specific stakeholders. The diverse academic literatures 
on the Venture Capital industry concentrate their analyses on issues relating to 
developed economies, with a primary emphasis on the functioning and evolution of 
the US Venture Capital Industry (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Puky, 2009; Bygrave & 
Timmons, 1992; Gompers & Lerner, 2004) and, to a lesser extent, the Western 
European markets, particularly the UK (Bottazzi, Da Rin, & Hellmann, 2004; Bottazzi, 
Rin, Ours, & Berglof, 2002; Gilson, 2003, Murray and Lott, 1995). In these regions, 
the implications and experience of enterprise policy is well understood. However, 
recently the academic focus is starting to shift. Gradually more attention is given to 
emerging economies (David & Garry, 2006; Lingelbach, 2013; Lingelbach, De La 
Vina, & Asel, 2005; Scheela & Van Dinh, 2004), although very significant 
asymmetries still remain in the literature. Within the global trend, currently, academic 
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research is shifting more toward Asian Venture Capital markets, rather than Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE). Treatment of the emergence of venture capital in 
transition economies of CEE is decidedly weak and ‘the industry development 
processes in these markets are not well understood’ (Klonowski, 2005:332).  
The research aims to contribute to academic knowledge in the following ways. 
Firstly, it addresses the literature gap by supplementing the currently limited 
knowledge of the emergence of a contemporary Venture Capital industry in Poland. 
In particular, the role of Poland’s recent membership of the European Union (since 
2004) in stimulating this development is considered and examined. Secondly, and 
more fundamentally, the research contributes to an understanding of the processes 
of the emergence of a Venture Capital industry in economies which undergo 
profound structural and economic transformation.  
At the level of theory it contributes by applying a combination of Resource 
Dependence theory and Institutional theory as the leading frameworks for 
understanding the process of emergence and development of Polish Venture Capital 
industry. Such a combination allows the capture of multilevel perspectives as well as 
including the social and historical context in the research.   
Pioneers in newly established industries face multiple threats, which arise both from 
economic trade-offs as well as from the lack of both cognitive and socio-political 
legitimacy for the new enterprises (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). However, the social context 
may also serve as a source of opportunities for entrepreneurial activities. Due to the 
‘isomorphic’ process described by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) organizations 
operating within the same field became more similar to each other over time. 
Therefore the first successful entrants may serve as a ‘blueprint’ for followers 
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thereby establishing what becomes a widely accepted conduct of behaviour i.e. a 
‘dominant design’. And thus in turn allows opportunities for radical change. 
In the West, especially in the US market, Venture Capital was created by 
practitioners. Looking at the historical perspective, the modern Venture Capital 
industry developed in the 1930s and 1940s in the US from the initiative of wealthy 
Americans. The first professional firm, American Research & Development (ARD) 
was established in the 1946, with the goal of financing the commercialization of 
technologies that were developed during World War II. The aim of the ARD, was to 
add value to the companies they backed by providing industry and management 
expertise along with finance. ARD is believed to have established the standard 
Venture Capital paradigm (Gompers, 1994) which later spread across other 
advanced economies.  
A theoretical understanding of Venture Capital behaviour arose ex post and was of 
interest to academics rather than Venture Capital users. In contrast to the mature 
Western market economies, in the transforming Central and Eastern European 
countries, it is proposed that Venture Capital emergence and development cannot be 
fully described using just the existing dominant agency theory.  
For a more complete understanding of the state of knowledge about the studied 
phenomena we can employ two axes: a conceptual axis and a contextual axis, with 
the latter being the less developed. On the conceptual axis Venture Capital is 
already probably fully described for the Western experience, although further 
development may be needed to accommodate the new conditions arising from the 
geographical and political contexts that the research is addressing. On the 
contextual axis, the economic and social conditions of transitioning economies in 
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central Europe are very different from what was observed in the USA and Western 
Europe. This disparity between theory and practice may create both new threats as 
well as new opportunities for start ups created in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Consideration of the potential dynamics of the processes governing the emergence 
of a Venture Capital industry leads to the following research questions: 
• Given the continuing legacy of their Soviet influenced histories, how 
effectively can Central and Eastern European economies match or exceed the 
development trajectory of established Western countries (particularly the USA 
and UK) in the formation of a successfully operating national Venture Capital 
industry. 
• How able are countries of Central and Eastern Europe to learn from the 
Venture Capital industry experiences of developed Western economies in 
order to accelerate their industry development. 
• How do the existing institutions shape the process of emergence and 
development of the Venture Capital industry in Poland? To what extent do the 
institutions constrain or foster the application of a ‘Western’ model of Venture 
Capital.  
• In light of Central and Eastern Europe’s history, what does the process of 
‘Venture Capital industry emergence’ look like? What are the inhibitors to 
rapid implementation of a new service based sector in this transitioning 
economy context? 
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• Can existing theories on industry emergence, and the structure, conduct and 
performance of financial services, help illuminate the context, practice and 
thus opportunities in the target country (Poland). 
It is believed that better understanding the process of Venture Capital industry 
emergence and development in Poland will provide deeper insight on the impact of 
institutional changes, during a transformation process, on various stakeholders in the 
private sector.  
At the methodological level the research contributes by creating a tailored made 
template, eliciting and grouping the factors influencing the emergence and 
development of a Venture Capital industry. The template leads further data collection 
and analysis.  
At the practical level the research findings may contribute to policy recommendations 
formulated to accelerate effective development in financial services in Poland and 
possibly in other transitional countries, which have comparable political 
backgrounds. This latter emphasis on pragmatic and practitioner value from 
academic research has become a policy focus in the UK and other countries, the 
new theme of evidenced based research is popular with governments because it 
meets the demand for more detailed justification of policies. 
The research is organized in the following order. The second chapter provides a 
literature review on Venture Capital and indicates existing gaps. The third and fourth 
chapters discuss the theoretical framework used for data analysis and the applied 
methodology respectively. The fifth chapter presents and discusses the data 
collected. The report concludes with further discussion on the results of the research 
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and its implications both for other regions and for the wider academic study of 
economies in rapid transition. 
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2. Chapter 2 
2.1. Literature review  
The first chapter introduced Venture Capital industry emergence and development in 
Poland as the central focus of the research. Before discussing the Polish context, the 
second chapter provides a literature review on the Venture Capital industry in the 
western context. The leading perspective is through the US industry lens, as it is the 
best documented industry. The European Venture Capital industry is also included 
and when appropriate contrasted with the US one.  
2.2. What is Venture Capital? 
The complexity of the Venture Capital industry can be seen from the variety of 
different definitions present in the literature. A coherent definition is provided by 
Lerner (2001) and describes Venture Capital as  ‘independently managed, dedicated 
pools of capital that focus on equity or equity-linked investment in privately held, high 
growth companies’ (Lerner, 2009:6-7). Gilson (2003), on the other hand, highlights 
the intermediary role of Venture Capital defining it as ‘providing a unique link 
between finance and innovation, providing start-up and early stage firms (...) with 
capital market access that is tailored to the special task of financing these high-risk, 
high-return activities.’ (Gilson, 2003:1068). Da Rin et. all indicate Venture Capital’s 
role in the creation and of growth of innovative, entrepreneurial companies (Da Rin, 
Nicodano, & Sembenelli, 2006). 
Despite the lack of a legal or regulatory definition (Amit, Brander, & Zott, 1998; 
Brander, Amit, & Antweiler, 2002; Hellmann, 2000) there are three specifying 
features of Venture Capital highlighted in the available definitions. Firstly, Venture 
Capital is professionally managed money. Venture Capitalists invest on behalf of a 
set of investors following a defined protocol. Secondly, the investment has got equity 
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or equity-like character. Thirdly, the targeted companies are at the early stage of 
development, high-technology oriented and with growth potential (Hellmann, 2000). 
It has to be highlighted that Venture Capitalists do not provide finance to commonly 
understood ‘small business’, as Hellmann (2000) indicated, they invest in ‘infant 
giants’.  
Venture Capitalists operate in an environment dominated by uncertainty, information 
asymmetries and agency costs (Gompers & Lerner, 2001).  
Uncertainty, which should not be confused with risk, refers to the ‘measure of the 
distribution of possible outcomes for a company or project. The greater the 
uncertainty, the wider distribution of potential outcomes’ (Gompers & Lerner, 
2001:23). Venture Capitalists face multiple sources of uncertainty, such as towards 
their own development possibilities, the market, or the industry in which their portfolio 
companies operate.  
The information asymmetries represents the difference in knowledge that 
stockholders have about the company’s internal workings and prospects, market 
trends and other information important for investment decisions (Gompers & Lerner, 
2001). Venture Capital is particularly exposed to the problem of information 
asymmetries when investing in a portfolio company which is involved in cutting-edge 
technology (Gilson, 2003). Presence of information asymmetries encourages 
opportunistic behaviours and thus generates agency costs.  
What distinguishes Venture Capital from other means of financing for young firms is 
its structure, which by combining the financial ‘hard’ skills with non-financial ‘soft’ 
skills allows effective management of the environmental features outlined above.  
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A simplified overview of the Venture Capital process is presented in Figure 1, and 
followed by detailed explanation.  
 
Figure 1: An overview of the Venture Capital process 
 
 
Source: adapted from (Gompers & Lerner, 2004) p. 9 
 
The Venture Capital process can be portrayed as a cycle. The process begins with 
raising funds, is followed by an investing phase, monitoring and adding value to 
firms. It continues with the Venture Capitalists’ exit from successful deals and return 
of capital to their investors. The process renews itself with the Venture Capitalists 
raising additional funds (Gompers & Lerner, 2004).  
Following the US model, within the first stage (raising funds), institutional investors, 
such as pension funds, insurance companies, endowments and foundations, invest 
into a ‘Venture Capital Partnership’, often referred as ‘Venture Capital funds’. The 
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investors are passive limited partners (LP) and provide the vast majority of capital. 
The general partner (GP) is typically a company itself, consisting of investment 
professionals. The general partner contributes to the fund by providing expertise, 
thus its capital contribution is minimal4, however, it receives almost complete control 
of the fund. The general partners, as already pointed out, are professional firms. 
Those firms aim to operate on the Venture Capital market by continuously raising 
new funds (Gilson, 2003). The general partner receives an annual management fee 
for provided services and carried - interest (a specific percent of profits realized by 
the partnership) (Gilson, 2003).  
At the later stage (the investing phase) the Venture Capital partnership enters into 
contracts with entrepreneurial ventures (Sahlman, 1990). However, before the 
particular portfolio company is chosen the Venture Capitalist employs a thorough 
screening and due diligence process (Gompers & Lerner, 2001). When the best 
deals are selected the Venture Capital fund enters the investment stage.  Venture 
Capital funds’ engagement typically takes the form of convertible preferred stock. A 
common practice is so called ‘staged financing’. The supply of assigned funds is 
divided into tranches and released in stages based on receipt of new information 
about the project and the achievements of certain project milestones (Gompers & 
Lerner, 2001).  
The staged financing is one of the monitoring methods applied by Venture 
Capitalists. Other forms of ‘active’ control take form of regular evaluation of financial 
reports, sitting at the board of directors, and shaping and recruiting the senior 
management. Venture Capitalists also sometimes participate in developing the 
                                                 
4
 According to (Gilson 2003) the general partner contribution to the Venture Capital funds is one 
percent of the total capital  
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business plan, assisting with acquisitions, facilitating strategic relationships with 
other companies or designing the compensation system for employees (Kaplan & 
Strömberg, 2001). The intensity of monitoring is related to the expected agency 
costs. The higher the expected agency costs, the more intense monitoring applied. 
Such features as intangible assets, the higher market to book ratio and R&D 
intensity are expected to increase the agency costs (Gompers, 1995).  
Another mechanism applied by Venture Capitalists to avoid opportunistic behaviours 
on behalf of all partners is a complex compensation system. For example the 
management teams salaries are tightly connected with the performance of the 
portfolio company by decreasing the level of fixed salary in favour to increasing the 
level of stock and option grants as a proportion of the compensation. Similarly 
entrepreneurs’ compensation aims to encourage them to optimize performance. The 
stock or options received by entrepreneurs may be accompanied by a vesting 
schedule of three to four years, which discourages them from leaving the company 
for new opportunities. Additionally, contracts may contain regulations which keep the 
entrepreneur from performing stock splits, issuing special dividends, or selling equity 
to other parties at a lower price that the Venture Capitalist paid (Gompers & Lerner, 
2001).  
The exit phase is critical for ensuring returns for investors and raising additional 
capital (Gompers & Lerner, 2004). A typical limited partnership agreement 
terminates after 7-10 years. By this time the deals with portfolio companies have to 
be liquidated. The exit by the Venture Capitalist from a particular portfolio investment 
provides an important benchmark for the capital providers. It represents both the 
managerial skills of Venture Capitalist and the profitability of Venture Capital 
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compared to other investments (Black & Gilson, 1998). Although, the Venture 
Capitalist has got several options to exit a deal, such as an Initial Public Offering 
(IPO), acquisition, secondary sale, buy-back or write-off; the IPO and acquisitions 
provide the most desirable options (United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe, 2007). Thus the presence of developed stock markets is perceived as one 
of the crucial factors for an active Venture Capital industry (Black & Gilson, 1998; Da 
Rin et al., 2006; Gompers & Lerner, 2004).  
A successful end of one Venture Capital cycle will start a new cycle. Although, the 
careful design and set of techniques applied are believed to make Venture Capital 
particularly well suited to nurturing young companies operating in cutting-edge 
industries, they simultaneously slow down the industry’s abilities to adjust to market 
changes in the supply of capital or demand for financing. The long adjustment 
periods required within the Venture Capital industry generate a challenge for policy 
makers. The introduced regulatory and policy shifts may take years to be reflected in 
the changes in the industry (Gompers & Lerner, 2004).  
 
2.3. Overview of Venture Capital industry in the US and Europe 
The US Venture Capital industry 
The foundation for the modern Venture Capital industry was established in the 
United States in the 1920s and 1930s. The prototype was established by wealthy 
families and individuals, who invested into start-ups, some of these became famous 
later, such as Eastern Airlines, and Xerox (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992; Gompers & 
Lerner, 2001). In 1946 the MIT president together with a Harvard Business School 
Professor and local business leaders established American Research and 
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Development (ARD) with an aim to commercialize the technology developed during 
the Second World War. It was the first firm, in contrast to previously individual 
personal initiatives, providing funds for new and rapidly growing firms. ARD had the 
legal structure of a publicly traded closed-end fund. Although this structure had 
drawbacks it was determined by the preferences of institutional investors who were 
reluctant to invest into a different type of company. ARD can be perceived as the first 
professional Venture Capital firm and a blueprint for later industry development 
because it demonstrated the classical Venture Capital attitude. It used only equity for 
financing, invested for the longer term, and was prepared for accepting losers and 
negative cash flows in the short term (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). 
In 1958 a structure of Venture Capital Limited Partnership (LP) was introduced. The 
first Venture Capital Fund which applied this legal form was Draper, Gaither & 
Anderson. Such a structure allowed the fund to avoid security regulations and 
disclosure requirements. Later some funds have followed this legal construction, 
however, the Venture Capital Limited Partnership did not become popular until the 
1970s (Gompers & Lerner, 2001).  
A significant milestone in industry development is related to the creation of Small 
Business Investment Companies (SBIC) by the Small Business Administration (SBA) 
in 1958 in the US. It was a government program aimed at creating government- 
licensed and regulated pools of Venture Capital funds for early stage ventures. 
Although the funds were public, the investment decisions were left in private hands 
(Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). Throughout the 1960s SBICs raised significant money 
and boosted industry growth. Within the first five years of the program 692 SBICs 
licences were granted providing $ 464 million under Venture Capital management. 
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Between 158 and 1969 it supported small firms with over $3 billion (United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe, 2007). Although, there are no doubts that this 
project had a positive overall influence on industry development the ease of 
accessing government money resulted in increased number of new inexperienced 
entrants who underestimated the challenge of nurturing young, high-tech companies. 
This resulted in poor performance. By the end of the 1977 the number of SBICs fell 
to 276. In 1994 the program went through a deep-seated redesign which allowed 
earlier problems to be overcome and resulted in renewed growth (United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe, 2007).   
In the 1960s the yearly flow of money into Venture Capital was limited to a few 
hundred million dollars or less (Gompers & Lerner, 2004). The significant increase in 
funds raised took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The introduction of 
amendment to the ‘prudent man’ rule in the 1978 was indicated as the major 
contribution to such shift in the trend. Previously pension funds were not allowed to 
invest in high-risk asset classes. The introduced clarification indicated that small 
fractions of a pension fund portfolio might be invested into Venture Capital. Under 
the new rule pension funds’ commitment to Venture Capital has grown from 15 
percent in 1978 to more than half of all contributions eight years later (Gompers & 
Lerner, 2004).  
During the 1980s a series of other legal changes influencing the Venture Capital 
industry were introduced. The Small Business Investment Incentive Act redefined the 
Venture Capital firms as business development companies. As result Venture 
Capital firms did not have to register with Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), additionally, some of the reporting requirements were taken away. The ‘Safe 
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Harbour’ regulation indicated that Venture Capital funds managers would not be 
considered fiduciaries of pension funds assets invested in the pools they managed. 
Both of those regulations allowed Venture Capitalists more flexibility. The later 
Economic Recovery Tax Act lowered capital gain tax rate paid by individuals, which 
resulted in increased inflow of money into the industry (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992).  
Simultaneously, the role of financial advisors increased. The financial advisors, also 
called ‘gate keepers’, initially created by large institutions such as banks, pooled 
resources from clients, monitored progress of existing funds and evaluated potential 
new funds and advised about venture investments. In the 1970s -1980s almost all 
pension funds invested directly into Venture Capital, whereas in the 1990s almost 
one third of pension funds invested though advisors.  
The changes introduced in 1980s resulted in growth of Venture Capital industry as 
well as in changes in its structure. The number and size of firms increased, and 
specialization in investment stage, industry and region became visible. Venture 
Capitalists also changed the investment strategy turning toward later stage and 
larger ventures (Landström, 2009).  
As it could be seen in the figure below, between the 1980s and 1990s the industry 
experienced ups and downs. The peak of activity both in the amount of raised funds 
and invested funds was recorded in 2000.  
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Figure 2: Capital commitments to Venture Capital in the US  
 
 
Source: Adapted from NVCA 
Figure 3: Venture Capital investment in the US 
 
 
Source: Adapted from NVCA 
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Due to the dot.com crash the industry declined and did not again achieve the 
numbers of the peak period. Considering the data provided by the National Venture 
Capital Association, it can be noted that the current state of the industry is reaching 
about half of the peak era. The number of existing firms in 2012 was estimated at 
841 compared to 1089 in the year 2002. The number of existing funds was reported 
at the level of 1269 in 2012 compared to 2119 in the year 2000. The industry is now 
dominated by a few large players which can be illustrated by the fact that the ten 
largest funds represented 48 percent of all the funds raised in the researched year 
2012. The remaining share of funds was raised by 173 funds. Venture Capital firms 
now prefer later stages of financing; seed capital attracts only 3% of investments 
(compared to early stage – 30%; later stage – 32% and expansion – 35%). Software 
and biotechnology stay the most popular industries, and California is the most 
popular region. There were 49 exits reported via IPO (compared to 280 IPOs in 
1999). However, the valuation of $122.3 Billion gives the best result since 1986 
(National Venture Capital Association, 2013). 
 
The European Venture Capital industry   
European history of modern type Venture Capital activities is much shorter 
compared to the US. Until the 1980s no economy except the US had an established 
industry (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). Nevertheless, there were some emerging 
initiatives undertaken by individual companies which invested capital into unquoted 
firms such as 3i in the United Kingdom, Investco in Belgium or SVETAB in Sweden 
(Landström, 2009).   
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The rapid development of the European industry happened during one decade. In 
1988 more capital was committed to Venture Capital pools in the UK and Europe 
than in the US. By the 1990 over half of the all Venture Capital under management 
worldwide was outside the US (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). The rapid growth of the 
industry was linked to the introduction of secondary markets in many of the 
European countries, which allowed the Venture Capital funds to liquidate their 
investments though IPOs (Landström, 2009). The industry turned toward merchant 
capital, with a preponderance of investments into LBOs, acquisitions and expansion 
phases. The share PE in the years 1986-1989 reached the level of 84% of all capital 
whereas in the US it was at the level of 66% (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992).  
Although there are some general features referring to the European Venture Capital 
industry it has to be highlighted that there are significant differences among 
countries. Those differences are even deeper and more visible while comparing the 
developed economies with the developing economies across Europe.  
The following chart illustrates the amount of Venture Capital funds raised between 
1998 and 2011. In 2011 the total fund raising, which includes both Venture Capital 
and Private Equity, accounted for 39.7 K Euro. The share of Venture Capital in the 
total funds varies across the period. At the peak period in 1999 over 47% of all funds 
were allocated in Venture Capital. This share has significantly decreased 7% in 
2008.   
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Figure 4: Venture Capital commitments 
 
source: EVCA 
 
As already indicated the European Venture Capital industry is not homogeneous. 
While considering the amount of funds raised, as well as investment calculated as 
percentage of GDP, the performance of the UK industry dominates the rest of 
Europe. The UK, followed by Sweden, France and Germany, create the core of 
European industry.  
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Figure 5: Total Venture Capital/Private Equity raised  
source: EVCA  
Figure 6: Venture Capital investment as share of GDP 
 source: EVCA 
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Considering the structure of investors: banks along with pension funds constitute the 
major source of funds for the European Venture Capital and Private Equity 
industries. Compared to the US industry the share of public finance is significant.  
Figure 7: Investors in Venture Capital industry  
 source: EVCA 
In contrast to the US, where the Limited Partnership became the dominant legal form 
for Venture Capital, European funds use a variety of structures. Besides Limited 
Partnerships these can be public-type mutual funds, join-stock companies, or 
investment funds. Most of the legal obstacles to fund raising at the European Union 
level were reduced by 2003 through a set of EU directives. As result pension funds 
and insurance companies became more open to allocating their capital to Venture 
Capital. However, differences at the level of individual member nations remain 
(United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2007).  
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The overall investment pattern in Europe mirrors the US trend, however the amount 
of investment remains smaller. However, considering the number of deals, Europe 
exceeds the US, on average the single amount invested per deal is higher in the US 
than in Europe.  
Figure 8: Comparison between the US and European Venture Capital  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This picture has been removed by the Author of the dissertation for the 
copyright reasons. 
 
 
 
 
Venture Capitalists continue to prefer investments into companies working in life 
sciences, computer and consumer electronics and communication. Due to less 
liquidity than US secondary markets the European Venture Capitalist choose 
disinvestment by trade sale as the most common exit strategy. This, however results 
in lower returns on investment compared to the US funds (Landström, 2009).  
Moreover, Hege, Palomino, and Schwienbacher (2008) suggested that the lower 
return on investment recorded by the European funds are due to contracting patterns 
and frequency of syndication. Also, to the general lower level of sophistication and 
expertise performed by European Venture Capitalist. This difference between 
Europe and the US is also influenced by the higher specialisation of US Venture 
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Capital industry as well as bigger share of corporate investors in US investments. 
Similar conclusions were drawn by Bottazzi et al (2002) who indicated the dearth of 
human rather than financial resource as the main problem of the European Venture 
Capital industry.  
Governments’ attempts to shape the industry are materialized though the policies 
they introduce. The US approach and the European approach are different here. The 
US government approach to Venture Capital industry could be described as enabling 
the industry to grow rather than promoting it though direct intervention (Hellmann, 
2000). The case of Europe is more complicated. Firstly, while considering European 
policy, it refers only to European Union members. Secondly, within the European 
Union there are significant differences between individual members. Thus the 
introduced polices have to be tailored to the specific conditions. Public policy has 
played an important role in the development of European Venture Capital. The EU 
level policies aim at improving the environment for early-stage financing. Venture 
Capital initiatives are implemented mainly though the European Investment Fund 
(EIF). Despite the significant scale of activities performed by European Union 
institutions their involvement in the Venture Capital is indirect and the final effects 
depend on the individual national markets.  
The considerable differences in the Venture Capital industry construction and 
performance between the US and Europe lead to questions about the opportunities 
to influence and direct the development of the Venture Capital industry.  
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2.4. Can Venture Capital be engineered?  
The acknowledged role of the Venture Capital industry in promoting innovation and 
growth in the US economy encouraged other governments to emulate the success of 
Silicon Valley or Route 128. Creation of a ‘vibrant Venture Capital industry’ became 
a priority in economic policy worldwide (Da Rin et al., 2006). Alongside the national 
governments’ efforts to craft a vigorous and self sustainable state Venture Capital 
industry a question ‘how to engineer, if possible, the Venture Capital industry?’ 
arose.  
The next section presents two aspects of engineering the Venture Capital industry. 
Firstly, it introduces the ‘simultaneity problem’ addressed by Gilson (2003). 
Secondly, presents literature discussing factors influencing the emergence and 
development of Venture Capital industry.   
2.4.1. Simultaneity problem 
A Venture Capital industry requires three components to exist simultaneously in 
order to function. These are:  
 Entrepreneurs; 
 Investors with funds, who are willing to invest in high-risk, high- return 
ventures; 
 Specialized financial intermediaries to serve as the nexus of a set of 
sophisticated contracts (Gilson, 2003).  
According to Gilson (2003) the problem is that ‘each of these three elements will 
emerge if the other two are present, but none will emerge in isolation of the others’. 
(Gilson, 2003:1069). Therefore, in the case when the market forces are not strong 
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enough to solve the simultaneity problem, when a country is seeking to develop its 
national Venture Capital industry, government intervention is required. He stresses 
that the government programs should be focused on providing seed capital and 
helping to create the necessary financial intermediaries, but not substitute for them. 
The major reason for earlier failure of government programs was attributed to the 
governments’ efforts to serve as both capital providers and financial intermediaries. 
According to Gilson (2003) public Venture Capital is not able to substitute for private 
provision.  
The model proposed by Gilson (2003), although it provides a useful guideline, has 
two main drawbacks for being utilized in other than advanced economies. Firstly, it is 
based on the assumption that the capital market is already well developed and 
functioning. This also indicates the need for a range of institutions and an 
organization supporting the entrepreneurial ecosystem before the actual engineering 
process starts. Secondly, it assumes that entrepreneurs are solely a function of the 
availability of funds and specialized intermediaries. It does not discuss in depth the 
need for entrepreneurial culture as a precondition for Venture Capital industry.  
 
2.4.2. Demand and supply side of Venture Capital 
An alternative perspective for analysing factors influencing emergence and 
development of a Venture Capital industry might be through the ‘supply’ and 
‘demand’ lenses. The supply of Venture Capital is determined by the willingness of 
investors to provide funds to Venture Capital firms and it depends on the expected 
rate of return on investments. Demand is shaped by the quantity of entrepreneurs 
seeking Venture Capital financing that can supply a particular expected rate of return 
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(Gompers & Lerner, 1999). This approach allows capturing a broader perspective of 
components influencing the state of the Venture Capital industry in a particular 
economy. The same is believed to provide a better benchmark for analysing 
emergence and development of the Venture Capital industry in developing 
economies. The following section presents both empirical and theoretical literature 
on a wide range of factors influencing the supply and demand of Venture Capital. 
The performance of Venture Capital funds influences their ability to raise new funds 
(Gompers & Lerner, 1999) therefore determinants of Venture Capital fund 
performance are also presented. The factors discussed in the literature are grouped 
into six categories:  
 
 Regulatory framework; 
 Market conditions; 
 Other organizations; 
 Entrepreneurs; 
 Venture Capital Fund characteristics;  
 Culture  
Those categories are later used as a component of a purpose built template used to 
analyse the Polish Venture Capital industry emergence and development. More 
information on the template construction is provided in the methodology chapter.  
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Regulatory framework 
The legal system operating in a particular country establishes the fundamental 
platform for coexistence and cooperation between organizations and individuals. La 
Porta et al. (2008) points out that the existing legal rules, as well as financial 
institutions present in a country, are significantly influenced by the origins of the 
laws. Although there are no two countries with an identical legal framework, there 
are sufficient similarities in certain areas to allow the identification of separate ‘legal 
families’ or ‘legal traditions’ (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). 
The two broad categories of national systems are the ‘Civil Law’ and the ‘Common 
Law’. ‘Civil Law’ is based on Roman traditions. The existing regulations are 
organised in form of codes and statutes. In contrast the ‘Common Law’ is formulated 
on the base of precedence. Each independent decision undertaken by a judge in 
individual case creates a precedent, serving as an empirical benchmark for further 
similar cases (LaPorta et al., 1998). Because the original source of both categories 
of law may be seen as a ‘style of social control of economic life’ (LaPorta et al., 
2008) some general features, characterising each category can be identified. A 
‘Common Law’ tradition compared to a ‘Civil Law’ approach is perceived as being 
more protective of outside investors. It represents a lower level of formalism in 
judicial procedures and judicial independence (LaPorta et al., 2008). Furthermore, 
the evidence exists that independence of judges and simplified juridical procedures 
are associated with better contract enforcement and stronger protection of property 
rights (LaPorta et al., 2008). The prevailing legal system can influence a 
government’s response to new situations. As a generalisation, ‘Civil Law’ countries 
are more in favour of direct state control, whereas those where there is a ‘Common 
Law’ basis focus on litigation, and market supporting regulations (LaPorta et al., 
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2008). The operating legal system, while influencing the existing legal regulations, 
has impact on the socio-economic environment of organizations. These relationships 
are shown in the table below:  
Table 1: Legal origins and its outcomes  
 
Institution Outcome 
L
e
g
a
l 
o
ri
g
in
 
Procedural formalism 
Time to collect a bounced check  
Time to evict non-paying tenant 
Judicial independence Property rights 
Regulation of entry 
Corruption 
Unofficial economy 
Labour Laws  
Participation rates 
Unemployment 
Company law 
Securities law 
Stock market development 
Firm Valuation 
Ownership structure 
Control premium 
Bankruptcy law  Private credit 
Government ownership of banks Interest rate spread  
Government ownership of media  
source: adapted from (LaPorta et al., 2008:292) 
From the Venture Capital perspective, the existing legal framework can influence 
strongly the shape and pace of Venture Capital industry development (Gompers, 
Lerner, Blair, & Hellmann, 1998; Jeng & Wells, 2000). Armour and Cumming (2006) 
indicated that the legal and institutional variables can have a more robust and 
stronger effect on a venture capital industry than economic ones.  
Venture Capital operates in a complex and subtle network of cooperation with a 
diverse range of agents, usually during the investment process working to very fast 
and flexible schedules. The means and aims of the cooperation are often dominated 
by sophisticated and emerging technologies that generate legal novelties concerning 
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transfer, or sharing, of ownership and control rights. Above all, these risk capital 
providers operate in environments of very high risk and uncertainty as to the 
commercial success of the enterprises supported. These features mean that much 
more of the general law is relevant to the industry than just routine contract law.  
The literature provides rich empirical evidence for the importance of the legal system 
for the development and operations of Venture Capital industry. Among features 
most commonly cited in the literature are property rights, corporate governance 
standards, ‘capital gains tax’ and other forms of taxation, accounting standards, 
bankruptcy law and labour market regulations. The following section presents only 
selected examples believed to portray the situation in the best way.  
Analysing the broad picture Hazarika et at (2009) suggested that countries with 
better legal rights and protection positively influence venture capital success. 
Presence of better law facilitates faster deal screening and deal organization 
(Cumming, Schmidt, & Walz, 2010).  
It has been recorded that Venture Capitalists employ different strategies for 
formulating contracts depending on the country’s level of contract enforcement. In 
nations with effective legal enforcement, Venture Capitalists use sophisticated 
governance mechanisms, employing e.g. preferred stocks. Whereas in countries 
with low enforcement they have tendency to sign contracts which allow them to gain 
majority ownership and direct control on the board. Such a policy is employed in 
order to overcome the contractual protection issues. However, relying on ownership 
rather than contractual protection provides a lower valuation and return on 
investment (Lerner & Schoar, 2005). Furthermore, Cumming et al (2010) pointed out 
that legal origins and accounting standards influence the governance structure of 
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venture capital investments. High accounting standards, by impacting the reporting 
behaviours of managers, lead to more accurate valuation of investments (Cumming 
& Walz, 2010).  
From the entrepreneurs perspective strong protection of intellectual property rights 
reassures them that the venture capitalist will not snatch their idea and encourages 
them to seek this form of financing (Ueda, 2004).  
Analysing country specific features that makes them attractive to Venture 
Capital/Private Equity investments the ‘Investor protection and Corporate 
Governance’ along with developed capital markets are perceived as having the 
greatest influence (Groh, von Liechtenstein, & Lieser, 2010).  
The tax regulations affect a Venture Capital industry both on the demand and the 
supply side. Gentry and Hubbard (2000) indicated that tax policy influences the 
entrepreneurial behaviour in particular entry decisions. They found out that 
progressive marginal tax discourages entry into entrepreneurship.  
Gompers et al. (1998) highlight the significant influence of tax rates on the activism 
of the US Venture Capital industry. Decreases in capital gain tax rates are 
associated with greater Venture Capital commitments. A similar situation is observed 
in Europe where reduction of corporate tax influenced positively the share of high – 
tech and early stage investments (Da Rin, Nicodano, & Sembenelli, 2006).  
Armour and Cumming (2006) analysed factors influencing the demand and supply 
for venture capital financing. They concluded that a liberal bankruptcy law stimulates 
entrepreneurial demand for venture capital finance.   
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Based on the European experience, reduction in labour regulation resulted in higher 
share of high – tech investments (Da Rin et al., 2006). Jeng and Wells (2000) 
indicated that labour market inflexibility has a negative influence on early stage 
venture capital investing.  
 
Market conditions 
One of the dimensions of the environment in which Venture Capital firms operate is 
the macro-economy. Venture Capital has a cyclical nature and responds to the 
changing conditions of the public markets (Lerner, 2002). 
The literature indicates well developed financial markets (Gilson & Black, 1999; Jeng 
& Wells, 2000), growth in gross domestic product (GDP) and technological 
opportunities (Gompers et al., 1998; Romain & van Pottelsberghe, 2004) as the 
proxies for Venture Capital activity.  
Gilson and Black (Gilson & Black, 1999) highlighted the crucial role of financial 
markets in exit strategies for Venture Capital funds. The opportunity to liquidate the 
Venture Capital fund’s investment though initial public offering (IPO) offers 
advantages for all stakeholders involved in the investment process. From the 
investors’ perspective it allows evaluation of the managerial skills of venture 
capitalists, thus allowing decisions on which managers to cooperate with in future. It 
provides assessment of the risk to return of investment ratio, which creates a basis 
for deciding whether to continue of or withdraw investments into Venture Capital 
funds. Additionally it offers a benchmark for appraising the performance of the 
industry. The Venture Capital fund builds up its reputation, as well as being able to 
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maintain some control over the portfolio company after going public. The portfolio 
company gains credibility with third parties. Presence of well developed stock 
markets increases the efficiency of contracts between investors and Venture Capital 
funds and between Venture Capital fund and portfolio companies (Gilson & Black, 
1999).  
Growth in gross domestic product (GDP) is perceived as another factor influencing 
the Venture Capital industry. Along with the growth in GDP new opportunities arise 
for entrepreneurs, thus the demand for Venture Capital financing is increased 
(Gompers et al., 1998). Although the positive effect of GDP rates on Venture Capital 
flows is reduced by the degree of labour market rigidity (Romain & van 
Pottelsberghe, 2004).  
Venture Capital activity is also influenced by the existing technology opportunities, 
such as the growth rate of research and development (R&D) investment, the 
available stock of knowledge and the number of high value patents (Romain & van 
Pottelsberghe, 2004).  Gompers and Lerner (Gompers et al., 1998) indicates the 
positive relation between industrial firms’ R&D spending and Venture Capital 
investments. Government’s investments in R&D along with defence spending in 
general are perceived to be important factor of enabling conditions for Venture 
Capital industry development both in the US and Israel (Avnimelech, Kenney, & 
Teubal, 2004).  
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Other institutions 
Besides the close relationships between the investor - venture capital fund – 
entrepreneur, there are a range of other organizations that they are each either 
directly or indirectly connected with. One of the most significant players is the 
government: which sets the major framework for Venture Capital operation by 
establishing a legal framework, formulating policies and creating tailor made 
programs dedicated to a Venture Capital industry. Its actions might both facilitate 
and constrain the industry (Gilson, 2003; Jeng & Wells, 2000). As Lerner (2009) 
highlighted, governments’ efforts, in order to be successful, should focus on boosting 
the demand for Venture Capital financing in the first instance. These efforts should 
be accompanied by providing a favourable environment for both entrepreneurs and 
Venture Capitalists. Only at the very last stage of the process should governments 
shift the focus to increasing the supply of capital by directing for this to happen. 
Other organizations that play significant roles are the incubators and science parks 
as providers of corporate spin offs, university spin offs (Harding, 2002), as well as 
corporate laboratories as a source of R&D. The unique blend of leading–edge 
scientific and technological innovation provided by world class universities and 
corporate research laboratories with energetic and agile Venture Capital funds is 
believed to be the source of the US dominant position in the Venture Capital industry 
(Dimov & Murray, 2008). The research of Ortin – Angel and Venfrell-Herrero (2010) 
provides further empirical proof. The authors found out that young university spin-
offs are more likely to obtain Venture Capital financing than other technological start-
ups.  
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Business angels as a separate group play a significant role as a source of bridge 
finances for companies which are still too young to seek formal venture capital 
(Harding, 2002; Harrison & Mason, 2000).  
Additionally professional associations that promote industry good practices and build 
networking are important, especially in situations where the institutional environment 
is weak (Smallbone & Welter, 2001).  
Evaluating Silicon Valley, Hellmann (2000) indicated the cooperation between 
Venture Capital funds and certain professionals. These were investment banks, law 
firms, accounting firms and consulting firms. Each of those organizations is highly 
specialized in providing services for young companies. Investment banks, either set 
up  their own Venture Capital funds or provide money in the later stages of 
investments. Cooperation with law and accounting firms allows Venture Capital 
funds to significantly reduce the time needed for closing the deal. Whereas 
consulting firms along with head-hunters help to select the most suitable staff.  
 
Entrepreneurs  
The entrepreneurs seeking Venture Capital finance for their projects generate the 
demand for the industry (Lerner, 2002). Thus, their presence is crucial for the 
industry. Becker and Hellmann (2003) indicated a dearth of high quality 
entrepreneurs as one of the factors responsible for the failure of the German attempt 
to create agile venture capital. Also Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2001) suggested 
management mistakes as the root of business failure, at the same time indicating the 
need for governments’ support of entrepreneurial training.  
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Venture Capital funds characteristics  
Venture Capital represents a distinctive form of financing for young companies 
compared to traditional forms of bank financing or market finance from the stock or 
bond market (Hellmann, 2000). Although, in case of Venture Capital, the provided 
capital is necessary, it is not sufficient for growth and success of the portfolio 
company (Sapienza, 1992). A set of individual fund characteristics influences the 
way it operates and performs (Dimov & Murray, 2008; Walske & Zacharakis, 2009). 
Gompers (1996) argued that young Venture Capital firms take their portfolio 
companies public earlier compared to older Venture Capital firms. The motivation 
behind such behaviour was the need to establish a reputation to allow the raising of 
further funds. However, this tended to result in under-pricing and a lower level of 
development of those companies at their IPO. In addition to reputation, the age and 
size of a fund affect the ability of the fund to raise new capital (Gompers et al., 1998).  
Following Dimov and Murray (2008) research, the fund size influences the 
investment patterns. With increase of available capital the likelihood, number and 
proportion of seed and other early-stage investment decreases.  
Venture capitalists’ expertise is often based on tacit knowledge, which is gained 
though practice, therefore the funders’ experience influences the fund’s performance 
(Walske & Zacharakis, 2009). Walske and Zacharakis (2009) indicated prior venture 
capital experience and senior management experience as two leading elements. 
Longer presence on the market easies acquisition of further funds due to established 
networks, proved quality, better opportunities to syndicate, and secure underwriters 
to take their portfolio companies public. The Venture Capital fund benefits from 
senior management experience in three ways. Firstly, senior managers are usually 
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the standards to which entrepreneurs aspire. Secondly, experienced managers have 
acquired the operational skills for monitoring investments. Thirdly, the extensive 
network in the industry they worked in previously helps them to recruit high quality 
personnel (Walske & Zacharakis, 2009). The earlier recorded success in nurturing 
portfolio companies builds social recognitions thus gives visibility to the best venture 
capitalists, although the reputation is usually more attached to the individual than to 
the particular fund (Hellmann, 2000).  
The expectation of a required rate of return differs between funds depending on the 
stage of investment as well as whether they are privately or publicly funded. Early 
stage specialists require higher returns compared to those investing in later stages. 
Independent Venture Capital usually expects higher returns compared to captive or 
public ones (Manigart et al., 2002).   
The investment style, whether is passive or active, depends on investor types 
(Bottazzi, Da Rin, & Hellmann, 2008). The prior business experience of investors 
usually leads to more active style of investing. The human factor is perceived as 
crucial to recognizing opportunities, as well as for financial intermediation (Bottazzi et 
al., 2008). 
Clustering of Venture Capital firms in certain geographical areas, which provide 
unique business infrastructure, provides additional development opportunities, where 
such complexes as Silicon Valley or Route 128 could serve as examples. The 
regional advantage in such cases arises from the contiguous process of innovation 
and collective learning (Saxenian, 1996).   
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Culture  
Referring to North (1990), norms and conventions create the informal incentives in 
the economy. The influence of culture on individual and firms actions is subtle but 
substantial. Entrepreneurial behaviour is neither mechanistic nor homogeneous 
(Welter & Smallbone, 2011) therefore culture, as a source of informal institutions, 
and the role of trust, as a factor shaping behaviour, are given priority in the analysis. 
According to the research, Venture Capital operates better in countries where 
entrepreneurs are given high status (Bruton, Fried, & Manigart, 2005). The corollary 
to this is that lack of entrepreneurial traditions and a weak work ethos is often 
perceived as major obstacle for Venture Capital performance (Klonowski, 2006).  
Trust defined as ‘“the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that 
another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action.” (Bottazzi, DaRin, & 
Hellmann, 2011:5) has significant effect on Venture Capital investment decisions at 
both the individual and organizational level (Bottazzi et al., 2011).  
 
2.5. Gaps in the literature 
Venture Capital as a research field is relatively young. Modern Venture Capital 
emerged in the 1940s, however, due to its fairly small size and geographical 
concentration was not in the main scope of scholars’ interests (Landström, 2009). 
Only after the rapid growth of the industry and its internationalization in the 1980s 
Venture Capital did become a popular subject of research. Due to the character of 
the phenomena the research first concentrated on the US and advanced European 
economies. As demonstrated above, the Venture Capital process in the US and 
advanced economies are now well understood and documented both in managerial 
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and economic literature. There is a growing body of literature discussing emergence 
of Venture Capital in developing economies. However, so far, it concentrates mainly 
on large economies such as China or India (Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Yeh, 2007; Bruton & 
Ahlstrom, 2003; Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Puky, 2009; Lockett, Wright, Sapienza, & Pruthi, 
2002), although some initial work is dedicated to the African markets (Lingelbach, 
2009; Lingelbach, Murray, & Gilbert, 2009).  
Against this context the post-soviet Central and Eastern European countries are 
neglected. Indeed, individually these are small size markets, the available data are 
incomplete and of questionable quality. These factors contribute to the difficulty in 
researching those economies. Nevertheless, given the significant proportion of new 
entrants into the European Union structures which originate from the post-soviet 
countries, their influence on the EU Venture Capital industry as whole, becomes 
noticeable.  
Although, the literature provides a range of researched factors influencing the 
Venture Capital vitality in a given economy there is still a lot of unknown about the 
reasons for such differences between industries operating in quite similar 
environments.  
Currently, the literature provides a body of research referring to a systematic 
analysis of the emergence and development process of individual industries 
representing a holistic approach to the phenomenon. However this again applies 
mainly in advanced economies. For example works of Saxenian (1996) referring to 
Silicon Valley and Route 128 or Avnimelech’s and co-authors (Avnimelech & Teubal, 
2006; Avnimelech & Schwartz, 2009) series of analyses on the Israeli economy 
provide understanding of local industries in a broad economic and cultural context. 
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Central and Eastern European Countries are still lacking such a deep and thorough 
analysis of their markets. The conducted research supplements this gap by adding 
an analysis of the emergence and development of the Polish industry. By applying 
the existing understanding of Venture Capital processes to an economy undergoing 
structural transformation, the author believes to provide the basis for further 
development of a more complete theoretical framework for the industry operating 
under such conditions.  
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3. Chapter 3 
 
3.1. Theoretical Framework  
Venture Capital studies is a relatively young discipline. The pioneers in the field 
emerged from among management scholars who were interested in external sources 
of financing young-technological firms. Naturally their focus was primarily the 
entrepreneurs’ perspective. Another group of researchers analysing Venture Capital 
centred their interests on the Venture Capital process from investment to exit, 
spotlighting the investors’ perspective. In the 1980s scholars from the field of finance 
and economics concentrated on the macro-level analysis of the Venture Capital 
market. They mapped flow of Venture Capital, its role in developing industries, as 
well as examining regional aspects. The early works were highly descriptive, mainly 
due to a dearth of reliable data. Pioneers relied mainly on management theories and 
the rational economic model, where agency theory served as a dominant theoretical 
framework. Along with an increase of available data during the 1990s, the focus of 
research became more theory oriented. At this time two main streams could be 
observed: the first one having roots in finance and economics, and the second one 
derived from management and entrepreneurial studies (Landström, 2009). The 
processes of internationalisation of Venture Capital triggered another branch of 
analysis based on institutional theory. In contrast to previous theories, institutional 
theory argues that the actions within a given industry may not always be the most 
economically efficient, but they are the responses that become accepted in the 
industry (Bruton, Fried, & Manigart, 2005). As Landström (2009) indicated, although 
the Venture Capital became a research field on its own it would still benefit if 
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different perspectives represented by scholars originating from varied fields entered 
into a dialogue. 
Although the literature offers a variety of theoretical frameworks, none of them can 
provide a single, suitable theoretical framework, which could serve for a thorough 
analysis of the emergence of a specific Venture Capital industry.  
The presented research follows Van de Ven’s (2007) postulate for engaged 
scholarship. It aims on exploring the different kinds of knowledge that scholars and 
professionals can bring to bear on the problem, and thereby producing alternative 
explanations and, in this way, to add to the existing knowledge in the field.   
As already has been mentioned Venture Capital industry is a sophisticated 
phenomenon (David & Garry, 2006). Positioning it in a setting of a transition 
economy adds additional layers of complexity to the analysis. This results in a 
situation where the multilevel construction of the research problem disqualifies a 
single perspective as an adequate explanation of the phenomena (Van de Ven, 
2007). Accordingly, the proposed theoretical framework represents a multi–
perspective approach.  
Organization studies were selected as the dominant perspective for examining the 
emergence of the Venture Capital industry. It is believed that application of 
organizational studies in the context of emerging economies can bring a better 
insight into the processes involved, compared to the traditional approaches.      
Compared to industry studies, which concentrates more on the economic side of the 
research phenomena, organization studies allow additional emphasis on the social 
and historical context, while maintaining consideration of the economic context. 
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Naturally, given venture capitalists’ absolute and priority focus on generating capital 
gains, the more economics and finance based findings from industry and managerial 
studies’ research will be incorporated when relevant.  
Organization studies provide a useful framework for analysis of the emergence of an 
industry.  By including in the analysis the role of the wider environment in the 
development of new organizations, and its role in the subsequent shaping of 
populations of such organizations, more of the complexity of the industry creation 
process can be examined. 
 The following section discusses varied perspectives describing and evaluating 
organizations and their environments as well as their mutual relationships. There is 
an ongoing discussion between various theoretical schools referring to such issues 
as: do organizations function in objective environments or do they create them; do 
they adapt to the changing conditions of their environments or are they the subject of 
selection; what are the factors determining organizational behaviour or selection? 
The tensions between schools create social science ‘paradoxes’: as Pool and Van 
de Ven (1989) refer to them. Each of the theories discussed presents well stated, 
well documented and researched, alternative explanations; which, when juxtaposed, 
sometimes present paradoxes. The proposed theoretical framework actively exploits 
the existence of such paradoxes in order to take different perspectives on the 
research phenomena. Because these so-called paradoxes are not paradoxes in a 
logical or literal sense their coexistence is possible. Therefore when combined they 
help to provide a rich picture when the temporal and special character of the social 
world is taken to account. The research aims to embrace different levels of analysis, 
and also considers the role of time and space in creating the Venture Capital 
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industry using complementary theoretical perspectives to built up a plausible 
understanding. 
 
3.2. Venture capital industry as a social construct  
People and organizations co-exist and interact with each other on daily basis. Often 
the existence of organizations is taken for granted (Aldrich, 1979:2). Humans create 
organizations to achieve objectives they cannot accomplish individually. Thus 
organizations are shaped by the context from which they emerge (Aldrich, 1999:6). 
The diversity of definitions describing the nature of organizations reflects the huge 
variety of human interactions. For example, the ‘rational’ theories point to the 
instrumental character of organizations. They characterise organizations as a means 
to achieve a goal though a designed and managed process. The ‘natural’ theories, 
on the other hand, concentrate on social and human aspects, which are neglected in 
the ‘rational’ approach (Handel, 2003: 3-4).  
For the purpose of this study, the distinction between formal and informal 
organizations proposed by Blau and Scott (Blau & Scott, 1962) seems to provide 
useful insights. According to the authors’ interpretation, ‘social organizations’ refer to 
human conduct which is led by social conditions rather than physiological or 
psychological characteristics of individuals. Social organizations emerge wherever 
people live together. However some of the existing organizations are created 
deliberately for explicit purposes. In this case the goals to be achieved, the rules to 
be followed by members of organization and the status structure (the organizational 
chart) are designated a priori. They refer to this kind of relationship as a ‘formal 
organization’. The ‘informal organizations’ describe those patterns of social life that 
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evolved within the framework of formally established organizations but which are not 
guided by the official blueprint. Both aspects of the organization, the formal one and 
the informal one, are interconnected within a single organization and have to be 
analysed together  in order to understand an organization’s dynamics (Blau & Scott, 
1962:4-5).   
Similarly to Blau and Scott, Aldrich distinguishes between those organizations which 
were formed intentionally and those which emerged spontaneously. He describes 
organizations as ‘goal oriented, boundary-maintaining, activity systems’ (Aldrich, 
1979:4). The explicit goal orientation feature separates organizations from other 
forms of social collectives such as families or small groups. The presence of the 
organizational goals causes the members to act in accordance with the objectives 
regardless of their personal feelings. The difference in objectives and interests 
between organizations or individuals with whom they cooperate is a potential source 
of conflict, which could affect the organization’s survival. The presence of boundaries 
distinguishes between the members and non-members of the organization as well as 
separating them from the external environment. Whereas the activity system 
indicates set of routines though which the organization is achieving its goals (Aldrich, 
1999:3-4). Aldrich uses the term ‘routine’ in the sense of ‘forms, rules, procedures, 
conventions, strategies and technologies around which organizations are 
constructed and through which they operate’ in his approach, Aldrich affirms Blau 
and Scott’s taxonomy of formal and informal organization.  
Organizations take many different forms. The ‘form’ represents a set of 
characteristics that identify the organization as an individual entity, but at the same 
time as a member of a group of similar organizations (Freeman & Audia, 2006; 
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Romanelli, 1991). The distinction between forms appears at various levels. 
Differentiation might be embedded in the language – as a conventional classification 
used in example by some social scientists, or arise from abstract concepts (Hannan 
& Freeman, 1986). A group of organizations that share a ‘certain set of 
characteristics’ constitute the same ‘organizational form’. Organizations of the same 
form establish populations (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). The common characteristics 
of organizations within a particular population make them vulnerable to 
environmental threats in same way (Astley & Van de Ven, 1983). Diverse 
populations of organizations that occupy different niches and use different mix of 
general and population specific routines and competencies form communities 
(Aldrich, 1999:223). Within the community, populations may interact with each other 
on the basis of competition and/or symbiosis, depending on technology orientation, 
normative order or regulatory regime. Competition between diverse populations 
arises when they have similar demands on environment, whereas symbiosis takes 
place when mutual dependencies occur (Aldrich, 1999: 301). The figure below 
illustrates the above discussed difference between population of organizations and 
community. 
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Figure 9: Organizational community  
 
Source: adopted from: (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) and (Aldrich, 1999) 
Depending on the chosen hierarchical level of observation, whether it is individual 
organization, population or community of organizations, different outcomes may be 
observed. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggested that strategies employed at the 
organizational level may not be rational when adopted by a population (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). According to Hannan and Carroll, some factors influencing 
organization may be recognized only at the population level (Aldrich, 1999).  
Managerial studies, as well as strategy and economic studies, often use a single 
industry as the major unit of analysis. Borrowing from those disciplines helps to 
address the problem of clarification between the meanings and usage of term 
industry and population as used in the following research. Traditionally ‘industry’ is 
defined as ‘a group of business units producing products that are close substitutes 
from the buyer’s perspective’ (Bettis, 1998). However the recent increase in the role 
of information and technology in industries calls for a reassessment of the way 
industries’ boundaries are defined (Bettis, 1998; Sampler, 1998). The proposal by 
Bettis and Sampler suggests replacing the perspective of product/service substitute 
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by criteria of possessing critical information or competencies. This redefinition 
actually moves our understanding towards the organizational approach of 
populations and the increasing role of services.  
Carroll and Hannan (2000), based on organizational studies, indicated that industries 
contain a mix of populations of corporations rather than one homogenous population. 
They conditioned the usage of industry data as valid to the degree to which the 
studied population respects a clearly bounded form. Aldrich (1999) on the other 
hand, uses the phrases ‘industry’ and ‘population’ interchangeably. He argues that 
economists associate industry with consumption patterns and population ecologies 
with sets of potential competitors in production systems. However, in practice, both 
approaches use the same data sources but label them differently (Aldrich, 
1999:224).  
Acknowledging the above arguments, it is plausible to claim that for the purpose of 
this research the Venture Capital industry overlaps with the concept of population 
rather than community of populations. Furthermore, Venture Capital firms, being 
legal entities, have regulatory established boundaries. Thus, the selection between 
members and non-members unfolds according to formal rules. Moreover, Venture 
Capital adopts a specific set of competencies and routines which apply while 
operating. From the customer (entrepreneur) perspectives, Venture Capital provides 
similar services in the form of capital and advice for all new ventures. Additionally, 
adopting the community approach allows the linking of organizational research with 
other areas of scholarly inquiry due to their reciprocal relations with organizations, 
their structure, operating processes, human participation and strategic orientation 
(Freeman & Audia, 2006). Summing up the above it is believed to be reasonable to 
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treat the research of the Polish Venture Capital industry as a population of Venture 
Capital firms both sited and operating in a particular geographic area.  
Figure 10: Structure of Venture Capital Limited Partners and General Partners 
 
 
3.3. Organizations in an environmental context  
3.3.1. Concept of environment  
The following section discusses different theoretical approaches to the role of 
environment in shaping organizations’ structures and actions. The presented 
standpoints illustrate both organizational and economical perspectives in order to 
ensure a sufficiently broad perception.  
Following Selznick (1948) organizations may be seen from two perspectives, which 
even though from the analytical point of view are separate, remain empirically 
interdependent. On one hand they function as economic systems, on the other hand 
are adaptive social structures. In its economic aspect an organization is a system of 
relationships allowing the obtaining and using of scarce resources in the most 
effective and efficient way. However, the economic aspect is influenced by organic 
states, internal to the structure, which are beyond any systematic control and 
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delegation system. He indicates that consent cannot be separated from the control 
act. Thus organizations should be perceived as cooperative systems. (Selznick, 
1948:26).  
Looking from the historical perspective, the classic theories, such as Weber or 
Taylor, tend to ignore the impact of environment on organizations, they take it as a 
constant element. The environmental demands, even if acknowledged, along with 
goals, were perceived as universal across all organizations (Miles, Snow, & Pfeffer, 
1974). The later incorporation of the open-system concepts and models borrowed 
from the natural sciences, led to the interest in the role of environment (Frishammar, 
2006). The system theory concentrated on problems of relationship, structure and 
interdependence rather than on constant attributes of objects (Katz & Kahn, 
1966:18). According to the open-system theorists this approach should not be 
treated as theory per se but rather as a framework for understanding and describing 
many kinds of relationships and levels of phenomena. Therefore, application of the 
concept of an open system to organizational studies bears several consequences. 
Firstly, organizations, likewise ‘living’ organisms, are dependent upon their external 
environment. They cannot be self sufficient or self contained because they require a 
supply of ‘energy’ from other institutions, people or material environments in order to 
function. Secondly, materials and human energy inflow is neither constant nor 
guaranteed. Thirdly, the same goal might be realized by using different methods. 
Finally, in order to understand the specific organizational behaviour it is necessary to 
study and understand the extant environmental influences (Katz & Kahn, 1966).  
Since the 1950s the term ‘environment’ is present in a variety of theories while the 
proposed conceptualizations differ. Emery and Trist (1965) indicated four ‘ideal 
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types’ of causal textures of organizational environment that exist simultaneously in 
the real world of most of the organizations. They differentiate the environment along 
static and dynamic perspectives. Placid, randomized environment – is the simplest, 
static type, characterised by relatively unchanging goals. The second form, which is 
more advanced but still assumed as static is the placid, cluster environment. In the 
latter case, organizational survival is linked to the knowledge it has got about the 
environment and the strategy it adopts. The disturbed – reactive environment 
represents a dynamic level involving the presence of other organizations. While 
functioning in the above dimensions, organizations aim to improve their wellbeing by 
hindering competitors. The last, dynamic type is referred as turbulent field. The 
variances for the component organizations arise from the field itself (Emery & Trist, 
1965).  
Building on Emery and Trist, Aldrich (1979) added dimensions of organizational 
environment. According to Aldrich, environments might be analysed in terms of their 
capacity, homogeneity, stability, concentration, consensus and turbulence. The 
dimensions are summarised in the table below.  
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Table 2: Dimensions of environments 
Environmental: Indicates: 
Capacity (rich/lean) 
relative level of resources available to an organization within its 
environment 
Homogeneity/heterogeneity 
degree of similarity or differentiation between the elements of 
population dealt with including organizations, individuals and any 
social forces affecting resources. 
Stability/instability degree of turnover in the elements of the environment 
Concentration/dispersion 
degree to which resources are evenly distributed over range of the 
environment or concentrated in particular location 
Consensus/discord 
degree to which an organization’s claim to a specific domain is 
disrupted or recognized by other organizations 
Turbulence 
extent to which environments are being disrupted by increasing 
environmental interconnections 
Source: adapted form (Aldrich, 1979) 
Each of the above characteristics has consequences for both organizational 
operations and ultimately survival. For example, organizations operating in rich 
environments have got access to more resources. But on the other hand such 
environments attract other organizations. Homogenous and stable environments 
promote standardized behaviours and routines (Aldrich, 1979) also called 
‘managerial paradigms’. 
Adopting the industry approach, Porter (1980) referred to the ‘initial structure’, which 
accompanies emergence of any industry. The ‘initial structure’ results of a 
combination of underlying economic and technical characteristics of the industry, the 
initial constraints of small industry size and the skills and resources of the companies 
that are early entrants. The evolutionary path of a particular industry depends on 
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combination of skills, resources, technology luck and firms performance (Porter, 
1980:162-163).  
The above perspectives - regardless whether they originate from organizational or 
industry studies - perceived the environment as given and independent from the 
organization entity. The environment has its own characteristics. In contrary the 
concept of ‘enacted environment’ proposed by Weick (1969) dismisses the idea of 
the external environment as understood above. Weick claims that human actors 
create the environment. They do not react to it - they enact it (Weick, 1969:64). The 
enacted environment is interconnected with creating meaning. The meaning on the 
other hand is closely tied to the process of attention and time. According to this 
approach environments became individually interpreted entities, influenced by 
personal features. The environment becomes an output of organizing not an input.  
Weick and Daft (1984) proposed a model of organizations as an ‘interpretation 
system’. The authors concentrate on modes through which individual organizations 
perceive and interact with their environments. The model is based on the assumption 
that organizations must build up a system for collecting and processing information 
important for their survival. Although individuals are responsible for setting the 
organizational goals, process data and interpret the environment, there are formal 
and informal internal systems within the organization allowing the retention of 
knowledge, behaviours, mental maps and values over time (Daft & Weick, 
1984:285). Moreover only the top of the organizational hierarchy is involved in the 
interpretation process. Therefore, the formal interpretations upon which an 
organization acts reflect the views and beliefs of a limited number of people.  
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Figure 11: The interpretation process within an organization 
 
Source: adopted from (Daft & Weick, 1984:286) 
The process of interpretation, presented in Figure 11, unfolds in three steps. The first 
one, scanning provides raw data for the organization. The form of collecting data 
may vary among organizations. During the second step – interpretation - data are 
given meanings. Throughout this stage events are given a meaning and a shared 
understanding and conceptual models are developed. However, as indicated earlier, 
this interpretation is created by the members of upper management (Daft & Weick, 
1984). The last step - learning - requires new responses or actions based on the 
created interpretation. It might be compared to learning a new skill by an individual. 
The act of learning provides also new data for interpretation. Therefore the three 
stages are interconnected through the feedback loop. Building up on the process of 
interpretation the authors constructed a two-by-two matrix to explain the diverse 
ways by which organizations obtain knowledge about their environments. According 
to their model the differences in interpretations between organizations arises from 
two dimensions: firstly, from management’s beliefs about the analyzability of the 
external environment and secondly, from the extent to which organizations interfere 
with an environment in order to understand it. Depending on beliefs about the 
environment, organizations apply different strategies. If an organization considers its 
environment as analyzable, it assumes that environment is concrete with objective 
events and processes which are determined. The main role for an organization is to 
 
Scanning 
(data collection) 
 
Interpretation 
(data given meaning)  
Learning 
(action taken)  
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discover the ‘correct’ interpretation. This might be achieved by using rational analysis 
and accurate measurements. In the contrary case, when the organization assumes 
that its environment cannot be analyzed, it constructs a plausible interpretation that 
makes previous actions sensible and suggests next steps. This sort of interpretation 
is more ad hoc, intuitive and individually biased. 
Organizations also have different strategies toward collecting data about their 
environments. Some organizations actively collect data by allocating resources to 
the process. Those actions may also include testing or manipulating the environment 
with the aim of changing rules or to manipulate critical factors within the 
environment. This sort of experimental behaviour is especially undertaken by 
powerful organizations. Other organizations take passive positions avoiding 
interactions with the environment unless they are forced to do so by crises (Daft & 
Weick, 1984).  
 
3.3.2. Role of the environment in organizations survival  
If it is assumed that organizations rely on their environments for the resources they 
utilise, competition for resources becomes the central force in organization activities 
(Aldrich, 1979; Astley, 1985; Hatch, 1997). However, the question arises, how much 
control over resources acquisition remains on the side of the organizations. The 
organizational literature discussing the issue represents theoretical pluralism, which 
reflects the complexity of the subject (Astley & Van de Ven, 1983) although the 
various schools collectively provide multiple perspectives. However, when 
considered individually, schools usually analyse only one aspect of the phenomena 
utilizing an exclusive taxonomy. This inhibits dialogue between them (Astley & Van 
70 
 
de Ven, 1983). Following Astley and Van de Ven (1983), it is recognized that 
different perspectives can present different pictures of the same organizational 
phenomena without nullifying each other. This is achieved by employing different 
analytical lenses to examine opposite or contradictory sides of the same issue.  
The following section discusses how different theories perceive the role of 
environment in shaping organizational existence. We also consider their relevance 
and possible limitations for answering the research questions. The dimension 
according which the theories are sorted is the level of analysis.  
 
3.4. Macro level perspective in organizational theories  
Population ecology focuses on organization populations as a primary unit of 
observation (Astley, 1985). It analysis how external conditions influence the 
population demographic by observing the rate of funding and mortality of 
organizations (Singh & Lumsden, 1990). The environment is perceived as the 
selection factor. If two populations use the same kind of resources from the 
environment and they differ in some organizational characteristic, the population 
which fits less well into environmental contingencies will tend to be eliminated 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1977).  
Borrowing from the paradigm of biological evolution the process occurs through 
cycles of variation, selection and retention. Variation, which is understood as the 
creation of novel forms of organization, is assumed to happen by blind or random 
chance. Selection of organization occurs though competition for resources (Van de 
Ven & Poole, 1995). Whether an organization survives depends on the nature of 
environment and competitive forces (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Retention involves 
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forces that perpetuate and maintain certain organizational forms. In this case 
variation stimulates the selection of new organizational forms whereas retention 
preserves previous organization forms and practices (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). 
Hannan and Freeman (1977:930-931) pointed out that although adaptation process 
are present within a population, those processes are limited due to existence of 
structural inertia. The structural inertia is generated due to various internal and 
external factors to the organization. Internal factors arise from sunk costs of firms, 
communication constraints, internal politics and norms. External factors consist of 
barriers to entry and exit, bounded rationality, and social legitimacy. The stronger the 
structural inertia affects an organization the more likely it is to favour the logic of 
environmental selection over adaptation. 
In order to explain regularities in the growth and decline of population, Carroll and 
Hannan (1989) proposed the population density model. According to the model, the 
number of organizations constituting a population is function of social processes of 
legitimation and competition. With an increase in density, the legitimacy of a 
particular form of organization will increase. Thus the rate of organizational founding 
will increase while the rate of organizational death will decline. However, after 
reaching a certain point the competition processes will overtake the effect of 
increasing legitimacy which will subsequently result in a reversed situation of falling 
organizational founding rates and increasing organizational death rates (Carroll & 
Hannan, 1989). However, Delacroix et al. (1989) question the universal character of 
this model, suggesting it is limited to organizations which are institutionally 
constrained.  
72 
 
The limitation toward direct application of the population ecology theory for analysis 
of the Venture Capital industry arises from several factors. Firstly, the population 
ecology gives little attention to structural characteristics of organizations as a 
determinant of survival. Secondly, it does not distinguish between controlled and 
uncontrolled mortality of organizations (Betton & Dess, 1985; McKinley & Mone, 
2003). Additionally, it does not provide a plausible explanation for population 
emergence. Further limitations arise from the general critique of this approach. The 
phenomenon of structural inertia is largely associated with complex organizations. 
Thus, it would intuitively appear that populations of small organizations should be 
more adaptive to environmental changes compared to a large organization. However 
empirical evidence does not support this proposition (Betton & Dess, 1985). Perrow 
(1979) points out that, although large organizations might not be adaptive to their 
environments, they survive better because they strive more successfully to create 
and control their environment. Following this argument, the environmental niches 
inhabited by small and large organizations are subjectively different (Betton & Dess, 
1985).  
In contrast to ecological approaches the Neo-institutional theory turns toward the 
organizational structure. The article of Meyer and Rowan (1977), in which they 
discussed the role of ‘institutional rules’ in shaping organizational structure, started 
the broader discussion within the Neo-institutional stream (McKinley & Mone, 2003). 
The discussed institutional environment refers to the pressures generated externally 
to the organizations via law and regulations or by the professions based on their 
wide spread authority (Zucker, 1987). Mayer and Rowan (1977) argued that 
organizations reflect their institutional environments rather than the demands of their 
production activities. This is due to the general acceptance of those institutions as 
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proper, adequate and rational. Therefore organizations must adopt those rules in 
order to avoid illegitimacy. Existence of strong institutions results in set of 
consequences for organizations. Firstly, organizations incorporate elements which 
are legitimated externally rather than in terms of efficiency. Secondly, they employ 
external criteria of assessment to define the value of structural elements. Thirdly, 
dependence on external fixed institutions reduces turbulence and maintains stability. 
Summing up: organizations which exist in highly institutionalised environments, need 
to become isomorphic with their environments in order to gain legitimacy and the 
resources allowing their survival. As a survival factor this is independent from - and 
more important than - the requirements of production efficiency. The success in 
organizational adaptation depends both on the environmental processes and on the 
skills of the organization leaders (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  
DiMaggio and Powell (1983), building upon the above, noticed that at the initial 
stages of the lifecycle of an organizational field, organizations acquire a wide range 
of forms and approaches, however with the increasing maturity of the field they 
become more similar to each other, without necessarily becoming more efficient, due 
to isomorphic processes. Although they show two types of isomorphism, competitive 
and institutional, only the institutional element is given attention in this theory.  
Within the analysis the authors assume that the number of organizations in a 
population depends on environmental carrying capacity whereas the diversity of 
organizations is isomorphic with the environmental diversity (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983:149). They indicate three sources of institutional isomorphism which are 
located in social processes. These are coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism 
and normative pressures.  
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Coercive isomorphism arises from political influences and the problem of legitimacy. 
Organizations operate under formal and informal pressures of other organizations 
they cooperate with as well as the cultural expectations of the society within which 
they function. In some cases, in example under new legal regulations, organizations 
are forced to change their behaviour, in other cases they change is voluntary.  
Mimetic isomorphism represents a tendency to imitate practices of other 
organizations in response to existing uncertainty. Especially in the situation where 
the organizational technology is poorly understood, goals are ambiguous or when 
the environment creates symbolic uncertainty. The model organization may be 
unaware of being copied: also, models might be copied unintentionally.  
Normative pressures stem from development of professionalization understood as 
collectively defined methods and conditions of work within an occupation. Formal 
education and development of professional networks are perceived as main sources 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
The Institutional theory, by stressing the symbolic aspect of organizations and their 
environments, adds new lenses to the possibilities for interpretation. Organizations 
are not perceived only as systems of production or exchange shaped by their 
technologies, their transactions, or the power-dependency relations growing out of 
such interdependencies. Additionally, the environment is not limited to the task 
approach: ‘as stocks of resources, sources of information, or loci of competitors and 
exchange partners.’ (Scott, 1987:507). The focus is given to idea that ‘all social 
systems - hence, all organizations - exist in an institutional environment that defines 
and delimits social reality.’(Scott, 1987:507). The employment of Institutional theory 
is believed to provide a valuable insight into the processes of establishing and 
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developing strategies that ameliorate the ‘constraints’ influencing human behaviour 
(North, 1990). 
Following North (1990) institutions are understood as ‘constraints that human beings 
impose on human actions’ whereas organizations are referred as ‘groups of 
individuals bound together by some common objective.’ (North, 1990:59). Thus the 
imposed limitations define the opportunity set in the economy. The emerging 
organizations will reflect this set of opportunities (North, 1990).  
Institutional theories commonly agree on the fact that institutional elements influence 
organizations structures, although they present different explanations on how the 
process occurs (Scott, 1987). North argues that existing organizations reflect the 
pay-off structure and their investment pattern will reflect the incentive structure 
(North, 1990). North draws attention to two sources of economic incentives: formal 
and informal, which are imprinted on the institutional framework. He defines the 
institutional framework as ‘political structure that specifies the way we develop and 
aggregate political choice, the property rights that defines the formal economic 
incentives and the social structure – the norms and conventions- that defines the 
informal incentives in the economy.’ (North, 1990:49). March and Olsen (1984) point 
out that not all outcomes are the result of a conscious decision process (Scott, 
1987).  
Historically institutions were used by people to intentionally modify their 
environments in order to obtain a desired outcome with the emphasis on decreasing 
level of uncertainty (North, 1990:78). However, they are not universal across 
societies. The variety arises from differences between cultures. North argues that 
learning is transmitted between past and present generations via culture. Culture 
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shapes the way societies perceive their worlds. Thus interpretation of the world 
varies across cultures and results in diverse institutions (norms and conventions) 
leading to any particular desired behaviour. Therefore the specific learning 
processes of individuals and organizations are crucial for the formulation and 
evolution of institutions, which are incremental and path dependent (North, 1990).  
Theories referring to industry studies also discuss population ecology and 
Institutional theory concentrates on the macro level of observations. The population 
of organizations as a subject of observation is replaced by the notion of an industry. 
An industry consists of business units producing close substitutes, with related 
buyers, suppliers and potential entrants (Porter, 1980). In contrary to the theories 
discussed earlier, industry studies highlight the economic aspects of industry 
operations. Such elements as mode of entrance and exit, including barriers, 
structure of costs and revenues as well as preferred structures and strategies are 
considered (Gort & Klepper, 1982; Jovanovic & MacDonald, 1994; Klepper, 1996; 
Klepper & Graddy, 1990).  
The life cycle approach is widely utilized to explain fluctuations in the number of firms 
within an industry (Williamson 1975; Gort and Klepper 1982; Klepper and Graddy 
1990). It assumes that a developing entity passes through a sequence of stages, 
which comes in a specified order where none of the might be omitted (Van de Ven & 
Poole, 1995). The number of stages occurring during the life cycle may differ in 
number or a factor that defines them. For example, Williamson (1975: 215-216) and 
Klepper and Graddy (1990) refer to three stages and Grot and Klepper to five (1982). 
However, all taxonomies stress the periodicity of the process as well as favouring 
economic factors as defining the survival and non-survival of a firm.  
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According to industry studies the structure of the market is dominantly shaped by 
discrete events and the flow of information among existing and potential participants 
of the market (Gort & Klepper, 1982). A new cycle might be triggered either by new 
technology or obsolescence of the product. Klepper and Graddy (1990) build a 
model of industry evolution concentrating on determinants of market structure. They 
indicated that at the point where the number of firms present on the market stabilizes 
the survivors are only those incumbents with sufficiently low costs or high product 
quality. Moreover they analysed the path of prices and output and pointed out that 
the rate of capacity expansion of firms will be a function of the expected profit from 
expansion. Due to decline in industry prices the expected profits will decline and the 
rate of growth of incumbents will decline over time (Klepper & Graddy, 1990). 
Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) supported the first mover advantage theory 
pointing out that research firms, which were able to implement early, were rewarded 
with growth in output and value (Jovanovic & MacDonald, 1994).   
Analyzing the mode of entrance into novel industries Saviotti and Pyka (2008) 
highlighted the role of intra – sector and inter – sector competition, presence of 
competent institutions and appropriate timing of entrance. The intra–sector 
competition refers to the level of competition within the creating sector, whereas the 
inter–sector competition depends on the possibility that different sectors provide 
comparable services. The presence of institutions capable of appropriate evaluation 
of the potential of new sectors along with available resources constitutes the 
financial availability. Financial availability combined with the size of the new market 
determines the number of new entrants (Saviotti & Pyka, 2008). Londregan (1990) in 
his model of entry and exit over the industry life cycle concluded that at different 
stages, different traits are strategically advantageous (Londregan, 1990). Covin and 
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Slevin (1990) were analysing new firms’ strategic postures, structural forms and level 
of performance at three stages of industry development – emergence, growth and 
the mature stage. Their findings concluded that postures and organization structures 
vary over the industry life cycle as well as that firms’ performance is influenced by 
the fit of strategic posture, organizational structure and industry life cycle. Posture 
was measured between conservative and entrepreneurial extremes and the structure 
on a continuum from organic to mechanistic. They conclude that entrepreneurial 
firms with organic structure are the most efficient for emerging industries, whereas 
more mechanistic structures are more suitable for matured industries (Covin & 
Slevin, 1990).  
Although the industry life cycle theory originally was developed for manufactured 
products, some of its elements might be utilized for better understanding of the 
emergence and development of a venture capital industry especially in terms of 
assessing the level of maturity of the industry. Karaomerlioglu and Jacobsson (2000) 
and Klonowski (2005) utilized this approach in assessing the stage of development 
of national Venture Capital industries. Some potential limitations in utilizing this 
approach for researching development of a new industry based in services arise 
from two factors. Firstly the historical focus was on manufactured products. 
Secondly, it omits the social aspects of firms’ interactions - giving little weight to the 
social context within which decisions on a firm’s operations are embedded (Fiol & 
Lyles, 1985). Additionally there are voices criticising the logic of applying the life 
cycle approach to industry development. Porter (1980) dismisses the traditional life 
cycle model, assuming that industry follows an S-shaped curve crossing though 
stages of introduction, growth, maturity and decline. He argues that industries do not 
ultimately follow the standard life cycle pattern, often the duration of the stages differ 
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among industries, and some stages may be skipped. Additionally companies can 
affect the shape of the growth curve through product innovation; also, the nature of 
competition is different at each stage. The life cycle model does not allow predictions 
about under which conditions the industry will follow the pattern or not (Porter, 
1980:157-158). He assumes that industries follow an evolutionary process leading 
from the initial structure to potential structure. The actual path taken by firms is 
directed by a mix of luck, skills, resources and orientation of other firms in the 
industry. Porter described a set of evolutionary processes which are present in one 
form or another in every industry (Porter, 1980:163-164).  
 
3.5. Micro level perspectives in organizational theories 
The theories classified as micro perspective, focus on a single organization or firm 
depending whether they weigh more towards the social or economic approach.  
The Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) assumes that 
although environment is a powerful constraint on organizations’ actions, managers 
can actively shape their relationship with it (Astley & Fombrun, 1983; Hatch, 1997). 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) claim that an organization’s survival depends on its 
ability to acquire and maintain resources from the environment. Thus, in order to 
understand organizational choice, it is crucial to determine the environmental 
context. Accordingly, it is important to document the flow of resources between 
organizations and environment with the respect of criticality and scarcity of 
resources.  
Following the assumptions of Resource Dependence theory, the organizational 
environments are not given entities. Rather, they are constructed by organizations 
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through processes of attention and interpretation. Although organizational activities 
are constrained by economic, social and legal environments, such elements as law, 
social norms, values and politics reflect action taken by organizations seeking their 
own interests.  
To understand how the environment affects organizations the Resource 
Dependence theory provides differentiation of the environment into three levels. At 
the first level environment consists of the entire system of interconnected individuals 
and organizations which are related to one to another and to a focal organization 
through the organization’s transactions. The second level embraces those 
individuals and organizations with whom this organization directly interacts. At this 
level organization can experience environment, however the determination for 
actions is rooted elsewhere. The third level is described as the ‘enacted 
environment’ where organization’s perception and representation of the environment 
takes place. Those three levels are related to each other. The large system (level 
one) can impact the set of transactions possible between the focal organization and 
other organization within the system. Those transactions constitute the raw material 
for building the enacted environment. The enacted environment influences 
organizational actions, whereas events in the other levels of environment may affect 
the outcomes (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978:63).  
Organizations are linked to environment by a variety of relations i.e by federations, 
associations, and customer – supplier relationships. The character of those 
relationships is shaped by physical realities, social norms, information and cognitive 
capacity as well as by personal preferences. The challenge for organizational 
survival arises from the changeable character of their environments demonstrated by 
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fluctuation in number of organizations, and following it, diversity in supply of 
resources. Whenever the environment changes, the organization is faced by the 
choice either of eventual death or modelling its behaviour in response to new 
conditions. The bargaining position of an organization depends on resources or 
capabilities it provides. The more they are desired by other organizations the more 
influence and control the supplying organization gains in mutual contacts. 
Analogously an organization’s vulnerability is influenced by the extent to which it 
relays on particular type of exchange for its operations. Those interdependencies are 
neither symmetric nor balanced. The way power and the social agreement is shared, 
modelled and stabilized between organizations is represented by the forms of inter 
organizational cooperation, such as: cartels, joint ventures, advisory boards and 
social norms.  
Organizations have to control not only their external relationships but also deal with 
internal conflicts. According to Resource Dependence theory, organizations exists in 
order to provide satisfaction to participants who support them. Thus all direct 
participants, and those who are affected by the organization, are eligible to evaluate 
it. The number and diversity of interests represented by evaluators face the 
management of the organization with the problem of dealing with inconsistent criteria 
and often competing demands.  
Another challenge managers have to face is the problem of legitimacy, which is a 
conferred status, controlled from outside of the organization. It is bounded up with 
norms and values. However, many of those norms governing formal organizations 
are not codified in the legal system. Additionally, being a social process, it is not 
clear how large a proportion of the membership of a social system must approve an 
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organization or its practices for it to be considered legitimate (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978).  
In order to understand organizational behaviour it is necessary to analyze an 
organizational exposure to information, the attention paid to it, as well as strategies 
for searching for information about the environment. In short, the way an 
organization perceives and interprets its environment is given by a combination of 
the organizational structure, the structure of the organizational information system, 
and the activities of the organization.  
Although originally Resource Dependence theory was formulated at the individual 
organization level it is believed that a parallel use at the population level may bring 
valuable insight into the relationships within the industry. Because the theory focuses 
on the process of acquiring resources (which is a theoretical innovation, going 
beyond earlier theories that concentrated mainly on the allocation of resources, 
thereby neglecting the acquisition processes) it allows inclusion of both internal and 
external stakeholders in the analysis. The inclusion of attention to the power 
distribution across all actors within the industry should make it possible to expand 
the analysis up to the population level. 
Whereas Resource Dependence theory concentrates on interdependencies between 
organizations and strategies to preserve autonomy, management studies 
concentrate more on economic goals. The mainstream of managerial literature 
describes successful organizations as active and able to influence their environment, 
which is considered analysable. Within this approach managers are capable of 
creating and implementing strategies which allow the company to adjust to the 
changes in the environment (Frishammar, 2006). Porter, for example, indicates that 
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the core of competitive strategy lies in relating the company to its environment. Thus 
the goal for a business unit is to ‘find a position in the industry where the company 
can best defend itself against competitive forces or can influence them in its favour.’ 
(Porter, 1980:4) Positioning takes place through thorough examination of the 
environment, which in this case is perceived as the industry in which the firm 
operates. Interdependence of companies is identified as the central characteristic of 
competitions within an industry. Although the desired outcome of a competitive 
strategy is obtaining cost effectiveness, the analysis of environment includes 
elements of a limited interpretative approach. The leading idea of ‘competitive 
advantage’ presented by Porter agrees with the approach presented by the broad 
concept of transaction costs economics of Williamson (Williamson, 1998). The 
transaction cost approach turns its attention from the theory of firm as a production 
function into the theory of firm as a governance structure (Williamson, 1998). As 
Williamson himself refers to it, as ‘very much an inter-temporal, adaptive managerial 
exercise.’ (Williamson, 1998:33). However, while transaction costs economics will 
not be presented in detail, its assumptions about human agents’ behaviour are worth 
considering for the purpose of this research. The first relevant assumption refers to 
the concept of ‘bounded rationality’ and the consequences of such ‘bounded 
rationality’ on contracts. The second assumption refers to ‘opportunism’ of economic 
actors.  
‘Bounded rationality’ arises from the limitations of human perceptual and 
informational processing. Therefore, even though individuals intend to behave 
rationally they can do this only to a certain extent. Actions are based on sufficient 
knowledge rather than on complete knowledge (Weick, 1969; Williamson, 1998). In 
consequence economic actors are not able to foresee all possible actions. This is 
84 
 
reflected in the fact that even the most complex contracts remain incomplete 
(Williamson, 1998). According to Williamson human actors behave in splintered way, 
and the level of opportunistic behaviour is not equal among all of them (Williamson, 
1998).   
In more detail the issue of agent-principal relationship is discussed by agency theory. 
The emphasis is given to situations where individuals with different goals are 
engaged in cooperative actions. The theory assumes that social life consists of a 
series of contracts or exchanges governed by self-interest of its participants. 
Bounded rationality of individuals engaged in cooperation becomes a source of 
information asymmetry (Arthurs & Busenitz, 2003); additionally, monitoring contracts 
is costly and somewhat inefficient especially in organizations (Perrow, 1986), this 
exacerbates any asymmetry. Information is perceived as commodity with a cost at 
which can be purchased (Eisenhardt, 1989). Organizations may use formal and 
informal information systems (i.e. budgeting, the board of directors, or managerial 
supervision) to control agents’ opportunist behaviour. Additionally agency theory 
looks on uncertainty from a different perspective. The inability to pre-plan earlier, 
perceived as a source of uncertainty, is replaced by risk/reward trade-off 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Agency theory provides a powerful insight into the principal – agent relationship in 
the case of goal conflict between engaged parties, when the chance of an agent’s 
opportunistic behaviour is probable. It fails however, to explain the principal – agent 
relationship when their goals became similar/converge (Arthurs & Busenitz, 2003). 
Therefore it might be utilized effectively for evaluating the Venture Capital industry 
relations only under conditions of goal conflict between principals and agents. For 
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example there conflict how to share gains between the Limited Partners and the 
General Partners in the Venture Capital Fund. Moreover its utility for explaining the 
‘social nature of venture capital’ declines outside of more developed economies 
(Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006) therefore it might need further modifications in order to be 
applied in the case of transition economies.  
 
3.6. Applied theoretical perspective  
Researching emerging industries requires a holistic approach, often involving 
collaboration across several streams of macro-level entrepreneurial behaviour 
(Forbes & Kirsch, 2011). Additionally the analysis is longitudinal in character 
because it concentrates on the process of change. Therefore the emphasis on 
context is crucial (Pettigrew, 1990). Assuming that the process of change is neither 
linear nor singular, Pettigrew (1990:269) refers to three key points which should be 
addressed. Firstly, change should be studied in the context of interconnected levels 
of analysis. Secondly, temporal interconnectedness is crucial. This results in locating 
change in the past, present and future. Thirdly, context and actions ought to be 
analysed as mutually dependent elements. Highlighting at the same time that the 
term ‘context does not refer only to stimulus environment but also ‘a nested 
arrangement of structures and processes where the subjective interpretation of 
actors perceiving, comprehending, learning and remembering help to shape the 
process.’(Pettigrew, 1990:270)  
As mentioned earlier, in order to apply both industrial and organizational studies, 
Venture Capital firms are conceptualized also as equivalents of single organizations, 
which form a population – the venture capital industry. The population is embedded 
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within a community. Community is understood as a set of relationships between 
different organizational forms operating within a bounded geographical space. Those 
organizations operate interdependently with social institutions and other units of 
social structure. Through the exercised relationships resources as well as 
opportunities are channeled (Freeman & Audia, 2006).   
The emergence and development of the venture capital industry in Poland will be 
explored primarily through Institutional theory and the Resource Dependence theory 
in this study. This is because in the recent circumstances of Poland, as an exemplar 
transition economy and society, institutional and market transformations have been 
central to industry development. Application of the Resource Dependence theory 
allows tracking the flow of resources between organizations with respect to its 
scarcity. The advantages of using the Resource Dependence theory approach arise 
from embracing all participants involved in the process as well as including the 
interdependencies between them. The concept of ‘niche’ as a combination of 
resources and constraints supporting a population (Aldrich, 1999:226) might be used 
as guidance to draw the boundaries for the researched environment.  
According to Resource Dependence theory, organizations collect and interpret 
information from their environment and act upon those interpretations. Thus, further 
analysis is needed to assess the way particular organizations select which 
information to collect and what are the bases of their interpretations. The model of 
organizations as an interpretation system proposed by Daft and Weick (1984) could 
provide some valuable insight here.  
Additionally Resource Dependence theory points out issues referring to evaluation of 
organizations by stakeholders and arising from it the problem of goal conflict as well 
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as the need for building legitimacy. The employment of Institutional theory is 
believed to provide a valuable insight into the processes of establishing and 
developing strategies that ameliorate the ‘constraints’ influencing human behaviour 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; North, 1990). Moreover the role of context and path 
dependence is highlighted. Institutional theory claims that, depending on the 
background, individuals interpret the same evidence differently and thus make 
different choices. The particular interpretation of the surrounding world is grounded 
within the culture of an individual. The rules and norms accumulated within the 
culture of a society reflect the past beliefs, shape present actions and influence 
future choices (North, 1990:62). This is because the way organizations act is 
determined by the way they perceive their environment. The organization’s 
understanding of its environment is usually represented by the behaviour and 
interactions of their key stakeholders. The stakeholders’ perspective is shaped by 
their cultures and learning processes, which are individual and path dependent. 
Therefore in order to better understand the processes of an industry emergence and 
development it is necessary to acknowledge the role of context at the level of the 
stakeholders’ perceptions.  
The above theories stress the social aspect of organizations. However due to the 
nature of the venture capital industry there is a need to address the economic 
aspects of its operations. The insight might be provided by industry studies at the 
macro level and managerial studies at the micro level of analysis. The managerial 
perspective is believed to be useful because at the early stages of industry creation 
the number of organizations is limited. Thus focusing on analysis of early entrants 
could provide plausible explanations for further patterns of behaviour within the 
population. 
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Taking in account the theoretical background presented in this chapter it might be 
assumed that the Venture Capital industry in Poland will show the following features: 
1. The Venture Capital industry should become more homogenous over time 
(normalisation); 
2. Venture Capital industry emergence will unfold in set of development phases 
(phasing);  
3. The internal structure of the Venture Capital industry will reflect the incentives 
present in their economic environment (Incentivisation);  
4. The characteristics of the external environment for Venture Capital will change 
over time and at each stage will influence the shape of the industry (shaping);  
5. Venture Capital operating parameters will adjust to fit the specific environment 
encountered (adaptation); 
6. It will be necessary to understand the context of Venture Capital operations in 
order to understand its actions (motivation);  
7. The way Venture Capitalists will react to the changes to environment 
characteristics will depend on the interpretation processes of the top 
managers and will be culturally linked (sense-making);  
Based on the theoretical framework presented above, the next chapter concentrates 
on the methodology chosen for conducting data analysis.  
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4. Chapter 4  
4.1. Methodology and data collection  
The following chapter is dedicated to methodological issues related to the conducted 
research. Firstly, it discusses the positioning of the research project within the broad 
social science domain and indicates the philosophical stance undertaken. Secondly, 
it presents the methodology including its limitations. Thirdly, it describes the specially 
designed template. Fourthly, it indicates the data collection methods and data 
analysis process. The chapter ends with assessment of the validity and reliability of 
the research project.  
 
4.2. Philosophical approach  
The term ‘research philosophy’ refers to the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions about the world which form the philosophical base of the research. 
Where ontology describes the nature of reality, whereas epistemology refers to the 
nature of knowledge (Sarantakos, 2005).  
The choice of philosophical approach determines the way a project is conducted. It 
influences the mode of argumentation, the employed methodology, and the research 
design, as well as indicates the use of particular instruments.  
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Figure 12: Research pyramid 
 
Source: adopted from (Sarantakos, 2005) 
Discussion concerning the best way of conducting social research has been present 
within the philosophy of social sciences for a long time. A leading question refers to 
whether the social sciences should adopt a natural science approach, or whether 
they need to develop a special social sciences approach that would be more suitable 
(Scherer, 2003). As a consequence of the lack of consensus, social scientists have 
adopted a variety of approaches, which can be located on a continuum between two 
extreme positions: the ‘subjectivist’ approach and the ‘objectivist’ approach. Each of 
the extreme approaches exhibit clear differences in ontology, epistemology, and set 
of assumptions about human nature. This is reflected in clear differences in 
appropriate methodologies.  
The subjectivist approach, in its ontological assumptions, refers to relativism. In this 
case, reality is known only through socially constructed meanings. Because a single 
shared social reality does not exist only a set of alternative social constructions is 
available. The epistemology following on from this assumption is referred to as 
interpretivism: where the researcher and the social world coexist and influence each 
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other. According to interpretivists, an objective and value free inquiry is impossible, 
nevertheless, the researcher can be transparent about his/her assumptions and their 
employment.  
Contrary to the subjective approach, the objective approach refers to realism, which 
indicates the independent, verifiable existence of a reality. In one of its variants, 
called materialism, the distinction between the material (or physical) world and 
mental phenomena (such as beliefs) takes place. The material world is perceived as 
‘real’, and mental phenomena arise from the material world. The accompanying 
epistemology is positivist and indicates the independence of the world from the 
researcher. The facts and values in a realist approach are distinct from each other, 
thus an objective and value free inquiry is possible (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003:16-17).  
Morgan and Smircich (1980) suggested an overview of the relationships between 
ontology, epistemology and the specific assumptions about human nature followed 
within social sciences. The relationships are summarised in table below. 
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Table 3: Network of basic assumptions characterising the subjective – objective debate within social sciences   
Subjectivist 
approaches  
to social 
science  
 Objectivist  
approaches to 
social science  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ontological 
assumption 
Reality as a 
projection of human 
imagination 
Reality as 
social 
construction 
Reality as a 
realm of 
symbolic 
discourse 
Reality as 
contextual 
field of 
analysis  
Reality as a 
concrete 
process 
Reality as a 
concrete structure 
Assumption 
about human 
nature 
Man as pure spirit, 
consciousness being  
Man as social 
constructor, the 
symbol creator 
Man as an 
actor, symbol 
user 
Man as 
information 
processor 
Man as an 
adaptor 
Man as a 
responder 
Epistemological 
stance 
To obtain 
phenomenological  
insight  
To understand 
how social 
reality is 
created 
To understand 
patterns of 
symbolic 
disclosure 
To map 
context 
To study 
system, 
processes, 
change 
To construct a 
positivist science 
Research 
methods 
Exploration of pure 
subjectivity 
hermeneutics 
Symbolic 
analysis 
Contextual 
analysis of 
Gestalten  
Historical 
analysis 
Case study 
Lab experiment, 
survey  
Source: adapted from (Morgan & Smircich, 1980) 
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The two poles of the spectrum (1 and 7) represent extremely different views on the 
world. The subjectivist approach (1), views reality as product of individual 
interpretation. The main focus is given to understanding the process by which human 
beings construct their relationships with their world. The knowledge produced 
represents the scientist’s individual interpretation of the surrounding reality (Morgan 
& Smircich, 1980). The subjective experience of individuals in the creation of a social 
world becomes the central focus (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). The subjective approach 
in its assumptions challenges fundamentally the idea of the existence of ‘objective’ 
knowledge.  
Contrary to the above stance, the objective approach assumes, along with the realist 
assumptions, that the world exists independently of individuals’ perceptions. It 
consists of a ‘concrete structure’. Thus the relationship between the elements of the 
structure may be the subject of scientific investigation. It favours the ‘objective’ form 
of knowledge that uncovers ‘laws, regulations and relationships among phenomena 
measured in terms of social facts’ (Morgan & Smircich, 1980:493). Thus the 
researcher focuses on explaining the social world by searching for regularities and 
causal relationships between its consistent elements, using the methodologies 
present in natural sciences (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). The assumptions about human 
nature are also polarised between the extreme positions. The subjectivist approach 
perceives human beings as creators and controllers of the environment, whereas the 
objectivist approach perceives humans as conditioned and mechanistic in their 
responses to environment (Burrell & Morgan,1979). The approaches between these 
two poles or extreme types represent variations on the continuum between the 
presented extremes. The transition between them happens gradually and often one 
position may incorporate insights from others (Morgan & Smircich, 1980).  
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An unequivocal categorisation of the presented research, based on the philosophical 
paradigms taxonomy described above, is problematic. Following the mainstream 
research does not provide a clear answer. Considering one of the leading theories, 
Institutional theory, a variety of approaches is seen. As Bowring (2000) and Suddaby 
(2010) indicated, Institutional theory has been shifting paradigms over time. A 
transition from an interpretative to a positivist approach has taken place. According 
to Suddaby (2010) this change was driven by methodological issues, mainly by the 
increased number of quantitative research projects within the field similarly to the 
case of entrepreneurship studies. In consequence, the focus on measuring 
organizational outcomes concealed the core interest of the Institutional theory; that 
is, concentration on reasons and motives. He advocates rich case study research, 
which will perceive organizations as interpretative mechanisms.  
The second leading theory, Resource Dependence theory, provides ontological and 
epistemological challenges as well. The theory itself is perceived by academics as 
influential and one of the most comprehensive organization theories (Davis & Cobb, 
2010; Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009). Although, it has been widely utilized among 
a range of disciplines such as management, sociology, education or public policy 
(Davis & Cobb, 2010) the empirical research has concentrated on basic tenets of the 
theory (Hillman et al., 2009). Resource Dependence theory has been criticised for 
being more an approach than a theory, and the need for further theoretical 
development has been widely articulated (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Hillman et al., 
2009). 
Despite the limitations arising from these two theories, it is believed that a 
combination of both can provide a valuable insight into organizations. Resource 
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Dependence theory concentrates on the way organizations acquire and maintain the 
required resource by utilizing power relations, whereas the Institutional theory is able 
to shed light on the mode in which power is distributed.  
The following research focuses on understanding the emergence and development 
of a national venture capital industry, which is characterised as a highly specialized 
financial service. Additional challenge for the analysis arises from the post socialist 
background of the host country. Researching emerging industries presents 
ontological and epistemological challenges. It requires a holistic and interdisciplinary 
approach, the extended use of qualitative and historical data, as well as engagement 
of key practitioners in the process (Forbes & Kirsch, 2011). Referring to the set of 
paradigms proposed by Morgan and Smircich (1980) the presented research, in its 
principal assumptions, tends towards the objectivist approach although it does not 
reach the more extreme conclusions. It represents the statements between rows 5 
and 6, which following Guba and Lincoln (1994) might be also referred to as close to 
‘post-positivism’. It is assumed that reality exists, however due to its complexity and 
the nature of human intellectual mechanisms it cannot be fully understood. Reality 
should be widely examined in order to construct the most comprehensive picture, 
which however never will be perfect. While generating knowledge, the idea of 
objectivity remains crucial, thus emphasis is given to validation of findings. 
Furthermore, the replicated results are probably useful however remain always a 
subject to falsification. The knowledge is accumulated and serves as ‘building 
blocks’, which after reaching critical mass allows for generalizations (Guba & Lincoln, 
1994).  
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The research questions put emphasis on the ongoing process (emergence of an 
industry), which is embedded in a specific historical context (i.e. post soviet 
economy). In order to answer the research questions the analysis is going to discuss 
the following issues: how the process of emergence unfolds, what are the 
elements/actors of the process, what are their roles, how are they related to each 
other, why they unfold/act in certain way, and what are the consequences of such 
behaviour. Also considered is how time and space shapes those processes.  
Taking into account the nature of the research questions, and the characteristics of 
the data needed to answer them, especially the complex character of the 
phenomena and the extended role of human interactions, the qualitative approach is 
believed to provide the broadest insight. There are three major factors in favour of 
qualitative methods in this particular case.  
• Firstly, the knowledge of the researched phenomena is limited thus 
exploratory research is needed (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008).  
• Secondly, the qualitative methods provide ‘thick description’, which allow 
capturing the complexity of researched phenomena. They allow better 
understanding of aspects of the inquiry that remained unclear in quantitative 
studies (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008).  
• Thirdly, following Denzin and Lincoln’s (1994), qualitative research allows the 
study of things in their natural settings, thus making possible attempts to 
interpret phenomena in terms of meanings that people bring to them.  
Therefore, the proposed explanations acknowledge the context in which the 
research phenomenon is placed. Additionally, because there are no set preferences 
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toward any methodology, multiple methods and perspectives may be combined, 
which in consequence enriches the final picture providing the findings are consistent 
with each other. Qualitative methods will be also more suitable for managing and 
interpreting the collected data, which come from variety of sources and are not 
quantifiable. The collected data may be subject to different interpretations depending 
on the perspective taken, because they refer to reasons and motivations rather than 
to deterministic results. A quantitative approach is not suitable in this case, because 
the necessary data would not be provided readily from within the ‘privacy oriented’ 
industry, further it would not be verifiable due to privacy restrictions. And finally such 
data would anyway be incomplete for many stages of the industry cycle, and thus not 
be a credible basis for quantitative analysis. These three constraints severely limit 
quantitative analysis of Venture Capital both emerging and industrialised countries. 
The US and the UK remain exceptions in that more credible data sets are available.  
Within the research, emergence of industry is going to be perceived and analysed as 
a process. This is defined by Pettigrew as ‘a sequence of individual and collective 
events, actions and activities unfolding over time in contest.’ (Pettigrew, 1997:338). 
The main supposition referring to the emergence of industry is aligned with the 
‘process thinking‘ approach which assumes that social reality is a dynamic. Within 
this understanding, actions drive processes. However, processes cannot be 
explained simply by combining individual or collective actions. Actions are embedded 
in context, ‘which limits their information insight and influence’. The mutual 
interdependence between agents performing the actions and the context in which 
the actions take place have to be acknowledged (Pettigrew, 1997).   
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Within organizational studies, context is understood as surroundings associated with 
phenomena, which help to illuminate that phenomenon (Johns, 2001:31). These are 
circumstances, conditions, situations or environments that are external to the 
research phenomena and enable and/or constrain it (Welter, 2011:106). They 
provide frames for organizational behaviours as well as attitudes (Johns, 2001). The 
effects of context on the research results might be both subtle and powerful. 
According to Johns (2006), context is not sufficiently recognized and acknowledged, 
whereas it might be useful in providing explanation for such issues as: variation in 
study-to-study research findings, anomalous research findings, or ‘missing linkages’ , 
that explains how individual or team activities shape organizational outcomes.  
Context may be manifested in many ways. As referred to earlier, it can be 
considered as a set of situational opportunities for, or constraints on, particular 
organizational behaviours. Context might create so called ‘strong situations’. A 
‘strong situation’ is characterised by obvious norms and rigid roles, which tend to 
constrain the expression of individual differences. ‘Weak situations’ on the other 
hand provide more opportunities for the expression of such differences (Johns, 
2006).  
Acknowledging the multiple faces of context, Johns (2006) proposes a two 
dimensional analysis. The first dimension is referred as ‘omnibus context’ and draws 
attention to broad perspective, concentrating on such questions as: who, where, 
when and why. The second dimension is referred as ‘discrete context’ and focuses 
on specific situational variables that influence behaviour directly, or moderate 
relationships between variables; it includes tasks context, social context and physical 
context.  
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The difficulties in studies of context arise mainly due to the absence of a good 
taxonomy and the lack of systematic descriptive language (Johns, 2006). This 
present research study tries to overcome this difficulty by applying a tailor-made 
template, which is discussed in detail later in this chapter. This new template seeks 
to guide the data collection and analyses and not limit it.  
Referring to the previous section, Resource Dependence theory and the Institutional 
theory were presented as the dominant theories for explaining the researched 
phenomenon. In both cases the philosophical assumptions underpinning these 
theories are weighted towards the objective approach, applying the taxonomy of 
Morgan and Smircich op. cit. earlier. The social world is perceived as fluid. It 
represents a struggle between various influences, each attempting to move toward 
the achievement of desired ends. Relationships can thus be described as relative 
rather than fixed. Humans are engaged in continuous interaction with their 
environment or context (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). In case of the Venture Capital 
industry, the actions undertaken by individual firms (i.e. general partnership) aim to 
generate the highest possible financial return on the managed capital and enhance 
General Partners’’ bargaining position on the market especially regarding raising of 
subsequent funds. The character of interactions in which Venture Capital enters with 
its environment (represented by other organizations and individuals) has a dual 
nature. Depending on the case, it might have competitive or cooperative nature or 
both together as do most real world industries and firms. However, it is assumed that 
fund managers seek to exploit their environment to enhance their performance.  
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4.3. Challenges for the adopted methodology  
As mentioned before, the emergence of the industry is perceived as a process. The 
building blocks for starting the process analysis are events, sequenced 
chronologically. The undertaken methodology should allow organizing of the data, 
and a subsequent search for governing mechanisms. The mechanisms may be 
directly observable as well as be inferred from the context. Therefore, understanding 
the sequence and flow of critical events is crucial for the analysis. Additionally, the 
methodology should allow acknowledgement that simultaneous processes may (and 
indeed must) take place at different levels of observation, as well as multiple 
processes taking place at the same level of observation. Multiple perspectives allow 
the linking of these processes with a particular outcome (Pettigrew, 1997).   
Considering these requirements for the methodology, a case study approach is 
believed to fit best. The case study, following Yin (2003) is perceived as a research 
strategy rather than a strict method. The case study is broadly understood as: a 
research project which attempts to explain holistically the dynamics of a certain 
period of a particular social unit (Stoecker, 1991:97-98). In more details it is refers to 
an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and 
within its real-life contexts, especially when the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 2003:18).  
Following Cassell and Symon (2004) a case study is particularly well suited to 
examine social and organizational process in the emerging stages. It allows 
production of detailed and holistic knowledge of the researched phenomena 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). Moreover, it acknowledges the role of context as an 
integral part of the analysis (Cassell & Symon, 2004; Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008).  
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Stoecker (1991) points out that a case study has got an advantage over a statistical 
association arising from the fact that, although a variety of explanations can be 
applied, only careful analysis of the historical causal process allows us to see which 
theoretical perspective provides the best explanation. Additionally, application of 
statistical analysis will not easily capture many of the historical and idiosyncratic 
features of processes under investigation.  
Similarly to Grounded theory, the case study provides both descriptive and 
exploratory approaches to the studied issues. It also acknowledges the crucial role of 
context and employs a wide range of data sources. However, the major reason for 
preferring the case study as the strategy for data analysis is the approach toward 
existing theories. According to Grounded theory the collected data are used to 
generate a theory (Collis & Hussey, 2009:84). When first approaching the research, 
the researcher should minimize the number of predetermined ideas. The theories set 
‘a priori’ are perceived as imposing boundaries for the possible interpretation of 
gathered data (Collis & Hussey, 2009). The case study approach does not impose 
those restrictions. It allows both the building and testing of a theory on the base of 
collected evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, for the purpose of the research, a case 
study approach seems to provide the best analytical tool.  
The objective of the research is to construct an intensive case study, which 
concentrates on understanding, providing a thick, holistic and contextualized insight 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008) into the emergence and development of the Polish 
Venture Capital industry. The collection and analysis of the data is guided by a 
template presented below.  
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4.4. Framework for theory application 
Organizations can be analysed at three different levels of observation. Each of those 
levels provides different outcomes (Aldrich, 1999; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Taking 
the most complex perspective, at the highest level of aggregation, organizations 
operate within communities of populations. The dynamics occur between different 
populations within a community, and the resulting relationships may be either based 
on competition or symbiosis (Aldrich, 1999). For the purpose of the following 
research, the community level observation refers to the interactions between the 
venture capital industry and the populations of other organizations having impact on 
it, such as i.e. banks, universities and entrepreneurs. The main focus is given to the 
processes taking place between the populations as collectives. The second level of 
observation considers the individual population, an ‘industry’, and processes 
occurring within the industry. The focal point here is the dynamics of the venture 
capital industry. The third level of analysis refers to the individual organizations. At 
this level the individual venture capital funds and their characteristics became of 
primary interest. Regardless of the chosen level of observation, the role of context 
has to be incorporated.  
 
4.5. A Venture Capital template  
4.5.1. Template - construction  
In order to guide the evaluation of the interrelationships taking place within the 
Venture Capital community at different levels of analysis, the research developed a 
new template. The template utilizes existing literature to elicit environmental factors 
affecting the venture capital industry in developed economies. A map of the venture 
capital industry infrastructure is constructed. However, it should be emphasised that 
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because the constructed template pictures the situation in the developed economies, 
it is used as a guide line and reference point, not as a fixed frame. There are no 
intentions to limit the analysis exclusively to the elements of the initial template, and, 
if needed, some modifications will be introduced to accommodate the new context of 
transforming economies, here the Polish case.  
The template borrows from existing frameworks present in the organizational 
literature. The key framework to be employed was originally formulated by Van de 
Ven and Garud (1987) to assess emergence of an industry, and was later modified 
by Van de Ven (1993a; 1993b) to provide a macro perspective view on 
developments on infrastructure for entrepreneurship. The proposed framework 
considers industry as a social system, which by performing a set of functions allows 
the conversion of a technological innovation into a ‘commercially viable line of 
products or services delivered to customers’ (Garud & Van de Ven, 1987:318). The 
three subsystems under consideration consisted of: the instrumental subsystem 
(individual firms within the industry); the resource endowments subsystem (providing 
material support for the instrumental subsystem); and the institutional subsystem 
(providing norms and regulations regulating functions of the above). The later 
framework adds complexity, although keeping the three pillars’ structure. It consists 
of institutional arrangements (legitimation, governance and technology); resource 
endowments (scientific research, financing, human capital) and proprietary functions 
(technological development functions, innovation network channel activities, market 
creation and consumer demand).  
The template created for the purpose of the following research shares the main 
assumptions about the nature of infrastructure creation. Firstly, the elements of 
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environment should not be treated as ‘externalities’ to the examined industry. 
Incorporation of these elements into the framework allows the interdependencies 
between them happening over time, and the resultant developing of the 
infrastructure, to be followed. Focusing on the inter-organizational community as a 
unit of analysis provides a more inclusive perspective than the traditional industrial 
economics. Secondly, the emergence of infrastructure requires ‘accretion of 
numerous instrumental, resource, and proprietary events that co-produce each other 
over an extended period.’ (Van De Ven, 1993b:212). Thirdly, the institutional 
arrangements along with the resource endowments facilitating the industry can both 
boost and hinder its development.  
The framework proposed by Verheul et al. (2001), similarly to the theory presented 
above, concentrates on evaluation of entrepreneurship. However, it distinguishes 
two levels of observation - the macro-perspective and micro-perspective. While 
applying the macro lenses the authors isolate demand and supply factors influencing 
the level of entrepreneurship. The demand side consists of a combination of such 
features as: the stage of economic development, globalization, and the stage of 
technological development, which each create opportunities for entrepreneurship. 
The supply side is represented by the size and level of consumption (demand) of the 
population. The population is analysed from the age structure, population density, 
level of urbanization, number of immigrants, and proportion of women in the labour 
market. Additionally it acknowledges the micro-perspective. It points out the input of 
decisions made by individuals on the supply and demand size, especially the 
influence on individual characteristics, the risk – reward profile and the recognition of 
opportunities. Within both levels of analysis and in contrary to Van de Ven’s 
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approach, the environment factors are treated as external to the phenomena of 
entrepreneurship.    
Ahmad and Hoffmann (2008) within the OECD framework addressing and measuring 
entrepreneurship, take a less theoretical approach compared to the ones above.  
Authors isolate six themes referred as ‘entrepreneurship determinants’. These are: 
regulatory framework, market conditions, access to finance, R&D and technology, 
entrepreneurial capabilities and finally culture.  
Although the discussed frameworks focus on entrepreneurship, not directly on 
venture capital, they provide a useful theoretical base. Venture Capital is usually 
acknowledged within those frameworks as part of ‘access to finance’ or ‘resource 
endowments’, depending on labelling.  
In contrast to the above examples, Schoefer and Leitinger (2002) constructed a 
framework dedicated directly to venture capital. They used it as a theoretical basis 
for investigating venture capital in Central and Eastern Europe. The main focus was 
given to four ‘dimensions’ which the Authors found crucial for the emergence of 
venture capital investments. These were: economic environment, legal environment, 
social environment and entrepreneurial spirit. Later within the study they used the 
quantitative data to assign points for each element of the environment and ranked 
the CEE countries accordingly. Poland although indicated as a leader in the region, 
in reference to fund raising and fund investment, was ranked as the least attractive 
for Venture Capital investment. It was ranked 7th with (6.71) points behind the leader 
- Estonia (9.38) and Hungary (9.20) However, comparing the theoretical assumption 
of this framework to the entrepreneurship frameworks it identifies the same 
principles. The semantics might differ but the core stays the same. 
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The template created for purpose of the following study employs the theoretical roots 
set out above. It was constructed in two steps. During the first stage, the existing 
venture capital literature was reviewed and key articles discussing the venture 
capital environment were extracted5. The articles discussed either theoretical, or 
empirical, or both aspects. Afterwards, they were grouped according to the 
environmental factor discussed. Then the factors were clustered into themes. Further 
the data collected from the field will be confronted with this template.   
 
Figure 13: The Venture Capital template 
  
                                                 
5
 The articles were selected based on being published in leading academic journals e.g. the Academy 
of Management Journal, Venture Capital, Journal of Business Venturing, Journal of Private Equity, or 
Entrepreneurship, Theory and Practice.  
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4.5.2. Template – discussion 
The template isolates and groups factors influencing the Venture Capital industry 
which are most frequently cited in the literature. It is intended to serve as a blue-print 
for further analysis. However there are challenges in implementing this template. 
Firstly the number of factors is high and they are all given the same weighting. This 
has implications especially in time needed; choice of data; what to analyse, priorities; 
and when to stop. Secondly, there are no straight forward indicators for assessing 
adequate hierarchy of factors. Thirdly, there might still exist factors, on which 
literature is silent, which are important for the pace or/and direction of Venture 
Capital industry development. Additionally, in order to produce a coherent final 
analysis effective data collection and management is required.  
Although the six main themes are believed to provide the core factors responsible for 
the shape of a Venture Capital industry in developed economies, the hierarchy of 
factors for the researched Venture Capital industry should be revised individually and 
in line with the particular context. In order to emerge and operate Venture Capital 
requires existence of a market for its services. Therefore the first element to be taken 
in account is the legal infrastructure, because it affects all stakeholders in the 
industry and creates a common platform for exchange. The legal structure analysis 
is followed by mapping the relationships between stakeholders in the industry. The 
highlights are given to the investors and entrepreneurs as the actors most closely 
connected to Venture Capital firms. This sequence is aligned with the Armour and 
Cumming (2006) argument that the influence of legal and institutional variables is 
stronger than economic ones. The market conditions as the provider of opportunities 
is given attention next followed by characteristics of Venture Capital funds and 
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influence of culture. As mentioned before the influence of culture is both discrete and 
powerful.  
It should be acknowledged that the strength of influence of particular factors is also 
related to the initial conditions. Each of the countries going though the transformation 
process started with a different set of initial conditions. Therefore, for example, the 
role of legal rules related to private ownership will be different in countries which had 
an abundance of private firms compared to those which allowed exceptions.  
To provide a plausible explanation for the identified processes occurring within and 
between each of the key teams, one or more of the above theories can be applied. In 
all of the cases the Institutional theory could be used. While discussing themes (2) 
‘other organizations’ and (3) ‘entrepreneurs’ the Resource Dependence theory 
provides further possible explanation. The theories may both challenge each other 
thus provide competing explanations. Conversely, different theoretical lenses may 
complement each other thus enriching the explanation provided by a single theory.  
 
Figure 14: Proposed framework for theory application:  
 
Theory/level of analysis 
Community 
level 
Population 
level 
Individual 
level 
(A) Institutional theory x x x 
(B) Resource Dependence 
theory 
x x x 
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4.6. Case study presentation  
The research is constructed as a single case study. Because the research is 
qualitative, the case was selected based on purposive sampling, where units are 
chosen because of their particular features (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). The objective of 
the case is to reflect particular features, which are believed to enable exploration and 
understanding of central issues for the conducted research and not intended to be 
statistically representative (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003).  
Poland has been chosen as the case study for several reasons. Firstly, it has the 
largest economy in the Central-Eastern Europe region. Secondly, has experienced 
major institutional changes in the last twenty years. Additionally, it has been the first 
country to start the process of transformation, and thus served, to some extent, as a 
blue-print for other countries in the region. Thirdly, the Polish Venture Capital 
industry is believed to be the most advanced in the Central – Eastern Europe region 
(Klonowski, 2011). In 2011 Poland invested 681 M Euro in 57 companies, compared 
to the second ranked Hungary which invested 195 M Euro in 37 companies. The 
study is helped by the fact that the researcher is a native Pole and is resident in 
Poland. However, it is believed that the lessons learned from the Polish example 
may be seen as having a wider and more generic relevance than to one European 
country in transition. 
The time frame for the analysis is set from 1989 until the present. The year 1989 
covers two major events in the genesis and development of Venture Capital in 
Poland. The collapse of the Communist system, which opened the road to a market 
economy, and the creation of the Polish American Enterprise Fund, which was the 
first such fund created and helped to trigger the nascent Polish Venture Capital 
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industry. Although the starting date of the research period is firmly set by the two 
catalysing events noted above, where appropriate the analyses cite critical 
contextual factors prior to 1989.  
 
4.7. Data collection  
Researching emerging industries requires a holistic approach, often involving 
collaboration across several streams of macro-level entrepreneurial behaviour, 
extended use of qualitative and historical data, as well as engagement of key 
practitioners into the process (Forbes & Kirsch, 2011). Following Van de Ven’s 
postulate of ‘engaged scholarship’, the research aims to identify and investigate the 
different perspectives of the key stakeholders (Van de Ven, 2007) involved into 
Venture Capital industry.  
The process of data collection in case of the Venture Capital industry is constrained 
by access issues. The industry is characterised by uncertainty and information 
asymmetries across range of operational dimensions. Effective collection and 
efficient information analysis creates the competitive advantage of a successful fund 
(Gompers & Lerner, 2001). Venture Capital firms often act as gatekeepers and share 
information selectively. The available statistical data should be taken with 
consideration for the following reasons. The data are collected by the Polish Private 
Equity Association on voluntary basis only among its members. The data are often 
incomplete and difficult to verify. Additionally, taking in account that the vast majority 
of the association members represent Private Equity rather than Venture Capital 
investors the data are biased toward large investments. According to information 
obtained during the interviews, it is impossible to estimate what percentage of the 
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market is covered by those statistics. Additionally, there is a number of funds 
specialising in early stage investments, which are not members of the association 
and do not plan to become so6.    
These specific conditions had to be taken under consideration while planning both 
the sources and mode of collecting data.  
In order to capture multiple perspectives, the data were collected from various 
sources and refer both to the Polish Venture Capital industry and its environment. 
The secondary data sources include legal documents, official documents published 
by government, funds, trade associations, public institutions, and industrial statistics 
published both by governmental and international sources. The primary data arise 
from interviews and observations. Several interviews were conducted with key public 
and private actors. The goal was to interview a range of actors representing different 
stakeholders. Despite the access constraints, described earlier, it was possible to 
interview 15 participants. In the case of two contributors, follow up interviews were 
requested and conducted. A number of the participants were selected and contacted 
independently. This technique was effective with public bodies however, significantly 
less fruitful with Venture Capitalists. Other participants were recruited by network 
sampling or recommendation of previous participants. The possible biases were 
minimized by ensuring that participants represented different stakeholders. The 
interview method was chosen over a standardised survey questionnaire because it 
allows generation of rich data (Schultze & Avital, 2011). The research focuses on 
‘what’ and ‘how’ types of questions, additionally participants were experts in their 
professions therefore guided, open-ended question interviews were conducted. 
                                                 
6
 Interview with Venture Capitalist  
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Following Aberbach & Rockman (2002) the open-ended questions provide better 
opportunity of respondents to organize their answers within their own framework, 
which increases the validity and is best for the exploratory research. Moreover, such 
approach provides better rapport because elites especially, as well as well educated 
people, do not like to be confronted with strict closed-end questions. The drawbacks 
of the selected method arise from its time consumption related to arranging and 
conducting the interview in first instance, and later by transcribing (Aberbach & 
Rockman, 2002). Also due to the amount of collected data the analysis was more 
difficult compared to closed-end question type of interview.  
Each of the interviews took between 40 minutes and 1.5 hour. Depending on the 
schedule of the participant they took place either face-to-face7 or via phone. In order 
to assure ethical standards while conducting research all participants were provided 
with informed consent in their mother tongue before the interview. Although 
confidentiality was guaranteed, not all participants agreed to be recorded. In such 
cases only hand notes were taken. The recorded interviews were transcribed and, 
along with interview notes, were made anonymous.  
Additionally to the conducted interviews the researcher attended meetings and 
conferences organized to promote Business Angels and Venture Capital financing 
opened for entrepreneurs. The non-participant technique of observation was 
practiced. In order to avoid ethical conflicts no electronic recording equipment has 
been used. Also the information used in analysis was publicly available.  
 
 
                                                 
7
 10 interviews were conducted face to face and 5 by phone 
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Table 4: Sources of data 
 
Primary data 
Interviews Conferences and workshops 
 Fund managers (private – 3 interviews; 
co-financed with National Capital Fund 
– 1 interview ; hybrid public-private fund 
– 1 interview) 
 National Capital Fund (investment 
manager – 1 interview) 
 Entrepreneur – 2 interviews 
 Technology transfer centre/technology 
parks (2 interviews with Polish 
managers, 2 interviews with British 
managers)  
 Polish Private Equity Association 
(President – 1 interview, vice – 
President – 1 interview) 
 Expert – 1 interview 
 Layer – 1 interview 
o (total: 15) 
 ‘Patent na własność – jak 
skutecznie chronić własność 
intelektualną’ Pomorski Park 
Naukowo Technologiczny, Gdynia 
(26.10.2010)  
 ‘Z Aniołem do sukcesu w Biznesie’ – 
Ponadregionalna sieć Aniołów 
Biznesu – Innowacja, Warszawa, 
(14.04.2011) 
 ‘Giełda Produktów Finansowych – 
Inicjatywa JEREMIE dla Pomorza’, 
AmberExpo, Gdańsk (30.05.2012) 
 Dr. Burton Lee ‘Successful 
entrepreneurship – Silicon Valley 
Start-up culture’, Inkubator 
STARTER, Gdańsk (18.04.2013)  
o (total: 4) 
Secondary data 
 Legal documents 
 Official documents published by government, 
 Official documents published by funds, 
 Official documents published by associations, 
 Official documents published by other public institutions, 
 Industrial statistics; 
 Publications in journals, 
 Historical data collected by EUROSTAT and GUS 
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4.8. Data analysis 
The collected data, with just a few exceptions, are qualitative in their character. 
Maintaining the rigour of analysis in such a situation is extremely important and at 
the same time challenging. There are several strategies presented in the literature, 
which aim to help in overcoming such problems.  
The research adapts the organization theory as a leading approach to investigate the 
Venture Capital industry in Poland. Thus it concentrates on constructs, understood 
as theoretical formulations about researched phenomenon Gioia et al. (2013). 
However, constructs often are unable to be measured. Gioia et al. (2013) proposed a 
strategy, which helps maintaining the rigour of data analysis while creating a basis 
for further theory construction. The strict data analysis follows three steps. In the ‘1st-
order’ analysis authors create codes while holding to the terms used by informants. 
They call these 1st order concepts. During the second step, authors are seeking 
similarities and differences among the earlier categories and create ‘2nd-order 
theoretical level of themes’. The emerging themes suggest concepts that might be 
used to describe and explain the observed phenomena. The last stage creates 
aggregated dimensions. These sequential steps together create a basis for building 
a data structure (Gioia et al., 2013).       
The presented research applies the idea of ‘1st order concepts’ and ‘2nd order 
themes’. However, it does it in a modified way. The following section describes the 
process of data analysis. In order to efficiently manage and analyse the large 
amount of collected contextual data a computer software package was used (NVIVO 
version 8) throughout the whole process.  
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Construction of the template presented earlier required a thorough literature review. 
At this stage the template analysis strategy proposed by King (2004) was used. This 
method was chosen because it offers a flexible approach to researching multiple 
perspectives of various groups operating within organizational context. Moreover, 
due to the way template analysis is conducted, it allows the effective management of 
large amount of textual data.  
Template analysis refers to a group of related techniques allowing the thematic 
organization and analysis of textual data. At the core of this approach, the 
researcher formulates a set of codes (‘the template’) representing themes identified 
in the textual data. The initial template is applied to analyse the text though the 
process of coding. Additionally, during the process of coding the template is itself 
modified. 
In this particular case, the initial themes (the initial ‘template) are derived from the 
existing literature on the Venture Capital industry in developed economies. At the 
first stage the codes represented the factors influencing Venture Capital industry 
activities and performance described in the literature.   
Later codes are arranged in such a way that they cluster together creating a main 
theme thereby generating a ‘higher order code’. In this case the codes were grouped 
and created the main labels for the template. For example, the lower-order codes 
such as: legal origins, property rights, and tax regulations were later specified under 
a higher-order code of regulatory framework.  
The hierarchical arrangement of codes allows the analysis of data at different levels 
of specificity. The broad (higher–order) codes give the general direction and highlight 
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the main researched issues whereas the detailed (lower–order) codes allow the 
search for distinctions present within as well as between codes (King, 2004). 
The data collection process was led by the initial template based on ‘1st order 
codes’. However, while constructing the semi-structured interviews the researcher 
was very careful not to limit the interviewees in their responses. So in case any new 
factors arrive they would not be omitted.  
In a modification to the method presented by Gioia et al (2013), the initial codes were   
already given by the template derived from the literature, not from the data. The 
collected data at the first stage were sorted according to the broad subjects 
discussed (the main themes of template). At the second stage they were coded into 
1st order concepts, as proposed by Gioia et al (2013). The third step required further 
clustering into 2nd order themes. The Table below shows examples of coding the 
interviews.  
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Table 5: coding (example)  
 
Template (set a 
priori) 
First order concepts within groups 2
nd
 order themes 
Regulatory 
framework 
No one want to be first to fight with tax authorities 
Attitudes toward taxation Tax law is bad 
Tax  law is over-regulated  
Would like government to tidy up legal system 
Requests toward the legal system  
Need for transparency  
Suspicious treatment from tax authorities  
Problematic interpretation of rules 
Registration of funds abroad  
Practices to avoid taxation Use of tax havens  
Ideas how to avoid double taxation 
System is not bad  
Attitudes toward legal regulations 
It was supposed to be good (but it’s not)  
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Legal regulations in many cases do not apply VC funds in Poland 
No legal obstacle 
Other organizations   
Government(direct 
actions)  
No policy toward venture capital  
Lack of long term policies toward 
Venture Capital  
It wasn’t effect of detailed planning  
National Capital Fund  
National Fund is serving its role  
National Capital Fund activities in 
eyes of interviewees  
Flooding market with money 
The mechanism is inefficient  
Influence on development of the industry  
There are technically and economically bankrupt firms  
Efficiency of National Capital Fund’s 
actions  
No exit from deals  
We are restricted by the cap on investment 
Constraining factors for National 
Capital Fund’s portfolio funds  
Government (indirect 
actions) Structural 
It’s much easier to spend public money  
Impact of Structural programs on 
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programs  Very negative for industry Venture Capital  
Programs didn’t increase professionalization  
Object of political game 
Allowed people to start their own business  
Impact of Structural programs on 
Entrepreneurs  
Good for entrepreneurs  
Responsibility of the beneficiary is huge, for the civil servant is none 
It’s a way to earn extra money 
Major weaknesses of the Structural 
programs 
No specifications on distribution procedures  
Business models are not adopted to the market reality 
Business Angels 
To be rich in Poland is difficult  
Constrains toward being a Business 
Angel  
Many interesting projects are supported by wealthy Poles 
Business Angels presence in the 
industry   
There are many Business Angels but they don’t want to be talked about 
A group of wealthy people/not formal  
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Technology 
Parks/Technology 
Transfer Centres  
Monthly meetings are not popular  
Opinions on Technology 
Parks/Technology Transfer Centres  
Everyone is very pleased with the meetings  
Technology parks are estate investments  
Invested a lot in infrastructure and now have to fill in the space  
No high tech firms among clients  Quality of projects supported by 
Technology Parks/Technology 
Transfer Centres The activities do not translate into investment activities  
Universities  
Government wants good statistics  Policy toward universities  
Scientists are able to waste money  
Researchers attitudes toward 
business 
There is stagnation at the university  
Good salary compared to market  
No motivation to change  
Scientist have no interest in patenting  
Universities do not understand that time is money  
We cooperate but there is a lot of barriers  
Cooperation between Universities and 
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We tried twice to cooperate and failed  business  
Procedures are present  
Developed models to share technology   
Entrepreneurs 
Lack of entrepreneurs with good projects  
Quality of entrepreneurial ventures  
Few good projects 
Entrepreneurs do not engage in projects  
Perceived personal characteristics  
Entrepreneurs do not understand the value of company  
Market conditions 
Not reliable market 
Perceived negative features of the 
New Connect Market   
Corrupted investors 
High risk involvement  
Lack of innovative firms  
Investors will have problems  
Problem with collecting money later 
Lack of liquidity 
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Polish research pointless for commercialization 
Opinions on Polish R&D 
Institutions which suppose to support innovation do not meet requirements of business 
Need for exit option  
Perceived positive features of the 
New Connect Market   
Place where demand meets supply  
 It allows learning process  
Culture 
There is very little trust between citizens and the state  
Mutual trust between members of the 
industry  
Business Angels are afraid of personal risk  
Entrepreneurs don’t want external investors because are afraid of losing their businesses  
The fundamental difference in Poland lies in the amount of stealing  
Funds 
Management teams are professional  
Management team  Management teams are weak  
Management team background is from finance 
Polish Venture Capital is more like Private equity  
Venture Capital’s offer  
Besides money do not offer any support  
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Offered only money  
Good projects are most important for Venture Capital  Venture Capital needs  
They want too much control 
Entrepreneurs’ Attitudes toward 
Venture Capital  
There are legal possibilities to take over my company  
 
The secondary data collection was also guided by the template. At the first 
stage the data were ordered according to the heading (treated as second order 
codes) and subheading (treated as first order codes) of the template. Any data 
that could not be classified this way was treated according to the Gioia et al 
(2013) method.  
Finally, the second order themes allowed testing of the theoretical assumptions 
presented in the theory chapter (the normalisation of industry; phasing; 
Incentivisation etc) with the empirical findings.  
Employing this approach allows the researcher to keep the analysis flexible and 
adjusted to the needs of conducted research. At the same time, the presence of 
a structured template assures an organized approach toward handling large 
amount of textual data. This helps to produce unambiguous conclusions. As a 
result of applying this method data collected during interviews and secondary 
data are grouped thematically under headings provided by the constructed 
template.  
The drawbacks of the discussed method arrive from two main sources. Firstly, 
the literature covering the methodology, when compared to e.g. grounded 
theory or discourse analysis, is limited. Thus, there are less available guidelines 
for data collection and analysis compared to the above methods. Secondly, the 
coding process has to be done carefully in order to avoid the situation where 
there are either too many or not enough codes. Only a well balanced coding 
structure will provide a base for thorough analysis that is neither too shallow nor 
too descriptive. The template used in the research is based on the existing 
literature. This allows the assumption that the main codes which are used for 
the data analysis are already verified by other researchers.  
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While analysing textual data, besides the above discussed template analysis 
strategy, the reflexive methodology proposed by Alvesson (2011) will also be 
applied as complementary method. This method should help in capturing the 
impact of the context on the research phenomena. The reflexivity focus on 
‘conscious and consistent effort to view subject matter from different angles, 
strongly avoiding the priority privileged of a favoured one, including a focus on 
the details of the text.’ (Alvesson 2011: 106). In other words it should help to 
acknowledge information that is not necessary are driven by the text itself, by 
opening discussion on context and alternative explanations.  
 
4.9. Generalizability, reliability and validity  
The three concepts: generalizability, reliability and validity provide the basic 
framework for evaluation of the social sciences research (Eriksson & 
Kovalainen, 2008).  
Generalization concerns the issue whether the research results may be applied 
beyond the examined study, into a wider context (Collis & Hussey, 2009). While 
quantitative methods use statistical tools to assure genaralizablity, the case 
study generalizes to theoretical propositions (Yin, 2003). It means that a case 
does not represent a ‘sample’ in a statistical meaning and its goal is to expand 
and generalize theories (Yin, 2003).  
One of the methods increasing the generalizability of a case is achieved though 
applying theoretical sampling (Silverman, 2011). Following the advice of 
Silverman, the case was selected with an aim to illustrate the features and 
processes under investigation in-depth.  
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Reliability deals with replicability and refers the extent to which a measure, 
procedure or instrument yields to the same results on repeated trials (Eriksson 
& Kovalainen, 2008). As Yin (2003) highlights, the emphasis is put on 
replicating the same case over again, not replicating the results of one case by 
doing another case study. The researcher focuses on enhancing reliability by 
keeping the procedural and theoretical transparency (Silverman, 2011). It 
means that the philosophical stance, as well as the process of research design, 
data collection and data analysis is described fully. There is access to collected 
secondary data and interview transcripts if necessary.  
Validity refers to the extent to which the research findings accurately reflect the 
phenomena under study (Collis & Hussey, 2009). The study utilized the validity 
criteria proposed by Yin (2003): construct validity, internal validity and external 
validity. Construct validity, assuring the correct operational measurements will 
be obtained by establishing a chain of evidence using multiple sources of 
evidence ordered within a case study report at the level of data collection. 
Internal validity will be assured at the level of data analysis by building and 
addressing rival explanations. External validity is assured by using theory to 
which findings of the study can be generalized.  
Now having set out and justified the methodology used, the following chapter 
presents the detailed data analysis and findings 
.  
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5. Chapter 5 
5.1. Data analysis  
The following chapter presents and discusses the collected data. The 
presentation is divided into two main sections. The first section concentrates on 
secondary data. It aims to present the historical and contemporary socio-
economical context in which Polish Venture Capital emerged and developed 
over the last twenty years. It concentrates on the changes taking place in the 
environment influencing and shaping Venture Capital industry. The subsections 
follow the template and present: the legal system, market conditions, institutions 
supporting entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs and culture. The section closes 
with a historical overview of the Polish Venture Capital industry.  
The second section is driven by primary data. The presentation of subsections 
follows the template as well. Each subsection begins with a presentation of 
participants’ viewpoints. In order to enrich and validate the information provided 
by participants, supplementing perspectives arising from secondary data are 
provided.  
 
5.2. Secondary data presentation  
5.2.1. Poland the historical and socio-economical context  
The research focuses on the process of change. Due to the character of 
change, which is neither linear nor singular, the emphasis of context is crucial 
(Pettigrew, 1990). Additionally both of the leading theories employed articulate 
the need for including context into the analysis. ‘Resource Dependence Theory’ 
indicates that organizations collect and interpret information from their 
environment and act upon those interpretations. ‘Institutional Theory’ provides 
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further explanation on how those interpretations emerge. Depending on their 
background, individuals interpret the same evidence differently and thus make 
different choices. The particular interpretation of the surrounding world is 
grounded within the culture of an individual. The rules and norms accumulated 
within the culture of any society reflect the past beliefs, shape the present 
actions, and influence future choices (North, 1990:62). Consequently, the 
emergence and development of a Polish Venture Capital industry cannot be 
fully understood without reflecting on the historical and socio – economical 
context of the country.  
A full understanding of the context surrounding emergence and development of 
the Polish Venture Capital industry is crucial for a comprehensive analysis. This 
section provides detailed information on those elements of the Venture Capital 
industry, which, according to the literature, will influence its shape and thus 
what is specific or peculiar and what might be generic.  
Over the course of history Poland has changed its political and economical 
system more frequently than most countries in Europe with comparable 
longevity. Just in the 20th century such a shift took place three times. During the 
mid war period Poland had a market economy and a democratic political 
system. The end of the Second World War brought a shift towards a communist 
system and a centrally planned economy. After 1989 Poland returned to its 
democratic roots.  
The consequences of such shifts were felt in the economy and across the 
society. On one hand no part of the system was operating long enough to be 
fully developed and rooted, on the other hand the society was used to changes 
and was able to adapt to new situations more readily than in many comparable 
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countries. Also, the relatively short time between shifts allowed, at the early 
stages of transformation process, the adoption of some of the mechanisms 
used before the communist period, which were still present, at the very least, in 
the minds of many of the decision-makers in the population; and often in more 
concrete form, if dormant. For example, the Commercial Code of 1934 was 
restored with amendments and stayed in operation until 2001 when it was 
replaced by the Commercial Companies Code (Frankowski, 2005:222). The 
reconstruction of the Warsaw Stock exchange in 1991 was also facilitated by 
reference to earlier experiences. A stock exchange had existed in Poland since 
1817, and operated until beginning of the Second World War.  
The fact that in the case of Poland not all private ownership was confiscated by 
the communist system eased the transformation process. Private farming and 
limited number of entrepreneurs existed throughout the communist period. 
While the years under communist supervision had influenced the society’s 
approach towards private ownership, the concept had not been destroyed. The 
later privatisation process started quickly and the in case of smaller entities 
went smoothly (Nellis, 2002). The Mass Privatisation Program introduced the 
first public investment fund.  
In the case of social aspects, even during the communist period Poles kept links 
with the West. This happened via a strong emigrant society and their media 
such as Radio Free Europe8, which tried to break though the information 
isolation of The Polish people. 
The current political and economic situation in Poland might be perceived as 
quite stable. The legal system has reached relative maturity and stability 
                                                 
8
During the communist period it was illegal to listen to Radio Free Europe in Poland.  
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(Frankowski, 2005), however maturation was, and still is, a gradual process. 
Undoubtedly the decision to enter the European Union initiated serious 
amendments to governance and economic systems, in order to align Polish 
regulations with Western standards. Most of the market institutions had to be 
built from scratch but historical experience of Poland, and foreign assistance, 
helped to shorten the process. Although Poland records growing GDP since 
1992, and quality of life is constantly growing, most of the economic indicators 
are still below the EU averages.  
The historical context of the transformation process in Poland is provided in 
Appendix 1. The following subsection concentrates on the current social and 
economic situation in Poland. It takes a historical approach, indicating 
development milestones, which are believed to influence the current shape of 
Venture Capital industry.  
 
5.2.2. Current social and economic context  
During the last 30 years Poland has experienced a complex evolutionary 
process. Throughout this period the country not only entirely reshaped the 
internal political and economical systems but also became a member of 
international organizations, fully acquiring their rules and regulations.  
The following section aims to present the contemporary social and economic 
situation in Poland influencing the entrepreneurial activities. The selection of 
discussed components is based on the conceptual framework used by GEM 
(Reynolds, Hay, Bygrave, Camp, & Autio, 2000:5-6) and to calculate The Global 
Venture Capital and Private Equity Country Attractiveness Index (Groh, 
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Liechtenstein, & Lieser, 2011). The subsections extract elements of ‘general 
national framework conditions’ and ‘entrepreneurial framework conditions’. They 
include such aspects as the contemporary legal system, market conditions after 
1989, and institutions supporting entrepreneurship well as culture.  
 
5.2.3. Contemporary legal system  
The nature of the legal environment could be perceived as one of the most 
fundamental enabling conditions for development of entrepreneurship as well 
as of the emergence of a viable Venture Capital industry. At the very minimum it 
provides security of property rights, which, according to most economists, are 
crucial for free and voluntary exchange; while at the more advanced and 
aggregate level, the legal structure influences efficiency and certainty of 
investing and doing business (Parker, 2007). A stable legal framework 
promotes planning, resource acquisition and coordination of businesses. Strong 
property rights encourage reinvestments of profits which then are crucial for 
employment growth and sales growth. Entrepreneurs who perceive their 
property rights to be insecure reinvest only 32% of their profits while 
entrepreneurs who perceive their rights to be the most secure right reinvest 
56% (Johnson, McMillan, & Woodruff, 2000). The tax and regulatory burden 
may also influence productivity (Frye & Shleifer, 1997).  
 
5.2.4. Legal tradition and legislation process 
The contemporary Polish legal system, understood as a set of legal institutions, 
procedures and rules (Merryman & Perez-Perdomo, 2007) derives from the civil 
law tradition (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008). Similarly to other 
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countries following the civil law tradition the Polish legal system relies on 
comprehensive, continually updated legal codes. There are two categories of 
law: substantive acts and procedural acts. Substantive acts define the rights 
and duties of citizens and the state, whereas procedural acts provide rules that 
govern the proceedings of the court in criminal lawsuits as well as civil and 
administrative proceedings. Judges operate in a framework of established law. 
Their role is to establish the facts of the case and to apply the relevant code. 
Their role in shaping law is limited compared to the legislators who draft and 
initiate the codes.9  
The contemporary system in Poland has reached relative maturity and stability, 
in the view of ‘the Western Community of Nations’ (Frankowski, 2005: xxii).  The 
Polish system observes the rule of separation of powers. There is a clear 
distinction between executive, legislature and judiciary power. Law indicates the 
scope of state’s power as well as providing the framework for the government’s 
actions and policy implementation (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012).  
The supreme law within the Polish legal system is the constitution. Although, 
Poland has a constitutional history dating back to 1791; the contemporary, 
binding constitution was adopted in April 1997. It refers to principles and values 
typical for modern western democracies, such as sovereignty of the Nation, 
independence and sovereignty of a democratic State ruled by Law (Frankowski, 
2005). The Constitution provides the principle of bicameralism of the legislature. 
The lower chamber – Sejm, and the upper chamber – Senat, together constitute 
the National Assembly. Both chambers have a four-year term of office. The 
president is the supreme representative of the country and is elected in direct 
                                                 
9 http://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/robbins/CommonLawCivilLawTraditions.html 
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citizen vote for a five-year term. The President nominates the Prime Minister, 
who then proposes the manning of Council of Ministers. The President also 
appoints judges based on the recommendation of National Council of the 
Judiciary. 
The Polish judicial system, besides the system of courts (regional, district, 
appellate courts and The Supreme Court) includes two bodies: The 
Constitutional Tribunal and Tribunal of State. The first one decides on 
constitutional matters, such as conformity of laws and international agreements 
with the Constitution, as well as adjudicates on complaints regarding 
constitutional provision. The second judges violations committed by public 
officials while in office. The Supreme Court along with the Constitutional 
Tribunal serves as an effective control to the government and the legislative 
branch (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012).  
 
5.2.5. Legal environment influencing Venture Capital industry  
The following section highlights the legal aspects of Venture Capital funds 
creation and operations as well as legal regulations guiding the conduct of 
business in Poland.  
Although Venture Capital was present on the Polish market since the beginning 
of the transformation process, which is the early 1990s, the first national 
regulations were introduced much later. The first legal act referring to the 
Venture Capital industry was called ‘On Investment Funds’ and was announced 
on 28 August 199710, with later changes. It referred to funds established and 
operating in Poland. The above act gave legal personality to the investment 
                                                 
10
 Ustawa z dnia 28 sierpnia 1997 r. o Funduszach Inwestycyjnych (DzU 1997 Nr 139 poz. 933) 
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funds as well as to set out the possible kinds of funds, and the boundaries for 
their operations. Specialised ‘closed end’ funds were supposed to serve as the 
legal vehicle for Venture Capital. However, according to Gazeta Bankowa (31 
May 2004) as late as 2004 no funds had been established based on this 
regulation. The failure of this regulation was a result of lack of understanding of 
the specific nature of Venture Capital operations, manifested by not allowing 
funds to invest in R&D, and neglecting corporate rights of the investors (Socha, 
1999).  
Further improvements to this particular legal vehicle were introduced gradually. 
The Polish accession to the European Union resulted in significant changes in 
the rules governing investment funds. As result of the legal unification process a 
new act was introduced: the act on investment funds11 in 2004. Up to the year 
2012, this document has been changed seven times. According to the new 
regulations only an Investment Fund Company is entitled to establish and 
manage investment funds. Establishing an Investment Fund Company requires 
the approval of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority. An authorised 
Company may create three possible forms of investment funds:  
 open investment fund; 
 specialized open investment fund; 
 closed investment fund.  
                                                 
11
 Ustawa z dnia 27 maja 2004 o Funduszach Inwestycyjnych (DzU 2004  Nr 146, poz. 1546) 
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Such constructed investment funds, according to the tax regulations12, do not 
pay income tax on revenues. The tax becomes due when revenues are 
distributed to investors or the fund is selling or repurchasing its certificates.  
Although the legislators believed that this would be the best suited legal vehicle 
for venture capital investments this form is not used much. The main constraint, 
especially for smaller Venture Capital funds, is the high cost of such 
construction. In case of small funds with investment capital of 5M PLN (1,5M 
US) the yearly cost can reach up to 3% of capital13.  
While equity funds may choose to operate within the above structure, the 
smaller ones, especially Venture Capital funds, choose other legal vehicles. 
Although there are no official registers of Venture Capital firms operating on the 
Polish market the stakeholders14 claim that majority of funds are registered 
abroad. Funds choose to register abroad mainly for tax advantages. Funds 
which are receiving any sort of public support are obliged to register in Poland 
thus have to use legal vehicles available in Polish law. The most popular legal 
forms are limited liability company (spółka z ograniczoną odpowiedzialnością) 
and joint-stock company (spółka akcyjna) categorized as capital companies, 
followed by limited liability partnership and limited joint-stock partnership, 
                                                 
12
 Ustawa  z dnia 15 lutego 1992 r. o podatku dochodowym od osob prawnych (DzU 1992 Nr 21 
poz. 86) act 6/p.10) 
13
 See:  www.psic.org.pl 07-09-2012 (stanowisko w sprawie projektu zmian zasad 
opodatkowania spolki komandytowo akcyjnej) 
14
 MinisterstwoGospodarki. 2009. Raport z realizacji badań – Uproszczenie krajowych aktów 
prawnych „Reforma procesu stanowienia prawa i uproszczenie obowiązujących przepisów” 
Analiza uwarunkowań prawnych podmiotów działających na rynku Venture Capital / Private 
Equity. Warszawa Ministerstwo Gospodarki;  
interviews with expert and venture capitalists.  
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belonging to the partnership group. All of those forms are regulated within the 
Commercial Companies Code15.  
The limited liability partnerships as well as joint-stock partnership are relatively 
new legal forms introduced in the Commercial Company Code in the year 2000. 
The Commercial Company Code regulates issues concerning both partnership 
and capital corporations as well as provides guidelines for corporate 
governance. The major difference between the capital companies and 
partnerships is the presence of legal personality. Partnerships do not have legal 
personality thus are perceived as ‘imperfect’ legal entities. Although 
partnerships may acquire and dispose of property and be parties to the court 
proceedings they do not have distinct governing bodies such as a management 
board. Additionally partners are liable for the obligations of the partnership with 
all of their personal property (Frankowski, 2005). The limited liability partnership 
allows partners to distribute the liability between them in such a way that there 
is a partner or partners who are liable to creditors with all their personal property 
and also partners who are liable only up to a specific sum. That information has 
to be specified in the National Register. A limited liability partner has neither 
statutory right nor statutory obligation to represent the partnership or to manage 
its business affairs. Although one might be given those rights by the limited 
partnership agreement (Frankowski, 2005). 
The joint–stock partnership uses the same idea of categorising partners as the 
limited partnership. In this case the general partner (active partner) is personally 
liable and the shareholders (passive partners) are liable only to the value of 
their shares. Only the general partners have right to represent and manage the 
                                                 
15
 Ustawa z dnia 15 września 2000 r. Kodeks spółek handlowych (DzU 2000 nr 94 poz. 1037) 
with later changes full text available: 
(http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20000941037) 
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business affairs of the partnership. However the stakeholders may act as 
agents of the partnership. Joint-stock partnership may trade its stock publicly. In 
order to protect shareholders two governing bodies may be appointed: the 
supervisory board (which became obligatory when the number of shareholders 
exceeds 25) and general meeting which is always mandatory (Frankowski, 
2005).  
The main difference between limited liability partnership and the joint-stock 
partnership is in the partnership agreement. In the case of a joint-stock 
partnership statute refers to all shareholders, thus a shareholder by selling 
his/her shares may withdraw from the partnership without agreement of the rest 
of the shareholders or even the general partner. In case of limited partnership 
the agreement is based on personal ties and refers to particular partners 
(Ministerstwo Gospodarki, 2009).  
The joint–stock partnership became the most attractive legal form for domestic 
Venture Capital funds, after a recent tax interpretation published by the Minister 
of Finance16. According to this interpretation the shareholder’s tax is due on the 
day of dividend payment regardless of whether the shareholder is a legal 
person or private person.  
The capital companies forms (limited liability company and joint-stock company) 
are the most frequently used forms of Venture Capital fund legal vehicles. Both 
have legal personality and have to be registered in the National Register. The 
share capital may be paid either in cash or in non cash contributions. 
Shareholders are not liable for the company’s obligations. The major difference 
                                                 
16
 Interpretacja ogólna nr dd5/033/1/12/ksm/dd-125 Ministra finansów z dnia 11 maja 2012 r. w 
sprawie opodatkowania dochodów niebędącego komplementariuszem akcjonariusza spółki 
komandytowo-akcyjnej z tytułu udziału w zyskach spółki komandytowo-akcyjnej, Dziennink 
Urzędowy Ministra finansów 18/05/2012 poz 24.  
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between the limited liability company and the joint-stock company lies in their 
governance arrangements. In case of a limited liability company, appointing an 
advisory board or an audit committee is necessary only if the number of 
shareholders exceeds 25, whereas in case of joint-stock company a 
management board and supervisory board are always required. The limited 
liability company requires less capital to be established compared to a joint-
stock company, (minimum 5 000PLN to minimum 100 000PLN)17 but cannot 
issue securities in the form of shares that can be publicly traded.  
Although this form of operation is not optimal for Venture Capital funds, they 
choose it because firstly it allows them to limit the liability to a particular number 
of shares, secondly, compared to the typical investment fund this does not 
require extensive financial reports. The required yearly report presents highly 
aggregated data (Ministerstwo Gospodarki, 2009). The main disadvantage of 
utilizing the capital company’s form is the double taxation of company’s 
revenues. First time tax has to be paid when the Venture Capital fund exits 
investment in form of corporate income tax, second time tax is paid by the 
investor who is the stakeholder in form of personal income tax (Ministerstwo 
Gospodarki, 2009). 
Looking from the perspective of a small or medium size Venture Capital fund, 
although at first sight there is a lot of choice in possible legal vehicles, none of 
them is tailored for its needs. The legal form of investment fund although it 
offers tax advantages over other forms, is too expensive and, additionally, 
requires detailed financial reports. The forms of capital companies, although 
relatively not expensive, generate double taxation. The joint-stock partnership 
                                                 
17
 State for September 2012 
139 
 
currently serves as the most suitable form, however the changes in taxation 
procedure recently announced by the Ministry of Finance, due 1 January 2013, 
may easily devalue its position.  
Considering conditions for conducting a business, the Polish constitution 
creates strong foundations for a market based economy. It declares the ‘social 
market economy’, based on the freedom of economic activity, private 
ownership, and solidarity, dialogue and cooperation between social partners, as 
the base of economic system (Art. 20)18. Guarantees for negotiations as the tool 
for solving social conflicts arising from participating in the economic process, 
indicates that everyone is equal before the law and no one may be 
discriminated against. Additionally the constitution provides protection of 
ownership, other rights and the right of succession19. Whereas the constitution 
provides general guidelines, the more detailed terms and conditions of running 
economic activities are formulated in separate documents. The detailed 
regulations having most impact on conducting business are presented later in 
this section.  
The turning point in Polish legislation referring to conducting business was the 
Commercial Activity Act20 announced by the communist government in 1988 
and remaining in operation until 1 of January 2001. Although it was created 
when the communists were still in power it had long lasting effects for the 
emerging free market economy. The revolutionary character of the document 
was demonstrated in the following statements: 
                                                 
18
 English translation of  The Constitution of Republic of Poland, text published on the official 
web page of Polish Sejm:  http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm 
19
 Articles: 32, 33 and 64 form The Constitution of Republic of Poland 
20
 Ustawa z dnia 23 grudnia 1988 r. o działalności gospodarczej (Dz U 1988 nr 41 poz 324) 
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 ‘undertaking and running business activity is free and allowed to 
everyone on equal rules’ (art. 1); 
 ‘business entities within their business activity may undertake any action 
that are not forbidden by law’ (art. 4);  
It triggered rapid development of Polish small business; by the end of 1999 over 
70% of employment was situated in private sector (GUS, 2000).  
Currently, the fundamental legal regulation for conducting business is the 
Freedom of Economic Activity Act21. The document contains regulations for 
establishing, running and terminating a business. It also regulates such issues 
as registration and information obligations of an entrepreneur, indicates 
activities requiring concessions or other sorts of state control, control issues, 
foreign entrepreneurs, and contains a section on micro, medium and small 
enterprises. Compared to previously binding documents, this regulation 
introduces a new definition of medium and small entrepreneur as well as 
creates the concept of micro entrepreneur, which are aligned with European 
Union standards.  
The literature indicates that besides the entry regulations (Dulleck, Frijters, & 
Winter-Ebmer, 2006) also the bankruptcy regulations influence the level of 
entrepreneurship in an economy (Armour & Cumming, 2008; Lee, Yamakawa, 
Peng, & Barney, 2011). Softer bankruptcy rules encourage experimentation by 
entrepreneurs and allow fresh starts (Parker, 2007).   
                                                 
21
 Ustawa z dnia 2 lipca 2004 r. o swobodzie działalności gospodarczej (DzU 2004 nr 173 poz. 
1807)  
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The Polish legal system includes bankruptcy procedures, regulated by the Act 
of Bankruptcy and Rehabilitation22 issued in 2003, with later amendments. The 
regulation, besides procedures guiding the bankruptcy process, includes also 
‘rehabilitation procedures’, which are dedicated to business entities, which 
expect to become insolvent in the near future. The binding insolvency law has 
been assessed as of ‘medium compliance’ with the international standards 
according to (EBRD, 2010). The opinions of experts, both from the academic 
and professional field, realised in the PARP (2011) report are positive toward 
the proposed regulations. They indicate that the act serves the needs of the 
market and does not require any major changes in the near future. Experts 
highlight the use of an agreement procedure with creditors as a very positive 
solution. As areas of weaknesses they indicated mainly the length of the 
procedures, and their costs – increased by the long proceedings and the 
operation of trustees (PARP, 2011). The critique referred not as much to the 
regulations themselves as to their inefficient and therefore prolonged execution.  
Taxation issues are regulated by the act Tax Ordinance23, which was 
formulated in 1997 and from the beginning was heavily criticised for the 
extensive powers of the Ministry of Finance as well as for neglecting the 
experiences of tax practices (Gomułowicz & Małecki, 1998). The act regulates: 
conditions under which tax obligation emerges, defines taxpayers, tax 
authorities and indicates their duties, and sets out procedures for tax collection 
and tax control. The document was amended frequently, however the most 
important changes from the taxpayers’ point of view were introduced in 2007. 
Along with the new regulations, any entrepreneur who received written 
                                                 
22 
Ustawa z dnia 28 lutego 2003 r. Prawo upadłościowe i naprawcze (DzU 2003 nr 60 poz. 535) 
23
 Ustawa z dnia 29 sierpnia 1997 r. - Ordynacja podatkowa (DzU 1997 nr 137 poz. 926) 
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interpretation of legal provision concerning public duties can rely on it. It means 
he/she cannot be charged or punished on the grounds of further interpretation 
contrary to the one he/she received24.  
Currently the Polish tax system contains 12 different kinds of taxes, 9 direct and 
3 indirect. From the perspective of conducting a business the three most 
important taxes are the Private Income Tax (PIT), Capital Income Tax (CIT) and 
Value Added Tax (VAT). The above taxes were introduced early in the 
transformation process and were subject of frequent changes and intensive 
critique.  
The PIT 25 was introduced as the first tax in 1991. It refers to all physical 
persons, who have place of residence in Poland, or have a centre of personal 
or economic interests there and generate revenues, or run a business. 
Entrepreneurs since the year 2003 have a choice in terms of the form of tax 
payments. They may pay according to progressive rates or a flat rate. Until the 
year 2008 the progressive tax had three rates, since then only two (currently 
18% and 32% - state for 2012), the flat rate is 19%. If one decides for the flat 
rate of 19% automatically one is not eligible for the majority of tax allowances 
and deductions. Physical persons whose revenue is generated from 
participating in partnerships are also subject to PIT as well as those who are 
shareholders in companies with a legal personality and who participate in 
companies’ profits. The flat rate refers also to incomes from financial capital.  
                                                 
24 
Chałas i Wspólnicy, Kancelaria prawna, information prepared for Polish Information and 
Foreign Investment Agency 
25
 Ustawa z dnia 26 lipca 1991 r. o podatku dochodowym od osób fizycznych  (Dz U z 2010 r. 
Nr 51, poz. 307)  with later changes 
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The Corporate Income Tax (CIT)26 introduced in 1992 regulates the tax 
obligations of legal persons which have a site or management registered in 
Poland. The flat rate of 19% refers to the tax base as well as to dividends. In 
case of not providing the required documents the tax authority may adjust the 
tax due, based on similar transactions, the difference between the declared tax 
by the legal person and the calculated tax by the tax authority is subject to up to 
50% tax. If the legal person is a subject of Polish tax payment its income is 
taxed despite the source or the place of generation. Certain costs might be 
deducted from the tax base. Losses in the previous tax year may reduce the tax 
base in the following 5 tax years. The deducted amount may not exceed 50% of 
the loss each year. The tax base might be also reduced by certain deductions 
made by the taxpayer during the tax year i.e. by donations for public utility 
purposes, and for religious purposes, as well as for obtaining new technology.  
For the first time VAT was introduced in the Polish tax system in 1993 by the act 
on tax on goods and services and on excise tax27. This document was replaced 
in 2004 by a new act28 which is in compliance with the European Union 
regulations. This is one of the most frequently updated documents, for example 
there were 11 ordinances of the Ministry of Finance referring to VAT regulations 
in 2012 and 27 in the previous year, and since the document was published 
there have been over 200 amendments. Polish law recognizes three VAT rates, 
which are given as percentage value (23%; 8% and 5%).  
                                                 
26
 Ustawa z dnia 15 lutego 1992 r. o podatku dochodowym od osób prawnych (Dz U z 2011 r. 
Nr 74, poz. 397) with later changes 
27
 Ustawa z dnia 8 stycznia1993r. o podatku od towarow i usług oraz podatku akcyzowym (Dz U 
1993 nr 11 poz 50) with later changes 
28
 Ustawa z dnia 11 marca 2004 r. o podatku od towarów i usług (DzU 2004 Nr 54 poz. 535) 
with later changes 
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The OECD (2011) report evaluating Polish administration indicated the tax 
system as inefficient and complicated. The major weaknesses were assigned to 
frequent changes of regulations and high costs of compliance arising from high 
number of payments and time required to fill in the forms.  
Whereas, the communist period could be characterised by stagnation within the 
intellectual property rights area, the multi dimensional changes in Polish 
economic and social life after 1989 required reconsideration of these 
regulations. Currently those rights are protected by two major documents: the 
act on copyrights and related rights29 created in 1994 and the industrial property 
act30 created in 2000. According to jurists these acts serve contemporary needs 
by taking in account the impact of recent technologies and by creating effective 
mechanisms and procedures for preventing unauthorised copying practices. 
Moreover they are fully aligned with the European Union standards 
(Frankowski, 2005). The copyright act specifies and protects the rights of 
authors. These rights refer to intangible assets, defined as a piece of creative 
work. The work is protected whatever its material value, form, and means of 
expression or usage. The act protects work that either was created or co-
created by a Polish or EU citizen, was originally published in the territory of the 
Republic of Poland or simultaneously there and abroad, or was published for 
the first time in Polish. There are two groups of rights: personal copyrights and 
economic copyrights. The personal rights protect interests directly related to the 
person of the author. The economic rights on the other hand regulate issues 
referring to use and explanation of the work as well as regulate fees for such 
usage (Sieniow & Włodarczyk, 2009).  
                                                 
29
 Ustawa z dnia 4 lutego 1994r. o prawie autorskim i prawach pokrewnych (Dz U 1994, nr 24, 
poz. 83) with later changes 
30
 Ustawa z dnia 30 czerwca 2000r.  Prawo własności przemysłowej (DzU 2001 nr 49 poz. 508) 
with later changes 
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The industrial property act provides protection of inventions, utility models, 
industrial designs, trademarks, indications of origins, topographies of integrated 
circuits and business process designs. The act gives detailed definitions of the 
categories, which are protected. The protection would be provided after the 
Patent Office determines if the requirements are met. Patents are given for 20 
years, counting from the day of applying, utility models for 10 years, industrial 
designs for 25 years, trademarks for 10 years, indication of origins is granted for 
unlimited time and topographies of integrated circuits for 10 years.  
Patents are territorially limited. Within the Polish system there are three options 
for protection: at the national level, the European level (also referred as 
regional) and the international level (Pryża, 2009). The price for issuing 
protection documents rises with the level of protection (PPO)31.  
Employment issues are regulated by the document called the Labour Code32. 
Most of the employers perceive the code as over regulating. It includes such 
issues as working hours and holidays, which in other western countries are 
usually regulated by collective labour agreements (Frankowski, 2005). The 
labour regulations are heavily criticised among practitioners. The Polish 
Confederation of Private Employers Lewiatan (PKPP Lewiatan) publishes a 
yearly report on barriers for entrepreneurship. Labour law has got a dedicated 
section in this report. The main problems arising each year are the inflexibility of 
the legal regulations, vague formulation of regulations, bureaucracy related to 
employment, constraints related to the termination of contracts, a general 
imbalance in terms of employer/employee rights, as well as high costs of 
                                                 
31
 Polish Pantent Office, 
http://www.uprp.pl/uprp/_gAllery/27/88/27881/ochrona_wlas_przem_w_pigulce_INTERNET.pdf 
32
 Ustawa z dnia 26 czerwca 1974 r. – Kodeks pracy (DzU z 1998 r. Nr 21, poz. 94) with later 
changes 
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employment. The OECD (2008) evaluation of the Polish economy, despite 
continuous improvements in general, considered the labour market as poor. It 
indicated that Poland has got one of the highest wage taxes in the OECD 
countries, despite having relatively low personal income tax. The situation is 
due mainly to the high rates of social security contributions paid both by the 
employer and the employee.  
According to external evaluations the opinions on Polish legal environment are 
moderate. The World Bank reports Doing Business (summary Appendices 2) 
indicates that the business environment in Poland is quite stable since 2004. 
There are improvements in most of the researched areas although they are 
neither significant nor always maintained over time. A positive sign of 
decreasing costs of starting a business is not accompanied with a reduction in 
the number of procedures, despite the government’s declarations. There are no 
significant positive changes in the hiring and redundancy procedures. The tax 
duties, except taking less time, which might be due to the introduction of 
electronic systems, are not easier in terms of number of payments, or less 
expensive for entrepreneurs. Although the government introduced a wide 
program aiming to change the law to more be more entrepreneur friendly 
Reforma Regulacji (2006) the main problems remain. 
Since 2004 the European Venture Capital Association includes Poland in their 
report: ‘Benchmarking European Tax and Legal Environments’. The aim of the 
report is to provide a tool enabling comparison of certain elements of European 
tax and legal frameworks that are particularly important for the development and 
operation of national Venture Capital industries (EVCA, 2006, 2008). The 
evaluated factors are divided into three groups: tax and legal environment for 
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limited partners and fund managers, the environment for investee companies 
and the environment for retaining talent in investee companies and 
management funds. Assigned scores are between 1 (more favourable) and 3 
(less favourable).  During the 3 periods of evaluation (2004/2006/2008) Poland 
scored below the European average. It has improved from the score 2.13 in 
2004 to 1.95 in 2008. The tax incentives were evaluated as the weakest 
element constantly scoring 3. The fiscal R&D incentives were showing 
improvement over time. The major issues needing further improvement, 
mentioned in the conclusions of the 2008 report, referred to weaknesses of the 
dedicated fund structure, tax transparency, lack of tax incentives for investors 
and fund management, and lack of fiscal incentives for young innovative 
companies. Although there are limited fiscal incentives for businesses R&D 
expenditures, such areas as contracting researchers, cooperation between 
firms and research institutes/universities or creation of innovation firm are not 
subject of fiscal incentive.  
 
5.2.6. Market conditions 
The following section discusses the market conditions influencing Venture 
Capital industry development. There are three main groups of factors 
presented, the financial markets (including banks), the GDP growth rate and the 
level of R&D.  
Financial markets 
The literature agrees on the need for well developed financial markets for a 
Venture Capital industry to emerge and develop (Da Rin, Nicodano, & 
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Sembenelli, 2006; Gilson & Black, 1999; Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Jeng & 
Wells, 2000). Financial markets provide the exit for Venture Capital 
investments. A successful exit guarantees attractive returns for investors thus 
makes it easier to raise additional capital. As Gompers and Lerner (2004:205) 
indicated, although exiting is the last phase in the venture capital cycle, it is 
extremely important for the health of other parts of the cycle.  
The following section considers two elements of the financial system, which are 
emphasized in the literature as well as highlighted in the collected data. These 
are capital markets and banks. The capital markets provide the opportunity for 
Venture Capital to exit their investments via IPO as well as to raise new funds, 
thus the more sophisticated a capital market is, the better conditions are for 
Venture Capital development (Groh, von Liechtenstein, & Lieser, 2010). Banks, 
on the other hand, when involved in Venture Capital investment have different 
objectives compared to independent venture capitalists (Hellmann, Lindsey, & 
Puri, 2004).  
The Polish financial system, like most of the other elements of the modern 
market economy, had to be created almost from scratch. The first reforms 
introduced in 1989 included reforms to the financial system. The first changes 
applied to the National Bank of Poland (NBP) and bank law. In 1991 the act on 
public trading of securities and trust funds33 was introduced along with the 
creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Later documents 
introduced the Bank Guarantee Fund (BFG) and specific changes required to 
adjust the Polish system to European standards.  
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 Ustawa z dnia 22 marca 1991 r o publicznym obrocie papierami wartościowymi i funduszach 
powierniczych (DzU 1991 Nr 35 poz. 155)  
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Stock markets  
Poland has a stock exchange tradition dating back to 1817. With the beginning 
of World War II the sessions were suspended. Although there were attempts to 
reconstruct the stock exchange system after 1945, the communist regime was 
in opposition to this concept. The formal reactivation of the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange (Giełda Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie - GPW) took place in 
1991. The legislation was passed in March while the first trading took place on 
16 April. It has to be stressed that the high speed of legislation and preparatory 
work was possible due to very close cooperation between the Polish authorities 
and the French Société de Bourses Françaises and Central deposit 
SICOVAM34. 
The GPW developed quickly. Initially trading sessions took place once a week. 
Later a second and then third trading day were introduced. By 1994 the stock 
exchange was working 5 days a week. In 2010 GPW became a public company 
and its shares were traded on the main floor35.  
Currently issuers and investors may choose from five different markets: 
1. The Main List (operated from the very beginning), which is a regulated 
market; provides a trading platform for shares, bonds, pre-emptive rights, 
rights to shares, investment certificates, structured products, ETF’s, 
warrants and derivatives. 
2. Derivative Market (in operation since 1998);  
                                                 
34
 http://www.gpw.pl/historia http://www.gpw.pl/historia 
35
 ibidem 
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3. New Connect (in operation since 2007), which is an alternative trading 
platform, designed for young companies. Due to its relevance for the 
Venture Capital industry it will be discussed in detail later in the chapter; 
4. Catalyst (in operation since 2009), designed for trading debt instruments; 
5. Energy market (in operation since 2010), designed to expand the GPW’s 
operations in the commodities market; accommodating all categories of 
participants on the energy market (Warsaw Stock Exchange, 2012).  
 
Changes in legal regulations introduced in the year 2001, which aimed to adjust 
Polish law to EU standards, eased IPO procedures. Simultaneously the GPW 
concentrated on supporting corporate governance practices and created a 
code. As a result since 2003 all listed companies are required to submit a 
declaration of following the official corporate governance code.  
The activity of the GPW is concentrated on stock and bonds trading. The vast 
majority of trading (99%) takes place on the main market. Until the year 2000 
the market capitalisation was constantly growing. Although the worldwide 
financial crises were noticeable they did not significantly affect the overall 
capitalisation. The EU accession in 2004 visibly triggered further development 
of the stock exchange until the next financial crisis in 2008. Although the global 
tendencies were also felt on the Polish stock exchange, the end of year 
capitalization was comparable with stock exchanges in Austria and Greece, 
which GDP is comparable to Poland’s. Additionally the Warsaw stock exchange 
overtook the above markets in terms of number of listed companies 
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(Sobolewski & Tymoczko, 2010). Figure 15 illustrates capitalisation and number 
of companies during the period of 1999-2011.  
Figure 15: Market capitalisation and number of companies listed on the 
Warsaw stock exchange 
 
 
Source: (Warsaw Stock Exchange, 2012) copy rights granted by Warsaw Stock Exchange  
 
Due to its rapid development the GPW became one of the biggest markets in 
the CEE region. However, compared to western European markets its 
capitalization remains rather small. Since Poland joined the EU the trends of 
western stock exchanges are mirrored within the Polish pattern. The Polish 
Stock Exchange is characterised by a low level of liquidity36, compared both to 
stock exchanges of the same size and to bigger ones. One of the probable 
causes for such a situation is the relatively high number of companies with a 
low capitalization. The average capitalization of a company listed on the GWP 
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 Liquidity measured as relation of turnover to the capitalization value  
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was 182,6 M USD in 2011 compared to an European average of 1 472,3 M 
USD. Additionally the liquidity is limited because investors, such as pension 
funds or strategic investors, aim for a long term investments (Sobolewski & 
Tymoczko, 2012b). While trading investors generally concentrate on the largest 
companies.  
Despite the presented limitations of the stock market its presence is indicated 
as positive enhancement for the Venture Capital industry (Groh et al., 2011). 
 
Banking system 
The current situation in the banking sector is influenced by the course of 
reforms undertaken in the early 1990s. The reforms aimed at tidying up the 
relationship between the National Treasury and the banking system (NBP, 
2001). The National Bank of Poland was designated as the central bank of the 
state, bank of banks, and issuing bank. The newly established legal framework 
allowed other organizations to undertake banking activities, in which way the 
state monopoly was removed. In the first phase nine national regional banks 
were separated and designated to provide credit and deposit services to the 
public on a commercial basis. Simultaneously new organizations were 
established. The first two years were characterised by intensive expansion as 
well as changing relationships on the market. Foreign owned banks entered the 
Polish market, firstly as strategic partners, later changing position into 
stakeholders (Kornasiewicz & Pugacewicz-Kowalska, 2002).  
The Polish financial system is strongly bank oriented. Although the proportions 
are changing over time, still the banks dominate in the Polish economy 
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considered both in numbers and collected assets. The followed model is based 
on universal banking. Each bank, which meets the legal requirements, is 
allowed to provide all sorts of banking services. Figures 16&17 provide the 
overview on the dynamics in changes in number of financial institutions and 
their assets.  
 
Figure 16: Number of financial institutions in Poland 
 
 
Source: adapted from National Bank Reports  
Figure 17: Assets of financial institutions (B PLN) 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from National Bank Reports  
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In the early 1990s the majority of state owned banks started the privatisation 
process, which resulted in a very quick change in the ownership structure. The 
dominance of state owned banks declined in favour of those funded more by 
foreign capital.  
 
Figure 18: Ownership of banks’ assets 
 
Source: combined data form (Kornasiewicz & Pugacewicz-Kowalska, 2002; Osiński, Wyczański, 
Tymoczko, & Grąt, 2004; Sobolewski & Tymoczko, 2012b) 
 
In 1997 a completely new set of regulations was introduced, which according to 
the national and international experts, aligned Polish regulation with the 
requirements of the European Union (NBP, 2001). Two years later, after Poland 
joined the OECD, formal restrictions for opening foreign branches were 
removed completely (NBP, 2001). 
The global bank crisis related to the collapse of Lehman Brothers led to 
decreased financial liquidity on the Polish money market. As a result of the 
global crisis the crediting criteria became stricter. Nevertheless the banks’ 
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assets rose by 30.7% at the end of the year 2008 compared to the previous 
year (Sobolewski & Tymoczko, 2010). Polish banks remain universal in their 
character and concentrate on providing traditional services, which according to 
some experts makes them less vulnerable for external crises. The banking 
sector is characterised by a relatively low level of concentration compared to 
other European countries. Although banks provide a range of services designed 
for SMEs their major credit activities are targeted at individual clients 
(Sobolewski & Tymoczko, 2012a). The changes observed within the banking 
system during the last 3 to 4 years are not significant, which suggests a 
relatively stable and mature state of this sector.  
 
GDP growth  
The literature on Venture Capital does not present a consistent view on the role 
of GDP for the Venture Capital industry. Jeng and Wells (2000) concluded in 
their research that GDP growth has no significant influence on Venture Capital 
funding. Whereas Gompers et al. (1998) indicates that higher GDP growth 
leads to greater Venture Capital activity. For the purposes of the following 
research the argument of Gompers et al. seems to provide a better 
understanding of the process, because the authors present a broader 
perspective of Venture Capital activities. They point out that the increase in 
GDP growth creates more opportunities for potential and existing 
entrepreneurs. Thus the demand for Venture Capital funding increases.  
In the case of Poland the early transformation reform, although initially harsh for 
the society, brought quick economic benefits and consistent improvement of 
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living conditions. Starting in 1992 Poland records a yearly growth in GDP, even 
during the global economic crisis. Since then Poland has not experienced 
recession, although has felt the effects of global downturns. The economic 
slowdown in 2001-2002 was attributed the preceding crisis in Russia, in 2005 to 
the accession shock and the latest one in 2009 to the wider global crises 
(Tarnawa & Zadura-Lichota, 2012). The main factors influencing long term 
economic growth were within both the internal and external conditions. 
Especially during the first years of transformation such features as increased 
effectiveness of production along with changes in quality of capital and work 
culture, had significant impact. This was a direct effect of changing the 
dominant mentality from the socialist into the market oriented mode (Tarnawa & 
Zadura-Lichota, 2012). A significant role was played by investments, which 
were spurred by pre accession and later accession funds provided by the 
European Union. Poland received over 110 B Euro37 in the form of support 
programs. Along with the integration processes the Polish economy became 
more vulnerable to changes in the EU members economies. Currently over 70% 
of Polish foreign trade by turnover is conducted with EU countries, also the 
majority of foreign investors are residents of the EU.   
Although the Polish economy is perceived as stable and is complimented by 
foreign economists, a closer look at the statistical data shows that despite the 
recorded growth of economic indicators, Poland remains in the group of 
countries scoring below the average for EU members. According to the IMF 
classification it is still perceived as emerging economy.  
 
                                                 
37 http://www.mapadotacji.gov.pl/  
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Figure 19: Polish GDP growth (1996-2012) 
 
Source: Eurstat 
 
Figure 20: Polish GDP as percentage of EU 27 total  
 
Source: Eurostat  
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The above figure illustrates Polish GDP as percentage of EU average. The 
GDP has barely exceeded 50% of the EU average. Additionally the GDP count 
per capita still remains below the average.  
One of the major problems of the Polish economy is its low level of 
competitiveness. The situation in this respect has not changed significantly over 
the last decades. Inefficient public spending, and weak infrastructure 
accompanied by the low quality of public institutions are believed to be the main 
cause for the situation (Ministerstwo Gospodarki 2006; 2011).  
 
R&D potential 
The literature indicates that existing technology opportunities influence Venture 
Capital activity (Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Saxenian, 1996). Analysing the 
expenditures for R&D activities Poland shows that it stays behind the European 
Union average. Total spending does not exceed 1% of GDP, whereas the EU 
average oscillates around 2% and the US exceeds 2% of GDP as seen in figure 
21. 
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Figure 21: R&D expenditures as percentage of GDP (Poland) 
 
Source: Eurostat  
The majority of investment funds are still provided by the government. Although 
in recent years the role of foreign financing has significantly increased. Within 
10 years the share rose from 1,8% to 11,8% of the total R&D budget.  
Figure 22: R&D by source of funds (Poland) 
 
Source: Eurostat  
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constantly growing. The situation is similar while narrowing observation only to 
scientist and engineers positions (Eurostat). According to the European 
Innovation Scoreboard (2008/2009/2011) Poland has upgraded from a 
‘catching-up country’ in 2008 to a ‘moderate innovator’ in 2009 and 2011. 
However the average scores in innovation performance are still below the EU27 
averages. The only exception where Poland scores above the average is the 
‘human resources’ dimension. Among major weaknesses indicated in the 
reports are linkages & entrepreneurship and innovators.   
Figure 23: Convergence in innovation performance  
 
 
 
This picture has been removed by the Author of the dissertation for the 
copyright reasons. 
 
 
 
 
In terms of the speed of innovation growth Poland is among moderate growers.  
The innovation leaders, such as Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden and UK, 
are characterised by strong national research and innovation systems and 
outperform other countries in business activities and public private collaboration 
(Innovation Union scoreboard, 2011).  
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5.2.7. Institutions supporting entrepreneurship  
In Poland the commonly used term ‘centre for innovation and entrepreneurship’ 
describes organizations providing active support for entrepreneurship, 
innovation and competitiveness (Bąkowski & Mażewska, 2012). Looking at the 
historical perspective, the first innovation and entrepreneurship incubators were 
created in 1990/1991 in big agglomerations such as Poznań, Warsaw and 
Gdańsk. The initiatives were undertaken by universities, research institutions 
and supported by local councils. Shortly after this the Polish Business and 
Innovation Centres Association (Stowarzyszenie Organizatorów Ośrodków 
Innowacji i Przedsiębiorczości w Polsce)38 was established with the aim of 
providing a platform for knowledge and practice exchange. The association 
currently has 180 active members, undertakes its own research and regularly 
publishes reports on the state of Polish centres for innovation and 
entrepreneurship. It also engages in international cooperation with similar 
institutions abroad.  
The number of organizations supporting entrepreneurship and innovation is 
constantly growing and the changes over the last 23 years are shown on the 
picture below.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38
 http://www.sooipp.org.pl/en/ 
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Figure 24: Centres for innovation and entrepreneurship in Poland (1990-
2012)  
 
Source: adapted from: (Bąkowski & Mażewska, 2012) 
In the early and mid 1990 the majority of centres were providing training and 
consultancy, they used mainly local financing. The transformation processes 
created increased demand for these sorts of services. In mid 1990 the situation 
has changed in favour to activities supporting innovation. The share of 
innovation centers, among all the institutions supporting entrepreneurship, has 
increased from 3.2% in 1995 up to 34.2% in 2012. Similarly to the early 
transformation period the trend answers the market needs.  
Most commonly those organizations provide only one type of support, rarely 
combining two or more services on a regular basis e.g. education and financial 
support. Very rarely the cooperation at the regional level includes network of 
more than 5 organizations (Bąkowski & Mażewska, 2012).  
The character of these organizations has changed significantly over time. They 
have transformed from individual initiatives into professional organizations. 
Nevertheless they have kept the idea of no-profit organizations driven by the 
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social goal of filling in the gap between the market mechanism and public 
administration. There is no single legal form they operate in. It ranges across 
the forms of research institutions, foundations, and associations, on up to 
capital companies. They are characterised by high independence which on one 
hand gives flexibility in operations on the other hand results in a disparate 
system as a whole. There is an observable positive trend of increased 
engagement of higher education institutions and R&D institutes as well as local 
self governance institutions, such as commerce chambers, in participating in 
these sorts of initiatives. However, the commitment of practitioners in sharing 
their knowledge though this sort of platform is still perceived as not sufficient 
(Bąkowski & Mażewska, 2012).  
The European funds available in the last two programs 2004-2006 and 2007-
2013 created a unique opportunity for rapid development of organizations 
supporting entrepreneurship and innovation. The next EU financing turn of 
2014-2020 is forecast to be more selective and focused on financing directly 
research, innovation and technology commercialisation (Matusiak & Guliński, 
2010). Although the amount of disposable funds for organizations supporting 
entrepreneurship and innovation increased significantly there is a side effect in 
the change of their budgets’ structure. As a result the public financing plays an 
increased role which leads to financial dependency. Within a few years, when 
the current programs finish, those organizations will have to face the problem of 
finding alternative sources of funds (Bąkowski & Mażewska, 2012).  
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5.2.8. Entrepreneurs  
The following section is going to highlight features of Polish firms, which are 
believed to describe their ability to serve as portfolio companies of Venture 
Capital funds. Most of the data comes from official statistics and government 
reports.  
The Polish legal system separates enterprises into four groups according to 
their size described by number of employees, turnover and balance sheet 
assets. As Micro–enterprises are described those firms employing less than 
nine people, excluding the owner and co-owners, generating turnover of less 
than equivalent of 2 M Euro per year and recording less than 2 M Euro worth of 
assets in their balance sheet. Small – enterprises are those employing between 
10 and 49 employees, with turnover less than 10 M euro per year and assets 
not exceeding 10 M Euro. Medium-enterprises employ from 50 up to 249 
people, generating up to 50 M Euro of turnover yearly and record up to 43 M 
euro worth of balance sheet assets39. The large companies, by elimination, are 
those with higher numbers in employment rate, turnover and assets. Any of the 
above companies is perceived as an innovative enterprise when has made an 
innovation within last three years where a novelty was introduced in a product 
or service, process, marketing or organisation (OECD, 2010).  
The collapse of the communist system triggered rapid growth in the number of 
SMEs.  Currently over 99% of all firms operating on the market can be classified 
as SMEs. Their role in the economy is changing, nevertheless they are 
perceived as the important wealth provider. In 1999 the contribution of all 
enterprises in GDP generation was 70.4%, where 68% of the total GDP 
                                                 
39
 art. 1 appendix I European Commission (WE) nr 800/2008 from 6 of August 2008  
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generation was assigned to SMEs. In 2010 the enterprises still generated 
around two-thirds of national product (71.6%) with a decreased contribution of 
SME to 47.6%. Looking at the employment structure, the number of people 
working for SMEs increased from 68.4% in 1999 up to 69.9% in 2010 
(Dzierżanowski & Stachowiak, 2001; Tarnawa & Zadura-Lichota, 2012).  
The above data consider only the official statistics, however the actual size of 
the sector is bigger when so called ‘gray’ economy is included. The numbers 
reported under informal (gray) economics depends heavily on definitions 
applied. The broader the definition the higher are the numbers. Therefore 
estimates are between 26% of GDP and 14% of GDP depending on sources 
(OECD, 2010). Informal employment is less a problem than other aspects of 
informality, especially those aiming at tax evasion. According to the World Bank 
research run in 2009, over 43% of companies did not report all sales for tax 
purposes. This generated the highest rate in the Central Eastern Europe 
(OECD, 2010).  
Most of the statistics concentrate on the number of officially registered firms, 
however there is usually a difference between the registered and the active 
number of entities. The graph below illustrates the number of active enterprises, 
which it is believed gives a more accurate picture of the processes taking place 
in the SME market. As can be seen, the micro firms are outnumbering other 
types of firms and are followed by small enterprises. Compared to the EU 
average, in Poland the distribution of SMEs is heavily skewed to micro 
enterprises (OECD, 2010).  
Analysing the dynamics of changes in the number of active firms it can be seen 
that the increase in numbers between the years 2005-2006 overlaps with 
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improving market conditions, similarly the decrease in the year 2009 might be 
related to the global economic crises.   
Figure 25: Total number of active firms in Poland in individual size groups 
in years 2003 – 2010 (in K) 
 
 
 
 
This picture has been removed by the Author of the dissertation for the 
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Considering the first year, survival rate has kept improving since 2007. In 2010 
almost 80% of firms survived their first year. However the statistics are less 
optimistic for the survival rate in the second year, where the average is 50%, 
and 31% in the third year. Compared to the European average the number of 
closed businesses each year in Poland is higher (13% in Poland versus 10% on 
average in EU for 2009) nevertheless this is still better result than recoded by 
Portugal, Spain or Hungary (Tarnawa & Zadura-Lichota, 2012).  
The performance of Polish firms varies significantly among regions. The well 
developed voivodships such as Mazowieckie or Pomorskie offer higher 
investment attractiveness for businesses. Along with increased competitiveness 
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firms operating there have better access to external financing and also more 
often use it, in the form of bank credit, leasing, loan guarantees or Venture 
Capital financing (OECD, 2010).  
The Polish Confederation of Private Employer - Lewiatan runs regular research 
and issues yearly reports on performance of polish SMEs.  According to the 
latest report the most popular kind of innovation introduced by SMEs were 
product innovations, followed by marketing innovations. Process innovations 
were the least introduced.  
Those who did not introduce any kind of innovation explained the decision by 
factors such as: no need of innovation in the sector in which they operate, too 
small size of the firms, surprisingly, the lack of capital was nominated as third 
and followed by the assumption that clients do not need innovations, and last, 
that there was too high a risk connected with introduction of innovations.  
SMEs differ in respect to goals and long term planning. The micro-enterprises 
focus on short term goals such as staying in the market or increasing profit. 
Medium enterprises on the other had focus on increasing their share of the 
market and market value. In respect of goals these are very similar to large 
enterprises, in which planning is long term.  
Also the way firms perceive their competitive advantage has significantly 
changed during last 3 years. Until 2004 firms perceived price as the best way to 
position themselves on the market. Currently the situation is changing in favour 
of increased role of quality of products as well as quality of client services. 
(Starczewska-Krzystoszek, 2011) 
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5.2.9. Culture 
The following section is dedicated to the issues related to national culture and 
its relationship with entrepreneurship. Culture, in contrary to personality, is a 
collective phenomena. It refers to set of shared values, believes and expected 
behaviours. It is deeply embedded and unconscious (Hayton, George, & Zahra, 
2002). Following Hofstede (2001:9) culture might be described as ‘collective 
programming that distinguishes the members of one group or category of 
people from another.’ Furthermore, culture is socially constructed therefore 
learnt not inherited.  
The influence of culture on entrepreneurial activities had been discussed both in 
the theoretical and empirical literature (Hayton et al., 2002; Urban, 2010). 
Hayton et al (2002), based on a comprehensive empirical literature review, 
suggested that culture should be perceived as a moderator between contextual 
factors (institutional and economic) and entrepreneurial outcome. It acts rather 
as catalyst than causal agent of entrepreneurial outcome.  
This research follows an approach proposed by Hofstede (1983, 1984). Based 
on extended research the author proposed a consistent taxonomy of four 
cultural dimensions for explaining peoples’ behavioural preferences in business 
organizations. A fifth dimension was added later, based on a smaller scale 
research. His approach has been frequently used either directly on in modified 
versions in empirical research (Hayton et al., 2002). The wide application of this 
taxonomy allows comparison between different countries and times. Although 
the dimensions proposed by Hofstede do not absorb all the cultural differences 
between nations empirical research, they have proved their correlation with 
management and organizational aspects. For example, power distance is 
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related to the way subordinates approach their bosses, the 
individualism/collectivism dimension influences negotiation behaviour, 
uncertainty avoidance is correlated with job satisfaction and 
masculinity/femininity relates to number of female managers (Kolman, 
Noorderhaven, Hofstede, & Dienes, 2003). Li and Zahra (2012) indicated that 
the level of uncertainty avoidance and collectivism are particularly relevant for 
Venture Capital investments. The authors argued that although the formal 
institutional framework is fundamental for Venture Capital operations both the 
uncertainty avoidance and collectivism seem to reduce the sensitivity of Venture 
Capital funding to the incentives provided by the formal institutions (Li & Zahra, 
2012) 
The proposed dimensions according to which national cultures might be 
characterised are presented below. The figure illustrates the current state of 
Polish national culture in comparison with the British and Hungarian.  
Figure 26: Polish culture through the lens of the 5-D Mode of Hofstede  
 
Source: adapted from the official web page of The Hofstede Centre: http://geert-
hofstede.com/poland.html (2013) 
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The current values scored by Poland are contrasted with research published by 
Nasierawki and Mikula (1998), which applied Hofstede’s criteria to evaluate 
Polish managers in the mid 90s. The comparison should allow trends in 
changes of analysed dimensions to be recognised.  
The first dimension refers to Power Distance (PDI) and represents the extent to 
which members of a society accept that power in institutions and organizations 
is distributed unequally. In Large Power Distance societies, people accept 
hierarchical distribution of power and further justification is not required. In 
organizations Power Distance influences the amount of formal hierarchy and 
level of centralisation, influences mode of participation and decision-making 
(Newman & Nollen, 1996).  
Poland scored 68 (compared to 72 in previous research), which indicates that it 
is a hierarchical society, especially in comparison to the United Kingdom. Within 
organizations this is reflected by centralisation and acceptance of close 
supervision. Managers encouraging participation might be perceived as weak or 
incompetent (Newman & Nollen, 1996). People will make an effort to keep a 
powerful image. The large Power Distance does not foster participation, 
commitment and work ethic. Such a combination of features forms an 
unfavourable environment for technology transfer (Nasierowski & Mikula, 1998). 
Following Nasierawki and Mikula (1998), Polish managers do not perceive 
themselves as practical or systematic, they reject the need for support and 
avoid consultations with subordinates before taking decisions. Employees, on 
the other hand, are afraid to disagree with their bosses and often are 
uncooperative. This situation might be partially assigned to the communist 
inheritance, when people were discouraged to think independently. Also the 
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research indicates, in Central Europe respect for authorities is low and rather 
unlikely to change in near future (Mishler & Rose, 1997; Nasierowski & Mikula, 
1998).  
The second dimension Individualism – Collectivism (IDV) indicates the 
preferences toward social framework. Societies skewed toward Individualism 
prefer a loosely knit social framework, where individuals are expected to take 
care of themselves and their immediate families only. A Collectivist approach, 
on the other hand, favours a tightly – knit social framework, where individuals 
can expect their relatives, clan or other in-group members to look after them in 
exchange for unquestioning loyalty (Hofstede, 1984). Within organizations 
individualism is manifested as autonomy, individual responsibility and individual 
– level rewards (Newman & Nollen, 1996).   
Poland scores 60 (previously 56), which according to Hofstede, makes the 
society individualistic on the scale. However comparing to the UK (89) or 
Hungary (80) the difference is significant. In combination with Large Power 
Distance the individualistic approach indicates an internal ‘cultural 
contradiction’, which creates tensions. As Nasierawki and Mikula (1998) pointed 
out, while implementing changes a strong need for group support is displayed. 
At the same time respect or at least acceptance of the leadership is shown. 
However, this preference does not make Polish managers good team players. 
Also the earlier research indicated a lower level of individualism with 
simultaneous rejection of the concept of collectivism, at least in the communist 
version.  
The Masculinity versus Femininity dimension (MAS) indicates to what extent the 
social gender roles are clearly distinct. Masculine societies prefer achievement, 
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assertiveness and material success while Feminine societies favour 
relationships, modesty and the quality of life (Hofstede, 1984). The perception 
of failure differs significantly. Masculine cultures abhor failure in contrast to 
feminine culture, which rates failure as less significant (Newman & Nollen, 
1996).  
Poland scored 64 (previously 62), which leaves it behind the UK and Hungary 
values, but still classifies it as a masculine society. It translates into a need for 
career success both for men and women. However the presence of low ethical 
standards and prejudices results in a limited enthusiasm toward others’ 
individual success (Nasierowski & Mikula, 1998).  
Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) refers to the way individuals within the society deal 
with unknown. It relates to the level of stress caused by uncertainty and 
ambiguity (Hofstede, 1984). In organizations, Strong Uncertainty Avoidance is 
manifested in clarity of plans, policies, procedures and systems; application of 
which helps to reduce the uncertainly and cope with discomfort of unknown 
situations (Newman & Nollen, 1996). Those societies are described as 
intolerant toward deviant persons or ideas.  
Poland scored 92 (previously 106). Compared to 35 recorded by the UK, places 
Poland with a very high preference for avoiding uncertainty. Considering Polish 
recent history this might be classified as rational behaviour. The bureaucratic 
system during the communist period was characterised by rules and 
procedures. Individuals had limited opportunities to control their destiny 
(Nasierowski & Mikula, 1998). However, as Poland becomes blended in the 
European system this attitude is slowly changing toward weaker uncertainty 
avoidance.  
173 
 
The Long Term Orientation versus Short Term Orientation (LTO) dimension 
was added later and was based on separate research limited to 23 countries 
and later extended to 93 (Hofstede & Bond, 1988; Hofstede & Minkov, 2010). 
This dimension relates to the country’s time orientation. Long Term Oriented 
cultures are characterised by patience, determination and respect to elders as 
well as ancestors (Newman & Nollen, 1996). In organizations individuals value 
learning, honesty, accountability and self-discipline. The focus is given for life - 
long relationships, owners/managers and workers share the same values. In 
Short Term Orientation societies main work values are freedom, rights, 
achievement, and thinking for oneself. Personal loyalties vary with business 
needs (Hofstede & Minkov, 2010). 
Poland scored 32 (earlier data not available), which categorises it as Short 
Term Oriented culture, although to a lesser extent than the UK. Following Short 
Term Orientation Poles are expected to respect tradition, have a limited 
tendency to save, follow current consumption trends, expecting quick results at 
the same time having strong concern with establishing the truth i.e. normative40.  
The changes in the dimension values recorded between mid 1990s and current 
state show that Poland is following trends present in Western cultures in 
general. Although, taking in account that cultural changes are slow, some of the 
characteristic features are not expected to change in the near future. 
Nasierowski and Mikula (1998) point out that such attributes as distrust in 
authority, lack of cooperative spirit, high expectations for life and low work ethic 
are difficult to withdraw. Additionally they indicate that the transformation 
process in Poland resulted in a dichotomy within the society. One group shows 
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 http://geert-hofstede.com/poland.html (last update: 14.03.2013) 
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entrepreneurial spirit, is open to new ideas and willing to take risks. The other 
group, usually connected with state controlled enterprises, expects government 
support and protection.    
 
5.2.10. Venture Capital industry  
The following section sets out the history of the Venture Capital industry in 
Poland. The data come mainly from secondary sources but include information 
collected during an interview conducted with an expert on the Polish Venture 
Capital industry – Piotr Tamowicz, PhD41.  
The history of the Polish Venture Capital industry can usefully be seen in terms 
of successive phases of development. The broadest categorisation comprises 
two periods: before entering the European Union and after entering the 
European Union. Klonowski (Klonowski, 2011) proposed a more detailed 
classification comprising: a development stage (1990-1994); an expansion 
stage (1995-1997); a stagnation stage (1998-2003); and a buyout stage (2004-
2009). His taxonomy was based on the fund raising, investment and exit activity 
of funds. Although such a classification gives clear boundaries it does not 
sufficiently describe the emergence and development of Venture Capital. The 
drawback of this classification for the purpose of this study arises from the fact 
that it is based on fund raising and investment values, which in most cases are 
generated by Private Equity; whereas, as indicated later in this chapter, Venture 
Capital constitutes less than 10% of the total of those numbers. Therefore an 
alternative approach is proposed here, which focuses on milestone events for 
                                                 
41
 1990-2004 worked for The Gdańsk Institute for Market Economies; now an independent 
market consultant. Laureate of the Educational Enterprise Foundation Prize for the best report 
on Polish Venture Capital Industry (2005); co-author of National Venture Capital Forum; author 
of publications on Venture Capital, innovation and corporate governance.  
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the Venture Capital industry as a whole. The turning points, identified for the 
first time here, are derived from the expert interviews conducted in this study.  
It is proposed that the turning points in the emergence and development of the 
Polish Venture Capital industry can be identified as: the entrance of foreign 
funds, based on aid finance; joining the European Union structure, which 
allowed access to extensive public funds dedicated to Venture Capital funding; 
establishing the National Capital Fund; and finally, activation of the New 
Connect platform as part of the Warsaw Stock Exchange.  
The economic and political changes that started in Poland in 1989 were 
accompanied by activation of the first Venture Capital funds. Data on the 
emergence of the Venture Capital industry is limited, especially for the first ten 
years. The European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA) 
started regularly collecting data on Eastern and Central Europe in 1998; 
however, the first reports include only aggregated data. The Polish Private 
Equity Association (PSIK) was created later, in 2002. Most of the data published 
by the Polish Association is based on EVCA calculations. The problems of data 
collection as well as validation will be discussed in the methodology chapter.  
The pioneers of the Polish Venture Capital industry were financed mostly by 
external stakeholders. Four funds established between 1989 and 1991 are 
believed to be the basis for the Polish Venture Capital industry (Tamowicz & 
Stola, 2002).  
The first fund operating in Poland - The Investment Fund for Central and 
Eastern Europe (IØ) - was established in 1989 on the initiative of the Danish 
government. The initial capital was c. 114M Euro and intended to be invested 
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into deals between 1.2M and 7.4M Euro. The aim of this fund was the 
promotion of entrepreneurship and growth in the countries in the region, 
through cooperation between local and Danish enterprises. Although the fund 
operated across Central and Eastern Europe, Poland became an important 
area of investment (46% of all investments were located in Poland) (Świderska, 
2008:140). When Poland joined the European Union the fund stopped new 
investments and moved its interests towards more emerging markets; it 
currently invests in Belarus, Ukraine, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina42  
The second fund, the Polish – American Enterprise Fund (PAEF), was 
established in 1990 with the support of the US Congress. The fund was part of 
a broader program initiated by the Support for East European Democracy 
(SEED) Act signed in 1989, which aimed to promote democratic and free 
market transitions in Poland and Hungary. The assistance concentrated on 
supporting the development of private business sectors in those nations, labour 
market reforms, and democratic institutions. Later the SEED Act was expanded 
to include five additional funds43. The PAEF (operated by Enterprise Investors) 
was engaged in a broad range of private investment activities such as equity 
investments, loans, grants and technical assistance targeted at small to medium 
size enterprises (Polish-American Enterprise Fund, 2008). The PAEF, due to 
professional management and effective cooperation with entrepreneurs, 
became a very successful project. When liquidating the fund had 350M USD 
(Świderska, 2008:141) compared to 240M USD of starting capital (Tamowicz & 
Stola, 2002). During 2000-2001 part of the initial capital (140M USD) was 
returned to the US budget. It was the first ever case of aid funds returning to the 
                                                 
42
 http://www.ifu.dk/en/Investments 
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US foreign aid program44. The remaining capital supplied was transferred to the 
Polish-American Freedom Foundation, the mission of which is to advance 
democracy, civil society, economic development and social equality in Poland 
and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe45. From the PAEF 
experience grew one of the largest firms managing private equity and venture 
capital funds in Poland and Central and Eastern Europe - the Enterprise 
Investors.  
The third fund – Towarzystwo Inwestycji Społeczno-Ekonomicznych SA (TISE 
SA) – was established in 1991 by cooperation of the Solidarité Internationale 
pour le Développement et l'Investissement, Bank Inicjatyw Społeczno-
Ekonomicznych (currently Bank DnD Nord Polska SA) and the Foundation for 
Social and Economic Initiatives (FISE). Initially TISE SA was designed as non 
profit organization, which aimed to invest into economic projects perceived as 
socially important. Therefore projects based on a local workforce and 
resources, as well as those which were environment friendly, were prioritised. 
However with time the operational profile of TISE SA has been changing into 
regular Venture Capital type investments (Świderska, 2008). Currently TISE SA 
is owned by Crédit Coopératif Bank and provides venture capital as well as 
loans to non-government organizations (NGOs) and small and medium firms46.  
The fourth fund – CARESBAC– Polska SA was also established in 1991. The 
funders were CARE Small Business Assistance Corporation (CARESBAC), 
Cooperation Fund and Foundation for the Development of Polish Agriculture 
(FDPA) (Świderska, 2008). The CARESBAC-Polska SA was structured as a 15 
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-year fund with committed capital of 17.9M USD. The majority of its investments 
were into agribusiness (43%) (SEAF, 2010). Alongside the investment activities 
CARESBAC–Polska SA also intended to promote and enhance cooperation 
with other organizations supporting entrepreneurship (Świderska, 2008).  
Smaller initiatives were undertaken with the help of the program PHARE-
STRUDER, which financed two regional funds: the Regional Investment Fund in 
Łódź and Regional Investment Fund in Katowice. Another two regional funds 
were established with the support of the Polish-British Enterprise Project47 in 
Lublin and Białystok (Tamowicz & Stola, 2002).  
Large commercial investment funds started operating on the Polish Venture 
Capital market from 1992 onwards. The Polish Private Equity Fund created by 
Enterprise Investors entered the market with 151M USD, followed in 1994 by 
Poland Partners (65M USD), Poland Pioneer Fund (40M USD), Poland 
Investment Fund (co financed by European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and International Finance Corporation (IFC)), 
Renaissance Capital, White Eagle Industries and Poland Growth. The total 
increase in the value of large commercial funds in 1994 is estimated at the level 
of 210M USD. At the same time the segment of bank owned private equity 
funds started to emerge. According to the EVCA: in mid 1990 in Poland, there 
were twelve companies managing capital of 660M USD. The main investors 
were EBRD, IFC and foreign pension funds (Tamowicz & Stola, 2002). During 
the late 1990s the experience gained by existing funds managers resulted in 
new funds emerging. The Enterprise Investors created the Polish Enterprise 
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 the program aimed to replicate Enterprise Support Scheme which operated in 1989-93 Sealy, 
C., & Gibson, A. 1999. The Polish-British Enterprise Project: Developing A Business 
Consultancy Programme, Rio de Janeiro DC Conference. Rio: Department for International 
Development (DFID). 
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Fund I (in 1997) and Polish Enterprise Fund IV (in 2000). Thus becoming the 
leading Venture Capital fund accounting for over 80% of the total fund managed 
on the market (Klonowski, 2006). The successes of Poland Partners resulted in 
creation of Innova/98 Fund (1998) and Innova/3 (2000). This period was 
characterised by emergence of funds, controlling large funds, which aimed to 
invest in the whole of the Central and Eastern Europe region. These funds often 
had managing teams in several capitals of the region (AIG, Advent, Dresdner 
Kleinwort Capital, DBG or Raiffaisena). At the same time, the first pan-regional 
funds, focusing on particular sectors, entered the Polish market (3TS Venture 
Partners, BMP/CEEV, Baring Communications Equity) (Tamowicz & Stola, 
2002).  
After ten years of development of the Polish Venture Capital industry there were 
circa 30 professional management teams, based mainly in Warsaw. The capital 
under management was estimated at 3,000M Euro. While, according to EVCA, 
the Central and Eastern European Venture Capital market development was in 
a relatively early stage - Poland along with Hungary and the Czech Republic 
were indicated as the most advanced in the region (EVCA Central and Eastern 
Europe Task Force, 2005).  
The most active group of funds were the private commercial funds, raising 
capital from individual investors, mainly abroad. The second group consisted of 
funds focusing on the Central and Eastern European region. The third group 
was of a few relatively small funds focused on supporting entrepreneurship and 
regional development. The two first groups were developing dynamically, 
whereas the third group activities were diminishing, mainly due to lack of 
interest and support from the government side (Tamowicz & Stola, 2002). 
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Despite the above, according to EVCA reports, in the year 2003 Poland 
recorded the highest number in seed and start up investments in the whole 
region (EVCA Central and Eastern Europe Task Foce, 2004). The preferred 
investment stages among all funds were buyouts, expansion and replacement 
capital. Compared to other Western European countries, funds in the Central 
and Eastern Europe used trade sale as the exit from investment more 
frequently. At the same time the Warsaw stock market proved to be an efficient 
exit option for large funds (EVCA Central and Eastern Europe Task Force, 
2005).  
The figure below summarises the emergence of funds in chronological order. 
Some management teams established more than one fund. Funds created via 
the program of privatisation (NIF) are included, but only those aiming at Venture 
Capital investments.  
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Table 6: Funds created during the first ten years of Venture Capital industry development (with segmentation)  
Year/ 
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Capital 
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Central Europe 
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European 
Food Fund 
 
 
Innova 98 
BMP/CE
EV 
Advent 
CEE I&II 
Technologie 
holding 
Strateg BV 
Environmental 
Investment 
Partners 
DBG 
Osteuropa 
Riverside CE 
Innova 3 
Renaissance 
II 
Lloyd`s IT IF 
Source: Private data obtained from Piotr Tamowicz 
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Entering the European Union in 2004 allowed Poland to participate in structural 
funds, which also targeted some segments of the Venture Capital and Private 
Equity market. The two programs directly influencing the Venture Capital 
industry were the Sectoral Operational Program - Improvement of the 
competitiveness of enterprises for years 2004 – 2006 and the Innovative 
Economy Programme 2007-2013.   
The first program scheduled for years 2004 – 2006 recognized the need for 
strengthening the Polish business institutional environment, especially in the 
context of joining the European Union structures. The barrier to implementing 
high technology start-ups was attributed to low quality external financing, 
particularly the lack of possibilities to utilise Venture Capital.  Thus measure 1.2 
of the program was dedicated to’ improvement of accessibility to external 
financing of enterprises' investments’. The support was directed to seed funds 
(measure 1.2.3 – supporting the emergence of seed capital funds) as well as to 
other sources of finance such as loan and credit guarantee funds. The Polish 
Agency for Enterprise Development was in charge of coordinating  the program 
which could cover up to 50% of qualified costs (Ministry of Regional 
Development, 2006).  
According to the program evaluation published in 2009 (Gajewski & Szczucki) 
the support embraced six seed funds48, which finalized 47 investments worth 
105M PLN. The time span of those investments was estimated from 5 to 7 
years. The majority of the funds managed to finalize the planned number of 
deals. Managers indicated the global crises of 2008 and the high risk 
                                                 
48
 BIB Seed Capital Sp. z o.o., Business Angel Seedfund sp. z o.o. S.K.A., IIF Seed Fund Sp. z 
o.o., MCI.Bio Ventures Sp. z o.o., Spółka Zarządzająca Funduszami Kapitału Zalążkowego 
SATUS Spółka z o.o. - Spółka komandytowa - FUNDUSZ KAPITAŁU ZALĄŻKOWEGO S.K.A., 
Silesia Fund sp. z o.o. S.K.A.  
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associated with projects as the main barriers to the deal flow. Entrepreneurs 
expressed positive opinions on cooperation with seed capital funds. They 
indicated improvement in company liquidity and increased support for growth as 
the major benefits of risk capital engagement. From the management 
perspective entrepreneurs highlighted the benefits of general consultancy, 
followed by legal and tax advice in establishing the company provided by the 
Venture Capital.  
The Operational Program Innovative Economy 2007-2013 aims to support 
innovative enterprises and the enhancement of competitiveness of the Polish 
economy. The priority axis 3 – Capital for innovation - is specifically dedicated 
to improving access to external sources of finance for innovative undertakings. 
The instruments supported by these actions are aimed at entrepreneurs, whose 
firms are characterised by innovative concepts, low book value and high 
potential, thus are not subjects for traditional forms of financing. Within this 
priority there are three sub actions:  
• 3.1 addressed to organizations providing support for newly established 
entities i.e. incubators or technology parks. The support provided to SMEs 
has to be taken in two steps. The first step includes help at the incubation 
phase and does not involve capital engagement.  The second step provides 
financial support for entities which proved at the incubation stage that they 
are able to operate in the business environment and generate future 
income. The capital investment at this stage cannot exceed 50% of the 
shares and 200K Euro. The whole budget for this action is 175M Euro   
• 3.2. is dedicated exclusively to the National Capital Fund (the fund of funds) 
and is assigned 160M Euro for its operations.  
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• 3.3 is dedicated to develop and support networking between entrepreneurs 
and capital providers and is directed to all business environment institutions. 
The total budget for this activity is 35M Euro (Ministerstwo Rozwoju 
Regionalego, 18 października 2012 )  
Currently49 within the sub-action 3.1 there are 580M PLN (141.4M Euro) 
assigned to 43 incubators. Those incubators invested already into 332 start-
ups. The planned number is 600. The preferred industries were ICT, 
biotechnology, medical science, tourism and education. Within sub-action 3.3 
workshops (1100) and seminars for entrepreneurs (260) were run discussing 
external financing of firms’ development and innovation. Additionally financial 
support was provided to cover the cost of preparation of the documentation 
required to obtain external capital. As result 71 companies obtained capital via 
New Connect, 57 got external private investors and 7 via the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange (Ulman, 2012).  
The sub-action 3.2 is dedicated to support an already existing and operating 
institution – the National Capital Fund (NCF). The section below describes in 
more details the organization of National Capital Fund and its operations. The 
information was provided by the official web page50 of the fund as well as 
collected via interviews.  
Creation of the National Capital Fund constituted a milestone for the 
development of the Venture Capital industry in Poland. The required 
legislation51 creating the first Polish fund of funds was passed in March 2005. 
The document sets out the framework for organization and functioning of the 
                                                 
49
 State for November 2012  
50
 http://www.kfk.org.pl/  
51
 Ustawa o KFK z dnia 4 marca 2005, Dz. U. z 2005 r. Nr 57, poz. 491 with later amendments 
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National Capital Fund as well as sets the terms of granting financial support to 
enterprises through risk capital funds.  
The NCF was created by the Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK) in a form of 
joint – stock company under the provision of the Commercial Code. BGK is a 
state owned bank, and it is the sole shareholder. The NCF has got a 
supervisory board, consisting of 5 members, of which one is appointed by the 
minister of economy and one by the minister of education. The supervisory 
board creates the investment committee, which advises the management 
board. The scope of NCF’s investment is regulated by the act and is treated as 
public support from the legal perspective.  
The act of 2005 created only the legal basis for the NCF existence, however, 
the document allowing the actual functioning was passed two years later in 
2007. The second act: regulation of the Minister of Economy of 15 June 2007 
on financial support granted by the National Capital Fund52, provides detailed 
regulation on terms of the financial support provided by NCF.  Also the first 
money was assigned at that time, which allowed the fund’s portfolio to be 
created. 
The NCF provides financial support to Venture Capital funds, which are 
registered in Poland. The financing may be up to 50% of the new fund 
capitalization. The preferred form of NCF’s capital engagement is a combination 
of equity (85%) and debt (15%): preferably bonds. In order to establish a new 
fund in cooperation with NCF a private investor (not a public entity) is required 
to commit 50% of the capital. New funds are usually established in the form of a 
                                                 
52
 Rozporządzenie Ministra Gospodarki z dnia 15 czerwca 2007 r. w sprawie wsparcia 
finansowego udzielanego przez Krajowy Fundusz Kapitałowy, Dz.U.07.115.796 
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limited joint- stock partnership or closed - end investment fund, however other 
legal forms are also possible. The intended duration of the new fund is up to 10 
years: in special cases the time might be prolonged up to 12 years. The 
investment period is set for 5 years. The funds to be supported by the NCF are 
selected in open competitions. NCF is declared as a passive investor but 
exercises its supervision duties though participation in the fund’s supervision 
body and the investment committee. There are several restrictions for the 
investment portfolio of the new fund. The new fund may invest in SMEs 
registered in Poland, with preference given to innovative enterprises conducting 
R&D and those with high growth potential. Additionally their activities should be 
beneficial for the local economies especially in terms of creating new working 
places. The investment phase may be seed, start-up or expansion, with the 
investment limit of 1.5M Euro and 20% of project capitalisation. 
While distributing revenues NCF gives preferences to private investors. The 
allocation of revenues is as following:  
1. private investors until they receive a capital contribution equal to the 
invested capital; 
2. the NCF up to invested capital; 
3. private investors until they receive a minimal rate of return (hurdle rate); 
4. the NCF until it receives a minimal rate of return (hurdle rate); 
Currently the NCF gets their capital from the following sources: own capital 
(from BGK – 24M PLN); Polish government support (55M PLN); Operational 
Program Innovation Economy (650M PLN) and the Swiss- Polish Cooperation 
Program (155M PLN), which together calculates for 884M PLN (214.3M Euro) 
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of collected capital. The portfolio consists of fourteen funds. The table below 
presents the funds and their investments (state for January 2013): 
Table 7: National Capital Fund’s portfolio  
Fund’s name Capital 
Number of 
investments 
BBI Seed Fund PLN 60 M 7 
Helix Ventures Partners PLN 40 M 6 
Assets Management Black Lion PLN 100 M 4 
Innovation Nest PLN 40 M 4 
GPV I PLN 84 M 2 
Skyline Venture PLN 40 M 2 
Internet Ventures PLN 100 M 1 
Inovo Venture Fund PLN 100 M - 
Opera Venture Capital PLN 100 M - 
Zernike – Meta Ventures PLN 80 M - 
Bastion Venture Fund PLN 50 M - 
Venture Capital Satus PLN 50 M - 
Nomad Fund PLN 40 M - 
Adiuvo PLN 40 M - 
Source: NCF (http://www.kfk.org.pl/en/funds_15.01.2013) 
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Figure 27: Aggregated portfolio of National Capital Fund by stage of 
investment:  
  
Source: adapted from: http://www.kfk.org.pl/en/funds/statistics/investments-made-portfolio-
funds 
 
Figure 28: Aggregated portfolio by the sector 
  
Source: adapted from: http://www.kfk.org.pl/en/funds/statistics/investments-made-portfolio-
funds 
 
As seen from the statistics above the seed investments are the most preferred 
stage for investment, which is consistent with the guidelines of the NCF, also 
ICT dominates as the preferred sector for investments. Due to the short time of 
NCF operation, and as there are no recorded exits from investments, it is not 
possible to assess how efficient it is.  
The next section presents the statistics on the Polish Venture Capital industry. 
However these numbers give only a partial picture of the actual state of the 
36% 
28% 
36% 
by number  
seed
start up
expansion
40% 
20% 
40% 
by value  
seed
start up
expansion
64% 
4% 
8% 
12% 
12% 
by number  
ICT
Industry
Healthcare
Software
Other
59% 
4% 
5% 
13% 
13% 
by value  
ICT
Industry
Healthcare
Software
Other
 190 
 
market, for the following reasons. Firstly, the data are collected by the Polish 
Private Equity Association (PSIK) from its members. At the moment53, there are 
43 members representing Venture Capital firms, only ten of which declare an 
interest in early stage investments. In comparison the British Venture Capital 
Association has 230 members. Secondly, due to a lack of other complete 
records it is impossible to specify the exact number of Venture Capital firms 
operating in the industry in Poland. Based on the interviews it is known that 
many Venture Capital firms investing in early stages are not members of the 
Association (PSIK). Therefore those numbers should be treated rather as 
indication of general trends than exact reflection of the situation on the market.  
 
Figure 29: Fund raised by Polish Venture Capital industry (2002-2011)  
 
Source: EVCA 
Venture Capital funds recorded increased fundraising starting from 2004, when 
Poland entered the European Union, until 2006, which was the high point for 
Poland. The later decreases in funds were attributed to the general global trend, 
as well as to the cyclical character of the industry. The reduced inflow of capital 
                                                 
53
 State for April 2013 
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between the years 2006-2008 resulted in less active fundraising in following 
years54.  
Figure 30: Fundraising by stage in Poland (only Venture)  
 
Source: EVCA 
Analysing the details of the fund raising structure, it can be seen that Venture 
Capital funds focus either on the early or balanced stages of investment. The 
fund raising share dedicated to the venture segment does not exceed 10% of 
the total funds raised by both Venture Capital and Private equity funds.  
The Polish Venture Capital market has always been dominated by foreign 
investors. According to the Polish Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association (PSIK), in 2004 over 99% of capital raised for Venture Capital and 
Private Equity came from abroad. The two graphs below illustrate the 
percentage share of different sources of capital within the Polish market and the 
European market.  
                                                 
54
 http://www.psik.org.pl/dane/items/rynek-private-equityventure-capital-w-polsce-w-2009-r.html 
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The proportion of domestic capital within Polish VC/PE industry is gradually 
improving and, as seen on the chart below, the domestic sources of capital are 
noticeable, but still behind the European averages. In 2009 the proportion was 
13.1% in Poland compared to 53.9% of domestic capital registered in Europe 
and in 2001 7.8% compared to 34.3%. However similar to the European trends 
most of the capital inflows in Polish Venture Capital/Private Equity industry 
come from Europe.  
Figure 31: Geographic sources of funds – Poland  
 
 
Source: EVCA yearbook 2012 
Figure 32: Geographic sources of funds – Europe  
 
Source: EVCA yearbook 2012  
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The recent increase in the domestic share could be attributed to the increased 
role of public funding to Venture Capital through the European Union funds.  
Figure 33: Investor type – Poland 
 
Source: EVCA yearbook 2012 
 
The following two graphs illustrate the percentage of different types of investors 
active on the local market. The dominant investors on the market are the Fund 
of funds and the government agencies. This is again related to the significant 
inflow of capital from the European structural funds. Compared to the rest of the 
Europe, Polish investors are relatively less diversified, also the investment 
proportions differ. In Europe on average the pension funds are the main 
suppliers of capital to the industry, whereas in Poland their role is very limited. 
In 2007, 2009 and 2010 EVCA has not registered any activity of Polish pension 
funds. A similar situation might be observed in case of insurance companies. 
The role of banks and capital markets as capital providers is again limited. 
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However, the recent development of the New Connect platform should 
positively influence the supply of capital from the capital markets. The New 
Connect platform was introduced in the earlier section of the chapter dedicated 
to the development of Polish capital market and will also be discussed in more 
detail in the data analysis chapter.  
 
Investments 
The investment pattern observed within the Polish Venture Capital industry 
echoes the Central Eastern Europe Region curve. A significant increase in 
investment activity is noticeable shortly after European Union enlargement, with 
a peak in 2007. The following two years recorded a decrease in investment. 
The first downturn between 2007 and 2008 was about 8%, whereas the second 
decrease was more significant and accounted for 58% decrease in 2009 
compared to the previous year. For the whole period of record the Polish 
Venture Capital and Private Equity industry prefers later stages of investment, 
where buyouts are the most popular. The investment in early stages accounts 
between 0.3% up to 3.2% of total investment. The exceptional year was 2008 
when the proportion met 7.9% of total investment.  
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Figure 34: Total investment in VC/PE industry in Poland (including stage 
of investment)  
 
Source: EVCA  
Relating the Venture Capital and Private Equity industry investment to the 
national GDP, generally Poland scores below both the Regional and European 
averages. The exceptional years were 2003, 2010 and 2011. The high Regional 
investment rate in 2009, that exceeded even the European average, according 
to the EVCA, was due to activities in the Czech Venture Capital/Private Equity 
market. Whereas the declining rate in Poland is assigned to exaggerated 
expectations of entrepreneurs toward pricing their new ventures in the light of 
the unstable market situation.  
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Figure 35: Investment as GDP share  
 
Source: EVCA  
Looking at the preferred investment sectors, the communication and consumer 
goods & retail remain dominant though the researched period. In 2004 all high-
technology investments were accomplished within the telecommunication 
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Figure 36: Investment by sectors (%) 
 
Source: EVCA yearbook 2012 
Disinvestment 
The two graphs below illustrate the disinvestment process, limited to Venture 
Capital sector with respect to value of deals and number of companies. 
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Figure 37: Venture deals – exit routes in Poland (in K Euro) 
 
Source: EVCA yearbook 2012 
Considering the value of disinvestment, the year 2010 registered a peak. The 
worst achievements were recorded in 2009, which reflected the global trend. 
The most popular ways of exit are though the trade sale, sale to another private 
equity, and public offering; and this tendency is constant throughout the history 
of Polish Venture Capital industry. The increasing popularity of public offering 
and IPO may be attributed to the introduction of the New Connect platform in 
2007.  
Taking into account the number of companies, the most popular exit route is via 
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Figure 38: Venture deals – exit routes in Poland (in number of companies) 
 
Source: EVCA yearbook 2012 
Following the statistics, although the numbers remain lower, the Polish Venture 
Capital industry is following the European trends, especially since becoming a 
full member of the European Union.  
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notes were made immediately after the meeting. Transcripts and notes are 
available on request.  
 
5.3.1. Regulatory Framework  
 Opinions on Polish legal regulations differ among respondents. Most of the 
respondents perceive the legal system as not the most constraining factor for 
their activities.  
In terms of the legal system everything is fine. One may always improve 
something but there is nothing like a legal obstacle. (Public Venture 
Capital) 
However, this view might be due to the fact that only a few funds have to 
operate according to local regulations. This constraint applies only to those 
funds registered in Poland, which in practice are only the funds using public 
support.  
Legal regulation does not apply (to the majority of Venture Capital funds 
– author’s clarification) because most Venture Capital funds are 
registered abroad. The only issue within Venture Capitals scope of 
interest are the double taxation agreements. (Private Venture Capital_I) 
As shown in the above quotation, the issue within the law that is of interest to 
Venture Capital are the tax regulations given their major effect on investment 
returns. Respondents across the researched community agreed that taxation 
and tax authorities are the weak points. There are two major problems 
indicated. Firstly, the large number of frequently changing regulations. 
Secondly, problems arising while interpreting regulation by tax officers, who 
 201 
 
have a lot of freedom in this respect. The following citations illustrate these 
points:  
‘Polish tax law for Venture Capital funds is very bad’ (Private Venture 
Capital_I)  
 ‘The Polish tax law is overregulated.’ (Lawyer)  
 ‘I would like the government to tidy the legal system, which is not 
transparent, especially the tax law, which is extremely opaque.’ (Private 
Venture Capitalist_HG)  
‘If we apply for a VAT refund, we would have tax control straight away 
because everyone who is asking for tax to be returned is treated like a 
criminal’. (Private Venture Capitalist_HG) 
‘There was a problem with the tax authorities and the interpretation of 
regulations. No one wanted to be first and fight with the tax authorities for 
legal interpretations. Such case would surely end up in court.’ (Expert)  
An example of tax regulations which are constraining for Venture Capital was 
given by the manager of a public Venture Capital fund. The fund signed 
contracts with entrepreneurs. The new ventures were valued at 2M PLN based 
on the potential value of the technology. According to law, tax is due on the next 
day after signing the contract. The CEOs of the fund in question turned to the 
minister of finance asking for changes in this respect. They proposed to move 
the tax payment from the moment of taking the shares to the moment of selling 
them thus following established Venture Capital practice. Results of their 
actions are still unknown.  
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The problems with unsuitable tax regulations for Venture Capital as well as 
inconsistency in regulations’ interpretation, which was present from the early 
1990s resulted in different strategies undertaken by Venture Capital firms. The 
most frequently used and still practiced strategy refers to registration abroad.  
‘...majority (of Venture Capital funds – author’s clarification) are 
registered, either in tax havens, or Luxembourg, London or according to 
the US law.’ (Expert)  
Other strategies included use of legal vehicles that are not directly dedicated to 
Venture Capital but offer better tax solutions. Often the legal constructions were 
very complicated and sometimes balancing at the edge of the law.  
‘From the investment point of view, yes (they operated like Venture 
Capital –author’s clarification) but from the legal perspective no. A 
‘propos this legal structure, at this time a lot of ideas emerged how to 
avoid the problem of double taxation. For example, in the case of 
partnerships involving banks, they were taking loans from the parent 
company. The loan was granted and it was recorded in the books as 
cost. The service of the loan was also recorded as costs. So they tried to 
minimize double taxation.’ (Expert)  
Despite the general disappointment about taxation some positive opinions are 
held. However, this comment put emphasis on the level of tax which, indeed, 
compared to other countries is lower55:  
‘Polish legal system is not bad compared to other countries. Yes, 
taxation is rather low’ (Private/Public Venture Capital) 
                                                 
55
 For Poland the main corporate rate is 19% compared to France – 33%; Germany – 29% and 
the UK - 23%  
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Comparing the opinions expressed by participants with evaluations run by other 
institutions they are consistent. The Polish tax system is under constant 
criticism from the legislature, entrepreneurs and citizens. In 2004 the 
government in its report ‘Entrepreneurship in Poland’ presented establishing a 
simple, transparent and stable tax system as its priority. In 2007 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers and PKPP Lewiatan conducted research56 on the 
Polish tax system. The respondents (entrepreneurs) indicated that for their 
operation a stable and transparent system is more important than the level of 
taxation, highlighting at the same time that the Polish system is very unstable. 
Also the process of reporting to the tax authorities is time and cost consuming 
especially in reference to VAT. Later research conducted by Deloitte57 in 2010 
indicated that not much progress has been made in this area. In this research 
70% of respondents declare CIT regulations as complicated, 56% perceived 
VAT regulations as complicated and 52% perceived PIT as complicated. 
Entrepreneurs questioned indicated that changes in tax regulation intending to 
simplify the system, in practice make it more complicated. On the positive side, 
90% of respondents declared that their relations with tax authorities are at least 
good. The core issue is the uncertainty of taxes, which increases the risk of 
investment. 
International bodies assess the Polish tax system with moderate enthusiasm. 
OECD’s report (OECD, 2008) admits that the reform taking place at the 
beginning of the transformation process was effective and allowed Poland to 
avoid monetary crises of the kind that happened in neighbouring countries. 
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 „Podatki w Twojej firmie – pomóż zlikwidować bariery” 
(http://pkpplewiatan.pl/dla_mediow/informacje_prasowe/1/podatki_idealne_wed321ug_przedsi2
8biorcow) 
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 Polski system podatkowy w opinii podatnika, raport z badań. Delloite, 2010 
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However the system later experienced problems when the economy got to a 
more advanced stage. The report indicated that the number of exemptions, 
allowances and other special tax treatments generates high compliance costs 
especially for SMEs. The high costs combined with high level of uncertainty 
linked to arbitrary interpretation of tax provisions by tax authorities generate 
space for bribery and corruption. Additionally it has highlighted the problem, 
present in other evaluations, of a lack of well defined objectives and strategy 
while producing law.  
In 2010 the Ministry of Finance published a report58 where the available tax 
schemes were evaluated. According to the report there were 437 tax schemes 
within the system, where 195 were related to VAT. Looking at the costs 
generated by the economy sector the most expensive from the state point of 
view were CIT preferences which cost 0.44% GDP followed by VAT with costs 
of 0.18% GDP and PIT with costs of 0.04%. The dominant position of CIT was 
due to the ability to deduct losses generated in the previous year in the current 
tax year, as well as tax preferences for companies operating in special 
economic zones.  
The report presented an interesting example of a scheme aiming to support first 
time entrepreneurs introduced in 2002 and still in operation in 2010. According 
to this scheme called ‘credit tax’ an entrepreneur who met the criteria, could 
postpone paying income tax during the first year of operation. The tax due could 
be paid within next 5 years without interest. During the whole period only 4 
entrepreneurs (3 paying CIT and 1 paying PIT) used this scheme. 
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 Ministerstwo Finansów, Preferencje podatkowe w Polsce, Warszawa 2010 
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A similar situation is observed in case of a scheme for purchasing new 
technologies. Here the numbers are a bit more optimistic: in the year 2009 there 
were 15 PIT payers and 25 CIT payers who used it, whereas in 2010 the 
numbers were: 398 PIT payers and 33 CIT payers59. The failure of the scheme 
is assigned to several issues. Firstly, the scheme refers only to intangible 
property. Therefore if an entrepreneur is purchasing a computer with software, it 
is not eligible for the scheme. Secondly, an entrepreneur using the flat rate tax 
of 19% does not meet the criteria. Thirdly, an independent research institution 
has to issue a certificate that the purchased technology is innovative and is in 
use worldwide for less than 5 years.  
Additionally since the scheme refers only to purchase of technology it does not 
stimulate companies to create internal R&D. This is an issue of poorly aligned 
incentives. 
The government spends large sums of money in order to support the national 
economy, and its actions are directed mainly toward the whole population of 
entrepreneurs. For the early stages of developing entrepreneurship such a 
policy might be effective. However at the later stages, especially when 
innovative companies are the target, the policies should be more selective in 
providing support. However, there is always a political cost to such 
discrimination. 
Both Venture Capitalists and Entrepreneurs indicated in interviews that the 
frequency and the number of changes in the legal system created significant 
obstacles for their operations, i.e., compliance costs. Lack of stability, especially 
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www.egospodarka.pl/article/articleprint/63422/-1/65 (21/05/2012) and 
www.gazetaprawana.pl/drukowanie/537829 (21/05/2012) 
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in case of legal forms, restricted the ability for long term planning essential for 
survival and growth.  
Additionally, actions undertaken by the government aiming at simplify the 
system bring opposite effects. According to the regulations all business entities 
have to be registered with several institutions (i.e., tax authorities, statistical 
evidence). In order to simplify the process in 2008 the government introduced 
an act allowing a system of ‘one window’60. Within the system an entrepreneur 
may use one window to apply for taxpayer number (NIP), statistical number 
(REGON) and social insurance (ZUS), which at least in theory was supposed to 
ease and speed the process. However the effects are not as satisfying as 
expected.   
‘There is one window now. (...) earlier was like this: there was the court, 
the tax office and the social insurance office, which are most important 
when establishing a company. So you went to the court, to the tax office 
and to the social insurance. Now there is one window, you go to the 
national registration court and leave all documents there. It was 
supposed to be great. Before, if you made a mistake in an application, 
you were getting information directly from the tax or insurance office. 
Now the information goes first to the court and later the court generates a 
letter. (...) and the days are passing somehow, such a technical issue.’ 
(Public Venture Capital) 
Again, this citation indicates that the problem lies not in the regulations 
themselves but in the execution process. However, if compared with the World 
Bank’s Doing Business Reports, Poland keeps climbing in the rank of the ease 
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 Ustawa z dnia 19 grudnia 2008 r. o zmianie ustawy o swobodzie działalności gospodarczej 
oraz o zmianie niektórych innych ustaw, Dz.U. 2009 nr 18 poz. 97 
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of starting a business since 2009 form rank 76 to rank 62 in 2012. The number 
of procedures as well as cost is decreasing systematically.   
The problem of the quality of law and the role of interest groups in the law 
making process was separately researched in a project run by the Vistula 
University in cooperation with Bank Zachodni WBK (Rybinski, 2012). The report 
was based on analysis of 1366 legal documents (which constituted 37% of all 
relevant documents) created between the years: 1998-2011. The report 
concentrated on regulations referring to public finance and the business 
environment. The findings indicated that 40 percent of regulations during the 
evaluated period reduced economic freedom and only one-third of bills reduced 
costs for the public finances. Among the most influential interest group was the 
public sector (public administration, doctors, teachers, farmers and 
representatives of regulated professions). The political cycle was reflected in 
the quality of created law. During election years more bills reducing economic 
freedom and generating costs were passed compared to non-election years 
(Rybinski, 2012).  
From the perspective of the following research, the most relevant conclusions 
were related to the legislation process and evaluation process. According to the 
report, the legislation process is chaotic. Many changes are introduced 
impulsively under public pressure, and are rarely due to a long term strategy. 
The consultation process, before a bill is introduced to Sejm, is vague due to 
the lack of a culture of professional public consultations. There is an 
organization - Komisja Trójstronna, which serves as the public consultancy 
body. However, according to the authors, it does not reflect the structure of 
public institutions intended to be involved in the social dialogue. The 
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government’s policy of reform of regulation remains more an aspiration than a 
reality. Additionally the idea of preparing bills in a specially designed 
Government’s Legislature Centre failed but at least is evidence of the 
Government trying to change. At the level of evaluation of law, most of the 
introduced bills lack the cost/effectiveness assessment.  
Although the legal environment is not easy to manage, using the help of 
attorneys is not popular among entrepreneurs. Looking at the statistics the 
number of available attorneys is comparable with Germany and gives Poland 
the EU average (Choiński, 2010).  The research shows that during the last 5 
years (counting from 2009) only one-third of entrepreneurs decided to consult 
an attorney. The bigger the firm is, the greater the chances it will use legal 
services. Surprisingly the reason for avoiding lawyers is neither the difficulties in 
access nor the price of services. Although Poles highly respect the 
qualifications of lawyers they do not trust them. If they have to consult they 
usually rely on the opinions of family and friends. Such a situation is believed to 
arise from an immature legal consumers’ culture. Those who used legal 
services have positive attitudes about them. Those entrepreneurs usually show 
more trust and confidence in legal services offered by attorneys and notaries 
(Choiński, 2010). 
 
5.3.2. Market conditions 
The market conditions section included three elements: financial markets, GDP 
growth and level of R&D. The following section is going to present data 
collected referring to this category. It should be indicated that during the 
interviews issues referring to R&D were largely discussed alongside the role of 
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universities. Therefore, here only matters referring to patenting or 
commercialization will be discussed.  
 
Financial markets 
The interviewee pointed out the role of financial market as the exit option for 
Venture Capital investmetns.  
It is extremely important for a fund to have an exit option (Former 
Venture Capital/Entrepreneur)  
One of the exit options for Venture Capital backed companies is via the New 
Connect market. New Connect was established in 2007 as an alternative 
market operating as part of the Warsaw Stock Exchange dedicated to small and 
medium firms, especially innovative ones. The opinions on the New Connect 
initiative among different stakeholders of the Venture Capital industry are 
polarised. The general idea of opening this sort of platform is perceived as a 
positive move. However when getting into more detailed solutions opinions 
vary.  
Participants agreed that this is a highly speculative market, characterised by low 
liquidity.  
‘This market is still not reliable, they (companies-authors explanation) 
promise miracles. (...) They pump up the company’s values. The 
company gets on New Connect and due to corrupted investors the price 
rises...’  (Expert) 
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‘Some of the companies achieved extreme prices at IPO, and now are 
showing no effects’ (Private Venture Capital_I)  
There is a high risk involved. Investors will have problems (Private/Public 
Venture Capital)  
‘...these are PR firms and other crap. You have to look up with a candle 
for an innovative one (firm) and if there is one, no one wants to buy it.’ 
(National Fund) 
What is missing on the New Connect is liquidity’(...)‘while getting on New 
Connect one needs to have buyers there already. (Former Venture 
Capital/Entrepreneur) 
There are (on New Connect – author’s clarification) small companies and 
low liquidity. For companies it means that although they got on the New 
Connect now they will have problem with collecting capital for the next 
financing. (Former Venture Capital/Entrepreneur) 
Low liquidity was indicated as less of a problem than low credibility arising from 
its speculative character. Participants indicated a tendency for improvement in 
terms of the quality of the listed companies.  
‘During the first years New Connect was perceived as a trash market, 
where mr. M was running with a suitcase full of money. But now is 
better.’  (Entreprenuer_W) 
Most of the interviewed stakeholders agreed that despite the problems New 
Connect provides a useful platform for both companies and investors to learn 
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about each other. Presence of the New Connect is perceived as a required step 
in developing a healthy Venture Capital industry in the future.  
‘New Connect is a place where demand meets supply. (...) this initiative 
had to emerge. We need to civilize the market and create a corridor to 
the main floor’ (National Capital Fund)  
Among the positive aspects of New Connect is the learning process, 
along with the marketing advantages of being a traded company.  
It’s cool to be a listed company. You don’t have to add “it’s on New 
connect” (Public Venture Capital) 
Requirements for an IPO are in principal easier on New Connect compared to 
the main market. A company may choose between two options: a private 
placement or a traditional public share issue. In the case of private placement 
the offer has to be directed to less than 100 investors and is followed by 
simplified procedures. Authorisation is granted on the basis of the information 
document and the decision of an authorised adviser. Thus the procedure is less 
expensive and time consuming compared to the main market. In the case of the 
second option the company is subject to similar issuing requirements as for 
entry to the main market. The disclosure requirement for companies listed on 
New Connect are less strict compared to the main market. They have to submit 
current reports and semi annual reports; however the scope of reported data is 
narrower, limited to an annual audited report and compliance with the corporate 
governance applicable for these sort of companies (Warsaw Stock Exchange, 
2012) is thus more liable to abuse 
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One of the companies taking part in the research is listed on New Connect. 
Their experience of the process was generally positive. However the time 
needed for all proceedings exceeded the 3 month indicated by the New 
Connect authorities. The processes took about half a year and required 
designating two full time employees for preparing the documents and to 
cooperate with the New Connect authorities. This may be a significant barrier 
but this interviewee perceived it as merely an extra cost. 
From the point of view of the subject company, issuing shares on New Connect 
was an attractive alternative for Venture Capital financing. Before taking the 
decision to go public extensive negotiations with two Venture Capital funds 
were run. In both cases the company did not agree to the contract conditions 
offered by the Venture Capital funds.   
According to statistical data New Connect is constantly growing in terms of the 
number of listed companies and capitalisation. The figure below summarises 
the number of companies listed as well as indicates yearly rate of IPOs.   
Figure 39: New Connect: number of companies, national IPO and foreign 
IPO 
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Source: adapted from: (NewConnect: 
http://www.newconnect.pl/index.php?page=statystyki_rynku_roczne) 
Although turnover rises steadily, New Connect, similarly to the main market, is 
suffering from low liquidity. This makes it particularly vulnerable to price 
manipulation. This problem combined with looser disclosure requirements 
increases risk for potential investors. Therefore the main actors on this market 
remain individual risk tolerant investors (Sobolewski & Tymoczko, 2012a, b).  
Presence of the New Connect trading platform, which serves as alternative 
source of capital for small and medium companies, breaks the monopoly of 
Venture Capital for these kinds of investments. On the other hand, firms which 
decide to omit the Venture Capital funding phase lose the learning opportunity 
arising from this cooperation, which results in situations where inexperienced 
managers are in charge of large sums of money within a short period of time. 
This increases the risk of failure. Nevertheless young companies have got a 
choice between these two forms of collecting capital, and while taking the 
decision have to be aware of consequences of each choice. The number of 
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companies financed by Venture Capital is small. According to EVCA statistics in 
2011 only 27 companies in Poland was supported by Venture Capital.  
 
GDP growth 
The literature considers GDP growth as one of the factors influencing Venture 
Capital industry (Gompers et al., 1998; Jeng & Wells, 2000). Polish GDP 
characteristics and its fluctuation were discussed in detail in the second 
chapter. During the interviews participants did not directly refer to GDP growth. 
However, they indicated the growing number of wealthy people who are 
interested in investing either as Business Angels or Limited Partners. Venture 
Capitalists pointed out that the situation at the Warsaw Stock Exchange had 
impact on the industry.  
Depending on whether the WIG20 index is at the level of 2000 or the 
level of 3000 the investors looks differently at the potential investment. 
(...) this is connected with the economic trend (National Capital Fund)  
Besides, people are getting richer. There are more and more Business Angels 
(Public Venture Capital Fund)  
 
R&D potential  
The rising number of institutions supporting innovation and entrepreneurship 
does not translate into a significant improvement in research output which could 
be commercialized. The problem seems to lie in the mutual relationships 
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between the research institutions and the business sector. There is a reciprocal 
lack of trust coupled with lack of clear procedures.  
‘Polish research is pointless for commercial use. There is not willingness 
to change the mindset of researchers. The incubators and technology 
transfer centres do not meet the requirement of business.’ (Private 
Venture Capital_I) 
‘Innovation happens, but despite the research not due to it’ (Private 
Venture Capital I) 
‘There are few (universities), but all this bureaucracy which has to be 
done. We established one firm with a polytechnic; no it was rather with a 
doctoral student from a polytechnic. The polytechnic has got right to the 
licence, and we’re going to pay it, which all is ok. But I won’t forget the 
fear of the student, what’s gonna happen if his professor finds out.’ 
(Public Venture Capital) 
 
An interesting initiative which may help to overcome the above problem is 
currently undertaken by the National Centre for Research and Development 
(NCBIR)61. The project is called „BRIdge Venture Capital: Research, 
Development, Innovation in cooperation with Venture Capital funds”. The aim of 
the program is to create a public – private co-investment programme which 
would support commercialisation of new technologies. According to the NCBIR 
                                                 
61
 The National Centre for Research and Development is the implementing agency of the 
Minister of Science and Higher Education. It operates within the area of national science, 
science and technology and innovation policies.  Established to provide a platform of an 
effective dialogue between the scientific and business communities. 
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Director the idea of ‘BRIdge VC’ follows the best practices developed by the US 
SBIC program62.  
The available financing is planned to be 420M PLN (102M Euro). The program 
assumes participation of NCBIR as well as Polish Venture Capital funds and a 
global Venture Capital fund. The provided services will have two components: 
investment and advisory. The financing will happen at three levels:  
· Pre –incubation; 
· Incubation; 
· Post – incubation. 
The pre-incubation phase, also referred as ‘proof-of concept’ will embrace such 
elements as industry research, evaluation of the commercial potential of the 
project, legal and environmental analysis. The maximum financing is up to 1M 
PLN. At this stage NCBIR is going to provide 80% of the financing (which will 
take the form of non-refundable support), the Polish Venture Capital will provide 
15% and 5% will come from a global Venture Capital partner.  
The incubation stage includes industrial research and development research. 
The maximum support is 7M PLN. It will be equally financed by Venture Capital 
funds, 15% each, and the remaining 70% of capital will be provided by NCBIR, 
at this stage it will be refundable.  
The post incubation stage, also referred to as acceleration, will help in further 
development works, i.e. actions related to R&D results implementation. The 
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 http://www.ncbir.pl/programy-krajowe/bridge-vc/aktualnosci/art,1681,nowy-konkurs-
wspierajacy-br-z-udzialem-funduszy-kapitalowych-na-420-M-zl-.html 
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maximum financing is up to 15M PLN where 50% of funds will be provided by 
NCBIR, 35% by global Venture Capital and 15% by Polish Venture Capital.    
From the organizational point of view the three financing bodies will delegate 
management issues to a separate management entity. This entity will be 
directly in charge of cooperation with a start-up company. Additionally NCBIR 
and Venture Capital funds will form a committee responsible for strategic 
decisions which will be passed to the management entity (NCBIR, 2012).  
This is a pilot program: the application process for both Venture Capital funds 
and firms is still in progress therefore it is impossible to evaluate whether the 
program will be successful.  
 
5.3.3. Other organizations  
Government  
The government programs, including the European Union funded programs, 
were described while presenting the history of Venture Capital in Poland. The 
following section is going to present participants’ opinions on the government’s 
policy, on the main documents shaping the government policy toward Venture 
Capital industry and the role of structural funds. The examined programs 
embrace both private Venture Capital, public Venture Capital and hybrid forms 
where public capital is combined with private. It has to be highlighted that the 
majority of entities created with help of public money are not Venture Capital 
funds in the traditional understanding, although according to their funders they 
are supposed to operate according to rules applied to Venture Capital. For this 
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purpose those sorts of funds should be rather called quasi-Venture Capital 
funds.   
 
Strategic documents 
The government attitude toward Venture Capital industry was summarized by 
one of the interviewers in the following way:  
‘(...) as one of the vice – ministers told me, what you’re doing in the 
Venture Capital does not fit into my Excel file. These are such small 
numbers.’ (National Capital Fund) 
Interviewer: ‘..... so it means that there is not planned national policy 
toward Venture Capital support?’ 
‘No, the fact we got the first 55M, when PiS was in power, was related to 
the great budget conditions, they need to make spending. (...) It wasn’t 
effect of detailed planning of: now we will create Venture Capital. There 
was money and everyone knew that NCF was waiting for two years now, 
so the money came. (...) They (government – author’s clarification) were 
very happy, we were asked to spend quickly and write reports’ (National 
Capital Fund)  
 
Although the fact of supplying money at the time of budgetary surplus would not 
be surprising itself, the attitude of the government shows lack of commitment to 
a long term sustained program of financing Venture Capital development. 
Indeed, looking closely at the official documents there is no policy dedicated 
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exclusively toward Venture Capital industry. Elements of programs which aim to 
support Venture Capital industry are incorporated into other programs, mainly 
those enhancing entrepreneurship and innovation.  
Looking from the historical perspective one of the first documents recognizing 
the role of venture capital funds was published in 2001 by the National System 
of Preparation for Structural Funds (KSP)63. The published analysis along with 
the institutional readiness indicated the need for creating an effective financial 
support system for regional development. The document recognized regional 
funds as one of the instruments allowing development of regions, and 
highlighted the needs of the commercial character of their operations. The 
participation of private investors along with the public ones in the regional fund 
was perceived as a guarantee for increased economic effectiveness of the fund 
(Hausner, Frączek, & Sułkowski, 2001).  
Analysing the documents presenting long term government strategies, shows 
that government awareness of the Venture Capital industry and its role in 
supporting other economic priorities is gradually growing but still limited. The 
National Development Plan 2000-2002 (Ministerstwo Gospodarki, 1999) 
perceived Venture Capital as one of the instruments allowing more efficient 
implementation of new solutions in the national economy. Apart from an 
intention to create an ‘environment’ for development of Venture Capital 
investments in Poland the document does not set any other long term goal. A 
later document, National Reform Program 2005-2008 (Rada Ministrów, 2005), 
recognizes the lack of Venture Capital funds investing in small projects (up to 2 
M Euro) and announces establishing a National Fund of Fund (National Capital 
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 KSP was a national wide concept involving networking of wide range of organizations 
(national, local and self governance) which aimed preparing Polish institutions for using 
European Union funds.  
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Fund) which aims to fill this gap. The Strategy for increasing the innovativeness 
of the economy 2007-2013 (Ministerstwo Gospodarki Departament Rozwoju 
Gospodarki, 2006), recognizes the equity gap and announces further support 
for development of a Venture Capital industry. Similarly to previous documents, 
it does not indicate any specific detailed goals for the industry to achieve.  
Strategy for National Development 2007-2015 (Ministerstwo Rozwoju 
Regionalego, 2006) in its priority goal of increasing competitiveness and 
innovativeness of the economy classifies Venture Capital among alternative 
instruments of financing SMEs, which are supposed to be supported. The two 
latest documents National Reforms Program – Europe 2010 (Ministerstwo 
Gospodarki, 2011b) and the strategy for innovativeness and effectiveness of 
the economy (project) (Ministerstwo Gospodarki, 2011c) aim to facilitate the 
Venture Capital industry by enhancing public–private co-operation in financing, 
providing incentives for such co-cooperation by promoting initiatives such as the 
Polish Fund of Funds and European funds as well as easing legal regulations in 
these respects.  
Summarising the government documents at the strategic level, Venture Capital 
is recognized there as a tool for obtaining priorities related to competitiveness 
and innovation. However, not much more interest besides identification is given 
to it. There are also no suggestions to maintain financial support to this sort of 
initiatives alternative to the EU funds.  
A more specific document dedicated directly to the capital markets: The 
strategy for capital market development – Agenda Warsaw City 2010 
(Ministerstwo Finansów, 2004) indicates that the Venture Capital market 
development in Poland does not meet the preferred level thus more actions 
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supporting this segment of the capital market have to be done. It indicated that 
Venture Capital industry is not increasing its role in the economy in a sustained 
way. At the time of the analysis investments into technology firms were 
decreasing. Additionally it highlighted lack of system changes in the year 1998-
2002 which could provide quantitative and qualitative changes in the Venture 
Capital industry. Thus the document indicated the need for assuring financing 
for Venture Capital from the financial institutions such as banks, investment 
funds, pension funds or insurance companies. However this would require 
changes in the investment restrictions put on them. As the long term goal to be 
achieved in 2010 the relation of invested funds to GDP was set at the level of 
0.25%. According to the data reported by EVCA (2011) the VC/PE investment 
was at the level of 657 M Euro in 2010 in Poland, which is 0.192% of the 
national GDP.  
The following paragraphs are considering specific actions aiming at enhancing 
the Venture Capital industry. The first part supplements the official information 
referring to the National Capital Fund. The second part concentrates on 
structural programs coordinated by the Polish authorities.  
 
National Capital Fund  
There is a consensus between the literature and participants’ opinions that 
establishing the National Fund of Funds was a milestone in the development of 
the Polish Venture Capital industry. Analysing interviews with the Venture 
Capital industry stakeholders, all of them were very positive about the idea of 
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creating the Fund of funds. They indicated its role in activating the early 
investment funds as well as providing good practices. 
The National Fund is doing a really good job (Private/Public Venture 
Capital)  
‘I think that significant influence on the development of the industry has 
got National Fund as well as other support programs. Generally it was 
difficult for those funds (Venture capital fund – author’s clarification) to 
develop. There were no rich people who could invest as Limited 
Partners. (Former Venture Capital/Entrepreneur) 
However, some voices of criticism have pointed to a potential weakness in the 
investment process. Combining the limits of 5 years for investment and the 1.5 
M Euro per investment there is a potential threat of allocating funds in not the 
most efficient way, especially at the end of the investment period. The sector 
restrictions and the investment limits were also offered as constraining factors.   
The limitations put on us by the UE or NF regulations are difficult for us 
because from time to time there might be good deals in the restricted 
sectors. But the most painful restriction is the cap for investment. In one 
project or connected project we can invest 1.3 M Euro. It means that 
when the company is growing and needs fuel, we have to go to other 
investors to raise funds. (Public/Private Venture Capital) 
Analysing the interview with a manager at the National Capital Fund the 
following conclusions might be drawn. Firstly, National Capital Fund aims at 
serving a dual role. It provides financing for commercial venture capital funds as 
well as creates opportunity for fund managers to learn by experience. The 
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interlocutor put emphasis on the need for creating conditions in which both 
investors and managers could learn: 
‘At the moment NF is flooding with money a market that did not exist 
before. (National Capital Fund)  
‘Yes, they will learn (managers – author’s clarification). As I said once 
during a conference when a politician was criticising NCF for being the 
most expensive MBA course. (National Capital Fund)  
The National Capital Fund records a constantly increasing number of 
applications for each financing round. Circa 10% to 20% of which are perceived 
to be very good quality. Unfortunately due to limited funds not all of them can be 
supported. Officially there are no exits yet, but opinions on the portfolio 
companies are moderately optimistic.  
This mechanism is inefficient. (...) Will see how these funds (co financed 
by NCF- author’s clarification) are going to operate. At the moment they 
are not doing too well and it can be seen. The same can be said of NCF’ 
(Private Venture Capital GH) 
None of the funds has exited the deals yet, so nothing has succeeded or 
failed yet. (...) but one case is a bankruptcy. Not formally but technically, 
and economically it’s bankrupt. (...) There is nothing up there with a 
global potential. (National Capital Fund) 
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Structural Programs  
Among the structural programs financed by the European Union budget two 
groups are particularly relevant for the Venture Capital industry. The first group 
of actions aims at increasing entrepreneurship and thus influence the potential 
demand for Venture Capital financing. The second group aims directly at the 
Venture Capital industry by supporting the National Capital Fund or indirectly by 
supporting Business Angels and public Venture Capital type of initiatives.  
The opinions of participants on both sorts of programs are polarized. There are 
extremely critical voices, usually expressed by the representatives of Venture 
Capital Funds.  
Interviewer: what was the worst occurrence for the Venture Capital industry in 
your opinion?  
‘It’s quite controversial, what I’m going to say but the EU money’.(...) It’s 
much easier to spend public money. The investor will look after each 
zloty, because this is his money.’ (Public Venture Capital) 
This was very negative for the industry, because it was giving away 
money (...) Flooding the market with money doesn’t increase the 
professionalization of the industry. (...) as result the professional firms 
has got a squeeze on profits. (Public/Private Venture Capital) 
‘The EU projects were giving away money. I find this initiative very 
negative for the market, because that money was given away. However, 
this is also maturing now, and it’s much more difficult to get this 
financing. (...) A lot of projects got financed. (...) We haven’t recorded on 
the Venture Capital market any increase of new firms with interesting 
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projects or business model. De facto, the models are often not adapted 
to the business reality. (Private Venture Capital_HG) 
Although less hostile opinions were also presented.  
‘Those initiatives allow people to start their own businesses (Former 
Venture Capital/Entrepreneur)   
‘The Venture capital market was weak and fragile. They (EU fund – 
author’s clarification) might increase competition. From the entrepreneurs 
point of view this is good. (Expert)  
As it can be seen from the above observations, Venture Capital funds perceived 
the European financing as competition to their services at the same time not 
seeing improvement in investment readiness of potential portfolio companies. 
The opposite opinions were expressed in reference to the ease of obtaining the 
support. Entrepreneurs generally perceived it as difficult money whereas 
Venture Capital funds as too easy money. Some voices expressed lack of 
discretion in dispatching funds. Such situation might be due to several factors. 
One of which was expressed by a representative of the National Capital Fund.   
‘Everyone is very much interested in the support money. This is political 
ice cream. You may give it to someone, or you may not, and you may 
use this power to threaten or guide someone. You may give it to a firm 
that is bankrupting but politically well located. (National Capital Fund)  
The Expert gave more light on how the system is abused for political/personal 
reasons:  
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‘it is perceived as venture capital fund but de facto it is an initiative of 
venture capital type. (...) For example: an incubator in Pcim Górny64 gets 
money for realisation of a project called ‘we invest in the  future’ and this 
is money placed in a separated bank account. It doesn’t create a new 
legal entity. It’s just a project but we call it seed fund for simplicity. (...) 
People from those institutions sit in supervisory boards or boards of 
directors of those start ups and this is a way to earn some extra money 
on the top of a regular salary i.e. as in the Agencja Rozwoju Pomorza.  
(Expert)  
Other sources of maldistribution of funds might be assigned to imprecise 
procedures and lack of professionalism on the part of public servants. A 
Venture Capitalist described the process of project evaluation done by PARP as 
based on a ‘first come, first served’ method. After being asked to cross check 
some of the projects he summarised that the due diligence concentrated on 
looking for ‘key words’ such as ‘innovation’, not on the market value of the 
project. As he commented: such a situation should not be surprising when civil 
servants are forced to evaluate commercial projects. Lack of precision in 
creating procedures was demonstrated in many aspects. Starting with the 
planning phase:  
‘Majority of those firms (which received EU funds – author’s clarification) 
can be classified as business teaching organizations. What is worse the 
regulation did not specify the structure of funds distribution between the 
incubation and the start up phase. So the money might be spent on 
incubation, which is not a transparent process. (Expert)  
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 Pcim Górny – refers here as metaphor for a small town situated middle of nowhere.  
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Finishing with the executions phase:  
‘Today I am working on application for the 5.1 program. Here is the 
instruction and here the minister’s directives. They are contradictory. So, 
I called but nobody wanted to give me answer via phone. Now, I’m going 
to Warsaw, I don’t know with whom I will manage to meet but I will 
require a written answer. But I can’t be sure that when I attach this 
document to the application someone else won’t say that it’s not valid.  
(...) Responsibility of the beneficiary is huge, for the civil servant there is 
none. (Entrepreneur_L) 
Structural programs seemed to be one of the most criticised factors and brought 
out a lot of emotions among participants. Especially entrepreneurs were critical 
of the procedures of applying for funds and later exercising the financing. Such 
issues as late payments, misclassification of costs and lack of cooperation on 
the part of civil servants were identified most often. It has to be highlighted that 
all interviewed entrepreneurs had personal experience with a range of different 
structural funds.  
 
Business Angels: 
The interviews highlighted several aspects of Business Angels’ operations as 
well as culturally related features, which may have influence on the registered65 
number of Business Angels.  
As the interviewee from the National Capital Fund indicated the Business Angel 
market is completely unrecorded and under researched in Poland. This should 
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not be confused with a lack of private investment initiatives. Wealthy people are 
present and do invest in a range of projects, although they do not want to be 
publicised.  
‘there are cultural indications: to be rich in Poland is still difficult and is 
related to being badly treated in the wider society.’ (National Capital 
Fund)  
‘there are many active Business Angels, although there is not much to be 
heard about them. Because they don’t want to be talked about.’ (Former 
Venture Capital/Entrepreneur)  
You would be surprised in how many interesting projects wealthy Poles 
invest in. (National Capital Fund)  
Also some investors do not categorise themselves as Business Angels but still 
invest in young companies. For example there is a group of investors that are 
active in the north part of Poland, where are no formal Business Angels 
networks.  
Entrepreneur_W: ‘(...) this was group of private investors.’ 
I: Do they perceive themselves as Business Angels? 
Entrepreneur_W: ‘it’s a good question. This is a group of wealthy people. 
(....) they all met around Procom66 . (...) They are not formally associated, 
they meet for a beer .... (...) they trust each other a lot.’  
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The interviewed Venture Capital funds had contacts with Business Angels, as 
did the technology transfer centre and technology park; however, none created 
a long term relationship either with individual Business Angels or a network.   
Participants indicated also that the level of Business Angels transactions is 
constrained by the tax system which is not promoting such initiatives67, equally 
the educational/professional background of Business Angels is an inhibitor68. 
The majority of Business Angels have a traditional economy background, which 
might constrain the industry. Those people are interested only in ICT, which is 
not synonymous with high-technology.  
The literature supports participants’ opinions that Business Angels are a very 
new institution in the Polish capital market and thus are still underdeveloped. 
Polish law does not provide special regulations for people willing to invest as 
Business Angels. The majority (83%) invests as private persons, using existing 
regulations of commercial law and civil law. As a result of a lack of special 
regulations referring to Business Angels the investment agreements with 
entrepreneurs are constructed based on civil law and following western 
standards, mainly British (Ministerstwo Gospodarki, 2011a). The Ministry of 
Economy reports shortages in both the demand and supply side of Business 
Angels. The supply side refers to the number of people (including successful 
entrepreneurs) willing to act as Business Angels. According to the report the 
problems lie in lower share of private companies in the society compared to 
Western Europe as well as in a lack of knowledge of the potential Business 
Angels. Many entrepreneurs, who have got both capital and experience are 
simply not aware of the possibility of investing into non – listed companies 
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(Ministerstwo Gospodarki, 2011a). However, there seems to be a growing 
potential in Polish society for recruiting Business Angels. It is estimated that 
currently there are about 13.6 K millionaires69 in Poland (PAP 24.07.2012) and 
the forecasts show a further increase in that number (Forbes 10.10.2012). 
Importantly the source of wealth has changed recently. A few years ago most of 
the fortunes were generated on capital markets’ deals, at present the wealth 
come from businesses and free-lance jobs.  
At the demand part the above report indicated two major problems: lack of good 
projects (which referred both to the ideas and the preparation of documents) 
and the lack of trust on the entrepreneurs’ side (Ministerstwo Gospodarki, 
2011a).  
One of the most efficient ways to overcome the problem of communication 
between potential Business Angels and entrepreneurs are networks. In Poland 
currently 10 Business Angels Networks are registered (Bąkowski & Mażewska, 
2012). The map below shows the geographical concentration of them.  
Figure 40: Business Angels Networks in Poland in 2012 
 
 
 
This picture has been removed by the Author of the dissertation for the 
copyright reasons. 
 
 
 
                                                 
69
 Refers only to those who pay income tax in Poland and report income over 1 M PLN 
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Business Angels operating within those networks prefer 3 – 5 year investments 
worth from 50K up to 5M PLN. The most desired stage of firm development for 
investment is start up (preferred by 29%) when the firm is already existing and 
passed the preliminarily market test. Most Business Angels place their money in 
IT, multimedia and the Internet sector, although biotechnology and pharmacy 
have become also popular recently (Bąkowski & Mażewska, 2012).  
The majority of investors prefer to share the investment risk by syndicating 
either with other Angels or a Venture Capital fund, only 15% of surveyed 
Business Angels preferred to invest on their own. As exit strategies from the 
investments Business Angels prefer to sell the firm to a strategic investor or a 
Venture Capital fund (Bąkowski & Mażewska, 2012).  
The Polish Business Angels networks are non-profit organizations. This 
character is forced by the wide usage of EU funds for financing their operations. 
Because of being non-profit organizations they do not charge their participants 
fees for joining the network, or charge entrepreneurs for presenting the projects 
in front of potential investors, or charge for training. They cut themselves off 
from the sources of income used by western networks. Although on average a 
network joins together about 77 Business Angels in fact the sizes of networks 
differ significantly, there are big ones with 120-160 members and a really small 
one gathering circa 15. (Bąkowski & Mażewska, 2012).   
Business Angels play a significant role in the Venture Capital infrastructure 
(Harrison & Mason, 2000), the interviews with the industry stakeholders 
confirmed they play an active part in the Venture Capital investment process. 
Unfortunately the currently available data do not allow the relationships 
between Business Angels and other members of the Venture Capital 
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community to be explored in more detail. Further research would be necessary 
in order to provide such information.  
Technology Parks/Technology Transfer Centres 
In 2005 a detailed report analysing the situation of Polish innovation centres 
(Dzierżanowski, Szultka, Tamowicz, & Wojnicka, 2005) was published. As part 
of the document a set of factors influencing success of those organizations was 
discussed. The features seem to be still valid. The authors indicate that in order 
to establish a successful initiative it is crucial to have support from an academic 
site. Therefore the successful parks were established in strong academic 
regions such as Poznań, Krakow, and Wrocław. Interestingly the support does 
not have to be direct from the institution per se, at least at the very beginning, 
engagement of individual academics is sufficient (the case of Gdynia). However 
the single presence of an academic centre does not guarantee success. It has 
to be strong and energetic enough to self organize and generate academic 
entrepreneurship. Besides the presence of an academic background, parks 
have to match the industry potential in the region. From the managerial point of 
view they should aim to divide the management functions from the research 
functions as well as be able to establish effective partnerships with the local 
community, business and politics (Dzierżanowski et al., 2005).  
As part of the field work a set of interviews were conducted with individuals both 
engaged in running innovation centres as well as participants in such places. 
The most attention was given to two organizations Uczelniane Centrum 
Innowacji i Transferu Technologii UAM (UCITT UAM) and Pomorski Park 
Naukowo–Technologiczny (PPNT) w Gdyni. The UCITT UAM is based in 
Poznań as part of the University. It cooperates tightly with the Poznań 
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Technology and Science Park, which is the oldest one in Poland. PPNT is 
situated in Gdynia, operates since 2001 and is one of the most dynamic 
organizations of its kind. Both parks, according to the benchmark research done 
in 2008 (Mackiewicz, 2008) belong to the group of well developed parks and to 
the first ranking group. Parks ranked in the first group had scored ‘good’ or ‘very 
good’ in all evaluated aspects such as: organization and management, 
infrastructure; inhabitants; offered services; technology transfer and 
commercialisation; efficiency; promotion and communication; and cooperation 
with other institutions.  
Uczelniane Centrum Innowacji i Transferu Technologii UAM (UCITT UAM) 
The main conclusions from the interview with UCITT UAM can be summarised 
as following. The main problem for development of the initiative rises from the 
attitudes of potential participants. There is a significant lack of cooperation 
between participants, which arises from recognizing only threats not 
opportunities.  
Looking at the structure of clients, these are mainly students from a wide range 
of departments, with no dominant source. People with PhDs are less willing to 
start their own businesses. The least interested group are Professors. Although 
still their knowledge about running a business is very limited the level of 
awareness is increasing. New firms complain about a lack of sources of 
financing. However, in the opinion of the interviewee it is not as much the 
problem of a financing gap as that of a failure to search for money effectively. In 
the case of large agglomerations, to which Poznan belongs, availability of EU 
structural funds is smaller therefore firms have to turn to alternative sources 
such as Business Angels or Seed Funds.  
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The cooperation between UCITT UAM and Venture Capital had a personal 
character. Keeping the relationship informal was influenced by two factors: 
firstly UCITT is in close relationship with the Poznań Technology and Science 
Park, which has his own incubator and all firms eligible are directed over there. 
The Park on the other hand is cooperating with a seed fund. The second 
argument for remaining informal was based on the complicated procedures 
which would be required for signing such a formal document because UCITT 
operates as a unit of the University.  
In the case of the Poznan Technology and Science Park the financial support is 
based on an external seed fund. The Jagiellonian Center of Innovation (based 
at the Jagiellonian University) has taken a different strategy and established a 
seed fund with the cooperation of an already financed management institution70. 
In both cases the seed funds were financed with the EU funds – Innovative 
economy.  
Pomorski Park Naukowo – Technologiczny (PPNT)  in Gdynia 
The Pomorski Park Naukowo–Technologiczny (PPNT) in Gdynia is one of the 
biggest initiatives in Poland, established by the City Council of Gdynia and 
Pomeranian Centre of technology. It aims to promote innovation and provides 
facilities in form of laboratories for R&D. As part of the park a technology 
incubator is run. Each firm applying for the incubator has to be accepted by the 
Research Committee. Additionally all firms in the incubator and the park are 
evaluated regularly, based on the outcome their contracts with the park are 
either prolonged or not71.  
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Also it is the only technology park in the country which had the Regional Patent 
Information Centre situated within its structures72. Within the park there were 
also two financial institutions situated: the Business Angel Seedfund and a seed 
fund SCVC Inveno Sp z o.o. (Mackiewicz, 2008:100). However, currently (2012) 
none of these organizations reside there anymore73. The interviewee was not 
able to give reason why those organizations moved away.  
Among many services provided by the Park for its clients, one supports 
networking between firms in the park. Every month a meeting is organized 
where new joining firms have the chance to introduce themselves as well as 
older firms have a platform to exchange experiences and build cooperation. 
Comparing opinions on popularity of those meetings the results are 
contradictory: 
‘... some of them come with enthusiasm, others do not have time at that 
particular moment. So, you know, there are not all firms there, but maybe 
half of them. But everyone is very pleased with those meetings. I can see 
that during these meetings they (firms) start to cooperate with each 
other.’ (Coordinator PPT) 
‘Park organizes monthly meetings. There are 75 of us (firms). Do you 
know how many comes over? 7 up to 10 show up. (...) so how to build a 
business relationship?( ...) We are here 5th year and just only now we 
think of doing a business together (with firm from the park). (...) I don’t 
know most of the new firms, although I’m coming to the meetings very 
often. (...) I tried to do some integration events to. I have twice organized 
‘birthday party of the company’. I’ve sent an email to all firms inviting for 
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cake and coffee after work. There came 6 firms. I telling that there is 
something is missing with the community. But this will develop. 
(Entrepreneur_L)  
Also in case of more detailed research on opinion of technology parks clients 
the problem of networking is highlighted (Cichocki, 2011). Although parks 
across the country seem to provide the expected level of support, the 
technology transfer component is perceived as weakest. The report 
recommends enhancing networking activities facilitated by the parks, as one of 
the solutions to overcome the problem of ineffective transfer of technology.  
 
Other participants’ opinions 
Most of the participants were critical about the quality of projects supported by 
technology parks and technology transfer centres: 
Technology parks are investments in estates, performing negative 
selection (except the one in Gdynia’ (Private Venture Capitalist_I)  
The Gdynia one is well assessed. Whereas the Park in Gdansk is just a 
commercial office space. (Entrepreneur_W) 
Parks are focused on different clients. Parks invested a lot, mainly the 
EU money into infrastructure and now have to fill in the space with 
whoever comes. (...) There is nothing to look for (from the point of 
Venture Capital – author’ clarification). Among residents there is no high-
tech. (Expert)  
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Majority of Technology Transfer Centres concentrate on training and 
coaching which does not translate into investment activities. There are 
few exceptions. (Expert)  
Combining interviews with the technology park, resident firms and venture 
capital an interesting picture arises. The venture capitalist highlights the role of 
technology parks as an intermediary between funds and potential portfolio 
companies, the representative of Technology Park claims such meetings take 
place and the resident of the park indicates that a limited number of people 
attend such meetings. The situation might be summed up with the following 
quote:  
‘Everyone cooperates but nothing comes out of this cooperation’ (Expert)   
Universities:  
Polish universities were widely criticised by all kinds of participants. The 
problems identified might be divided into the following groups:  
Participants indicated that universities do not have intentions to be involved in 
business, and they have no incentives to do so. They indicate that researchers 
are not interested in commercialization of their research.  
‘... but you have to remember that universities are establishing incubators 
and technology transfer centres not because they believe it is needed. 
It’s the government who wants to have good statistics for spending the 
European money. And as it’s widely known scientists are able to waste 
all money.’ (National Capital Fund) 
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‘What I can see at our universities is stagnation caused by quite good 
salaries compared to the market. There is no motivation to change and 
going toward entrepreneurship’ (Entreprenuer_L) 
‘It does not add up for researchers. They have good jobs at the 
university, extra hours in private colleges, the requirement to publish. 
They are not interested in patenting. (Expert)  
Also universities as organizations are not promoting entrepreneurial behaviours. 
Firstly, they are perceived as organizations which do not follow market rules 
especially do not understand the concept of time as the critical factor for 
business success. Secondly, if they make attempts to commercialize, the 
existing rules are constraining.  
‘I think that university should do what they do, it’s teaching and 
researching. The problem lies business takes universities with stride, that 
universities do not understand that time is money’ (Former Venture 
Capital/Entrepreneur) 
‘There is no need to go out of the university and the university is not 
going toward entrepreneurship either.’ ...‘there (at the university) are no 
ideas of marketing, selling..’ (Entrepreneur_L)  
‘We cooperate, but there are a lot of barriers, especially administrative 
ones.’ (Entrepreneur_W) 
‘With one university it didn’t work at all because signing one simple 
contract took 3 months. It was a pre-cooperation contract. After it had to 
go though the senate of the university. Luckily they signed.’  (Public 
Venture Capital) 
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‘We tried twice to cooperate with university and twice the same 
mechanism worked. The dean was afraid to either sell or take shares in 
the vehicle we aimed to establish. He was too afraid that he can’t price 
the technology. If in 5 years it turns out that we have earned money on it, 
he will have control, so he prefers not to do anything. (Private Venture 
Capital HG) 
Majority of participants had personal experience of cooperating with universities 
and all of them indicated the same problems related to lack of clear procedures 
which would allow transferring technology. Moreover the attitude of the 
university authorities does not enhance cooperation.  
‘They (researchers – author’s clarification) don’t want to be 
entrepreneurs, they want to be researchers. But they have developed a 
model of sharing their technology. (Private Venture Capital HG) 
‘there are procedures but there are so few cases that they can’t be 
practiced. (Entreprenuer_L) 
Additionally, according to the business representatives, universities have false 
idea of what business needs and venture capital is looking for.  
‘majority of funds will not chase researchers because fund is not looking 
for a researcher. Fund is looking for a motivated person for running a 
business. (...) there are only few people in Poland who understand the 
process.  (Private Venture Capital HG) 
‘in my opinion it should be the other way round. The entrepreneurs 
should come to the university with a project and the university should 
realize it. (Entreprenuer_L) 
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The quality of projects emerging from universities was also highly criticised: 
 ‘I don’t know any successful project coming out of university and I 
cooperate with universities for quite a while now. (Entreprenuer_L) 
The literature evaluating universities in respect to creating commercially useful 
research discusses in more details problems highlighted by participants. In 
2009 the Polish Agency for Entrepreneurship Development (PARP) conducted 
research on academic entrepreneurship, results were published in a form of a 
report (Banerski, Gryzik, Matusiak, Mażewska, & Stawasz, 2011). The report 
indicates that the general interest in running spin-off or spin-out companies is 
very small. On the other hand most of the academics have good opinions on 
the quality of the research and teaching provided by their own universities.  
The research indicates that only small fractions of academics are running a spin 
off or spin out firm. These were 6% of all respondents. Less than 10% of those 
who think about establishing a company are going to take formal steps in near 
future. Compared to academics, students are more willing to start their own 
businesses but only one in five would like to run it in connection with the 
university. 54% of academics believe that their supervisors would be supportive 
toward establishing new businesses whereas 14% think that supervisors would 
be against such a decision (Banerski et al., 2011).   
Academics judge that their universities are prepared for management of 
research results and are able to guard intellectual property. 75% of them 
indicate that universities are cooperating with businesses. On the other hand a 
large fraction (16%) has no idea about this kind of cooperation.  The vast 
majority of academics (80%) are convinced that the expected results of their 
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research answer the needs of industry or are able to be commercialised. 
However the knowledge about financing these sorts of projects is minimal, only 
8% recognize seed funds and 4% Business Angels (Banerski et al., 2011).  
In 2006 Tamowicz (2006) conducted an extended case study of 18 Polish spin-
off companies. Based on the analysis he drew the following conclusions: 
• Due to lack of credible statistics it is difficult to estimate the actual number of 
firms that can be classified as spin-offs; 
• The evaluated firms did not differ significantly in their characters from the 
same sort of firms in western economies; These were usually small entities, 
employing less than 10 people and based their operations on outsourcing; 
• Although the standard barriers for enterprise development are common for 
spin-off and traditional firms the management abilities of the founders were 
indicated as the crucial factor for succeeding. Firms which were able to 
combine research excellence with skilful management seemed to be much 
better off.  The second key factor deciding about the success of a firm was 
the size of the market. The national market is still believed to be ‘to poor’ 
and ‘too small’ to be able to absorb larger number of high tech companies. 
Therefore further development of spin-off companies has to be based on 
access to international markets; 
• As a recommendation for enhancing spin-offs the author indicates the need 
for active support of Business Angels initiatives.  
The picture coming out from those two studies shows that although the general 
interest of academics and students in running spin-off companies is not 
significant, those who start the businesses aim to follow the western standards.  
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Looking from the institutional perspective, the regulation on Higher Education 
(2005) in article 86 indicates that universities in order to promote their research 
results are allowed to run their own incubators and technology transfer centres. 
Via technology transfer centre the research results might be either sold or made 
available for free for industry. In the case of commercialisation of a new 
technology a university is allowed to establish a capital company which is in 
charge of the process. Although the legal basis exists, as seen both from the 
interviews with academics, entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, the more 
specific internal university regulations are too bureaucratic and time consuming 
to meet the market requirements. Additionally the human aspect, instead of 
smoothing the process, makes it more difficult.  
The statistics do not justify the high esteem in which Polish academics are held. 
The number of publications in internationally recognized journal per academic 
staff member, the index for Poland is two – three times lower than other western 
European countries such as UK, France or Switzerland. Statistically a Polish 
academic publishes once in four years in a high quality journal. Additionally, 
when compared the number of citations of scientific papers authored or co-
authored with a Polish academics, the numbers are three times smaller 
compared to Western Europe and the US (Wolszczak-Derlacz & Parteka, 
2010:10).  
The last 20 years of changes did not affect significantly Polish higher education 
and research institutions, in terms of market requirements. Their structures can 
be traced to the late 70s of the last century, which creates barriers for the 
research institutions to adapt to new situations. They are not ready to undertake 
commercial activities in an efficient and effective way. The increased number of 
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part time students, and taught post-graduate students, encouraged universities 
to broaden their educational services rather than be research based. In those 
situations where the patents or commercialisation of research has got marginal 
influence on an academic career there is no incentive for researchers to focus 
on it (Matusiak & Guliński, 2010).   
Looking at the financing aspects of academic entrepreneurship there could be 
two main issues highlighted. The first problem is related to the European 
Programs. Although there is a significant amount of money assigned from the 
European Human Capital operational program there is a lack of coherence 
between the subdivisions of the program. In example the priority 6.2 (Human 
capital, support and promotion of entrepreneurship and self-employment) is 
focused on creating new firms and enhancing self-employment. In case of 
graduate university students who intend to run a spin off/spin out the problems 
arise from the fact that: firstly, there is not priority given for innovative entities, 
secondly they usually are outside the preferred groups. On the other hand the 
sub-measure 8.2.1 (Human capital - Support to cooperation of scientific 
environment and enterprises - call for proposals projects) provides support for 
doctoral students, students and graduates, however only in non-financial 
aspects (Matusiak & Guliński, 2010; Ministry Of Regional Development, 2009). 
The second problem is related to lack of ideas to provide sustainable financing 
for programs supporting academic entrepreneurship in the situation when 
European Union funds expire (Matusiak & Guliński, 2010).  
 
 244 
 
5.3.4. Entrepreneurs  
Entrepreneurs are an invariable element of the Venture Capital investment 
cycle. They provide the demand side for the Venture Capital funding. Without 
people willing to undertake risk and challenges embedded in establishing new 
businesses Venture Capitalist would not be able to create their portfolios. The 
following section is devoted to analysing entrepreneurship and potential 
entrepreneurs in Poland. The focus is given to already established entities 
which can be described as innovative and of high growth potential thus are in 
the scope of interest of Venture Capital funding as well as to individuals who 
are willing to undertake entrepreneurial activities in future and create the above 
kind of firm.  
Opinions on entrepreneurs range from very positive to highly critical. Lack of 
good projects and an overwhelming number of bad projects were also 
highlighted. 
In Poland there are the best entrepreneurs, because they want to work. 
(Private Venture Capital_I)  
There is lack of entrepreneurs with good projects (Public/Private Venture 
Capital)  
At the moment there are relatively few good projects. There are a lot of 
weak projects. (Former Venture Capital/Entrepreneur)  
The business models do not fit the market reality (Public/Private Venture 
Capital) 
By some Venture capitalists they were perceived as very devoted to the 
business having clear goals and plan to achieve them; when others indicated 
 245 
 
lack of long term planning as well as lack of interest and ability to build the 
market value of the company. Also such issues as unwillingness to share the 
company’s ownership and neglecting to separate the company’s assets from 
the private assets were indicated.  
‘Entrepreneurs do not engage into the projects, they seem not to 
understand that you have to work extremely hard at the begging. (...) 
They believe that if they come with a project they will get the money 
straight away. (Public Venture Capital)  
Entrepreneurs do not understand the value of a company. They don’t 
create the company to increase its value with a vision of later sale. They 
want to have salary every month.  (Public Venture Capital)  
The managers at private Venture Capital funds were more favourable toward 
entrepreneurs compared to those operating in publicly funded. The further 
question, unfortunately not in the scope of this research, could follow the 
differences, if any, between the clientele of private and public funds as well the 
way the funds operate in relationship to their clients.  
More moderate voices concentrated on insufficient financial education, which 
resulted in misunderstanding the mechanism of Venture Capital functioning. 
With a conclusion that on average in respect to investment readiness Polish 
entrepreneurs do not differ from their colleagues in western countries.  
The industry stakeholders perceptions elicited though interviews, which 
although statistically not comprehensive enough to be significant, provide 
insights, including contradictions, which when set against the analysis in reports 
suggest some interesting further research questions.  
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The secondary data indicated that on average though, Polish entrepreneurs 
avoid using external financing and if they do, usually it is used for financing 
current operations rather than long term investments (Tarnawa & Zadura-
Lichota, 2012). While considering the investment activities of SMEs, the larger 
the company is the more willing it is to invest in fixed assets (Starczewska-
Krzystoszek, 2011). Looking at the dynamics of investment activities it might be 
seen that the 2003-2008 period of growth in investment was followed by 
decrease in 2009 and 2010 and then to rise again beginning with 2011.  
On the other hand only 44% of firms are using their full productivity potential; 
the rest are able to increase production, thus sales, without the need for 
investment in fixed assets. Polish companies are not willing to invest in 
innovation either. Only 18% of manufacturing sector firms invested in innovation 
in the period of 2007-2008, and even less – 14% of service sector. The R&D 
expenditures are low, and probably would be even lower if not for the supply of 
EU program funds. The average business sector expenditure on R&D 
calculated in Euro per inhabitant was circa 20 euro in 2010, whereas in the UK 
it reached 221 euro. When calculated as a percentage of national GDP the 
rates are 0.22% in Poland versus 0.79% in the UK.  
Despite the data, a positive trend can be seen, because almost one fourth of 
firms is planning to invest in innovation in the near future (Starczewska-
Krzystoszek, 2011).     
The above statements raise a range of possible areas of further and deeper 
research particularly on the relationship between the Venture Capital fund and 
entrepreneurs with respect to the maturity level of the entrepreneurs, whether it 
is a first time entrepreneur, serial entrepreneur or former venture capitalist.  
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5.3.5. Culture 
Cultural issues are delicate and often are not directly referred to. Hofstede’s 
framework of factors, widely used for assessing national cultures, was applied 
in detail in the context chapter discussion. Therefore the following section refers 
only to those elements of the culture specifically identified by participants. The 
second part of the section presents secondary statistical data which contributes 
to a broader national perspective on these issues referred to by interviewees. 
From the personal observations of the researcher it was noticeable that the 
Polish Venture Capital industry seemed to be dominated by males. Only two 
interviewees out of 15 were female. Both of whom had administrative jobs (the 
Technology Park manager and the President of PPEA). The funds’ managers 
and entrepreneurs were all male. Also, from the available personal data on fund 
managers there is seen to be an overwhelming number of male directors74.  
Although culture factors are an important influence, and the range of factors is 
broad, the respondents during interviews did not reflect much on this. There 
were only two issues referring to culture, that were commonly brought out by 
participants. The first one was trust between business partners and the second 
was the problem of dishonesty.  One of the participants indicated that due to the 
risk generated by combination of those two factors the costs of legal protection 
of an investment are very high and reach about 5% of the total cost of 
transactions.    
‘in Poland (...) I can see it also in Slovakia and Czech Republic, there is 
very little trust between the citizens and the state. And this is justified.(...) 
If for example a person from EVCA came to an entrepreneur and started 
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 http://www.psik.org.pl/funds.html  
 248 
 
asking questions, the entrepreneur will kick out him/her’  (National 
Capital Fund)  
 
Business Angels are afraid more of personal risk than market risk. (...) 
They don’t want to invest because they are afraid that someone will 
cheat them. (Public Venture Capital)  
They (Entrepreneurs – author’s clarification) don’t want an external 
investor because they think he/she will steal their company (Public 
Venture Capital)  
‘They said (a fund co financed by National Capital Fund – author’s 
clarification) that this is an NCF requirement. (...) so we stopped 
negotiations. Later it turned out that this was a lie made up by X75 just for 
the negotiation purposes. (Entreprenuer_W)    
The fundamental difference in Poland lies in the amount of stealing. I’m 
afraid that in IPO prospects of our portfolio companies will be expensive 
and later half of it will go to managers under the table. (National Capital 
Fund)  
Insufficient knowledge might be indicated as one of the factors influencing the 
lack of trust between members of the Venture Capital community. As the 
manager at the technology transfer centre pointed out, many researchers are 
afraid of Venture Capital because they do not fully understand the mechanisms 
behind equity financing. The manager of the technology park, on the other 
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 Fund manager – name known to researcher  
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hand, observed that firms are more willing to trust public funded Venture Capital 
funds or Business Angel seed funds than private ones.  
Lack of cooperation was indicated as constraining the everyday conduct of 
business, and also translates into a default mode of conducting business.  
 ‘We Poles and a compromise?(...)  (Entrepreneur_L)  
According to national level research the vast majority of Poles trust their close 
family (96%). However, trust towards the wider family drops to 36%. In respect 
to business activities: over 70% of respondents declared that it is wise to be 
careful with business contacts, and 42% that trust in business contacts does not 
bring anything good. However, over the ten years of the survey there are signs 
of improvement. Considering institutions Poles trust most the charity 
organizations (78%), and the Church (76%); at the other end of the scale of 
trust are the Courts (44%) and public administration (42%). (Fundacja Centrum 
Badania Opinii Społecznej, 2010) 
Although the literature indicates the role of culture in shaping the Venture 
Capital industry, participants seemed not to put much emphasis on this factor. 
There are several possible explanations: within the available time there were 
issues of more importance to discuss, and at this stage of industry emergence 
the cultural issues are not important or are too sensitive to talk about.    
 
5.3.6. Venture Capital  
Available secondary data on Venture Capital were presented in the second 
chapter. This section is dedicated to conclusions arising from the interviews.  
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A broadly discussed element of venture capital funds were the management 
teams. Opinions oscillated between positive and negative among fund 
managers. 
‘the Venture Capital management teams are professional. Most of them 
operate since 1994. They survived it means they are good. (Private 
Venture Capital_I)  
Our managers, being objective, are weak (National Capital Fund)   
The main difference between Polish and western funds are the 
management teams. I mean their background. In Poland members of the 
management team came from financial background, however it’s 
changing now. (...) if we consider at the UK or US management teams 
they usually have a member with industry experience, this translates for 
the whole investment process. In case of Poland the Venture process is 
more like Private Equity. It is based on formal financial analysis not on 
the business itself and the ways to help it to develop. (Private Venture 
Capital HG)  
Both Venture Capitalists and Entrepreneurs indicated that Venture Capital 
funds are providing only financial support. An interesting remark was made by a 
former Venture Capitalist who currently runs his own high tech business. While 
asked if he considered Venture Capital funding for his firm he replied that 
Venture Capital cannot provide what he is looking for, because his business 
needs something more than money. The other two interviewed entrepreneurs 
had similar experience. They turned to Venture Capital for professional help, for 
pure financial support they used European grants. Their statement contrasts 
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with the Venture Capitalists’ idea of providing a unique combination of money 
and advice.   
In Poland besides money funds do not offer any other support (Private 
Venture Capital_HG)  
(...) and this manager sees that our discussion is heading to nowhere 
and says: ok I tell you honestly, we give you only money and you’re 
going to do the business. (Entrepreneur_W) 
Funds indicated that one of the challenges for the industry will be related to 
selecting and later supporting good projects; although most of the projects in 
which Venture Capital funds invest are not high-tech.  
The ecosystem which is able to generate good projects is the most 
important for Venture Capital industry. (Former Venture 
Capital/Entrepreneur)   
If we look closer, we’ll see that for example MCI made big money on 
simple projects (National Capital Fund)  
Poland according to one of the participants represents too small an economy 
for Venture Capital therefore funds are looking for projects which have export 
potential. Recalling that finding good projects is difficult, this becomes a further 
challenge.  
The data published in statistics are not precise: 
‘Eurostat says that in Poland four early stage transactions took place this 
year, because someone has registered them. I can find six for this year 
 252 
 
and none of them will be the ones mentioned in statistics. (National 
Capital Fund)  
On the other hand entrepreneurs while referring to their personal experiences 
with Venture Capital funds expressed concerns on too high demands of 
Venture Capital for control. Some of them expressed fear against hostile 
takeover.  
‘We negotiated with MCI and Helix. We were close to sign a contract but 
they wanted too much control (Entrepreneur_W)  
‘the alertness that there are legal possibilities for them (Venture Capital) 
to take over my company even if I have the majority of shares. 
(Entrepreneur_L)  
In another case the time needed for the Venture Capital to take the decision 
was too long for the company to wait, so the company had to find alternative 
sources to finance the project. Taking in account that the same company 
finished successfully the planned project and had an IPO few months later 
undermines the argument of underdevelopment of both the project and the 
company.  
Some arrogant behaviour of Venture Capitalists was also recorded. Such a 
situation might be due not to the lack of professionalism but be reinforced by 
the monopolistic position of Venture Capital for early stage financing.   
‘So X arrived, put legs on the table. His assistant, Y during the whole 
presentation was watching movies on You Tube. I sat next to her. So 
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generally they behaved arrogant. (...) Besides you could see that 
between X and Z76 was a conflict. (Entrepreneur_W) 
The above analysis was guided by the factors set out in the template. Most of 
the factors were discussed by the participants; however, consideration of 
accounting standards, bankruptcy law, labour regulations, the role of 
corporations as R&D providers, and the role of professional associations did not 
emerge. Further discussion on the findings and their implications for policy 
makers is continued in the conclusion chapter.  
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 Z and X managers of Venture Capital funds (names known to the researcher)  
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6. Chapter 6 
6.1. Conclusions  
This research aims to understand the process of transformation from a centrally 
planned economy to a market economy. The analytical perspective was 
narrowed to one industry and one country. The framework was organizational 
theory, specifically a combination of Institutional theory and Resource 
Dependence theory. Analysis was guided by a template of factors derived from 
empirical results in the literature. Primary data was collected through semi 
structured interviews. Poland was chosen as the case study country, and the 
Venture Capital industry as the sample industry.  
Venture Capital is widely perceived as a one of the main drivers for innovation 
and wealth creation both in the US and in other developed and developing 
countries (Gompers, 2001; OECD. 1996; Pierrakis, Y. 2010). The literature 
discussing Venture Capital processes emphasises its cyclical nature as well as 
its complexity (Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Sahlman, 
1990). The cycle starts with raising long term funds from investors, then 
selecting and investing in portfolio companies, and finishes with exiting the deal. 
At each stage of the life cycle, Venture Capital participants cooperate with 
different partners and face various threats and challenges. The nature of this 
context influences behaviours and outcomes. Therefore, to obtain a more 
reliable understanding of a Venture Capital industry the analysis has to go 
beyond the Venture Capital partnerships.  
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6.2. Theoretical assumptions  
To obtain a broader picture of the Venture Capital industry in Poland is 
problematic. The application of a ‘principal – agent’ perspective, which is 
successfully used in Venture Capital research in developed western economies 
(Gompers, 1995; Osnabrugge, 2000; Sahlman, 1990; Sapienza & Gupta, 1994) 
seems to be too simplistic in the specific case of emergence and development 
of the Venture Capital industry in a transition economy. The principal – agent 
relationship, often referred to as ‘agency theory’, identifies hazards related to 
the relationship between a principal who delegates tasks and an agent who 
performs those tasks (Eisenhardt, 1989). In the case of Venture Capital 
relations, the role of principal and agent are not strictly assigned. Venture 
capitalists act as agents in relation to limited partners but also simultaneously 
as principals when cooperating with entrepreneurs (Sahlman, 1990). The 
potential for opportunistic behaviour may arise from uncertainty related to the 
project, and from information asymmetries, as well as from different risk 
preferences between parties (Arthurs & Busenitz, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
The theory assumes roles are clearly assigned. Therefore, agency theory does 
not provide a robust theoretical explanation in the case when the goals of 
principals and agents are not fully aligned (Arthurs & Busenitz, 2003).  
Following Pettigrew (1997), the emergence of a Venture Capital industry should 
be perceived as a process where events unfold in sequence over time, in 
context, and at different levels of an economy. The venture capitalist general 
partner operates as a highly specialised intermediary between finance and 
innovation (Gilson, 2003). Therefore, while aiming to understand the process of 
Venture Capital industry emergence and development, the analysis has to 
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include the analysis of the connected parties (providers of finance and providers 
of innovation) and not only the connector (venture capitalists).  
In the case of a country undergoing a transition from a centrally planned to a 
market economy, the dynamics of change are profound and affect both 
institutions and organizations. The existing institutions change, new roles are 
assigned to existing organizations, and new organizations emerge. The 
emerging Venture Capital industry is operating in an environment very different 
from the one experienced in developed western economies. There are new 
hazards, such as an unsuitable and unstable legal system, but also new 
opportunities such as unexplored markets. The range of participants and their 
roles differ from those found in traditional developed market economies. At the 
level of Venture Capital firms there might be found a range of funds with 
different backgrounds and goals. There are foreign private funds, with 
established procedures and strategies, new private local funds learning the 
business, as well as foreign public funds; there are also local public funds, and 
public/private funds, which, as a consequence of being financed from public 
money often have wider social goals in addition to their financial goals.  
The role of the state is as extensive as it was in the socialist era. As a legislative 
power during the protracted stage of transformation it influences all participants 
of the Venture Capital industry community. At the policy level, it formulates 
regulations and directives directly affecting the Venture Capital industry, i.e. 
creating a viable venture capital infrastructure. Additionally, it may act as a main 
investor or a co-investor in a fund.  
Any Venture Capital industry, in order to generate profits, requires a supply of 
exceptional innovative companies. Thus the conditions for development of 
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innovation directly influence the pace of Venture Capital development. Unless 
Venture Capital is able to invest in projects which potentially are able to 
generate profits, the potential investors will look for alternative ways to earn 
profits. Investors are not a homogeneous group. Depending on their origins 
they differ in attitudes toward risk and expected returns. Institutional investors, 
such as pension funds or insurance companies, are restricted by legal 
regulations. The expected returns on investment also differ depending on the 
source of funds and stage of investment (Manigart et al., 2002). It can be 
assumed that the nature of potential investors will influence the pattern of 
investments therefore investors should get attention in any analysis of the 
industry.  
To sum up, the Venture Capital process takes place at several levels. The main 
level is at the investor – Venture Capital fund – portfolio company level. Here 
agency theory can provide valuable insights on the relationships. The other 
levels of analysis are related to the investors’ environment and portfolio 
companies’ environment. The way these environments influence the 
relationships between investors and Venture Capital, and Venture Capital and 
portfolio companies, cannot be fully explained by using exclusively the agency 
approach.  
The research presented here aimed to understand the process of Venture 
Capital industry emergence and development in Poland, and to ascertain if 
there are a number of generic factors for industry emergence in post socialist 
economies. In order to capture a broad perspective the organizational theory 
approach was employed. The Venture Capital industry is treated as a 
community of organizations which are connected by direct or indirect 
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relationships. Two leading organizational theories were applied:  Institutional 
theory (North, 1990) and Resource Dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Both theories aim to understand how organizations operate in their 
environments. The core idea behind Resource Dependence theory indicates 
that an organization’s ability to survive depends on its ability to acquire and 
maintain the necessary resources. In order to obtain them, organizations may 
use different strategies which may change according to changes in the 
environment. Institutional theory attends to the institutional environment and the 
way it influences organizations. The theory also indicates that institutions are 
the outcome of cultures. Thus institutions with similar purposes may differ in 
structure and processes when in different cultures. Using the two theories 
together the following predictions about the process of emergence and 
development of a Venture Capital industry in an emerging economy are made: 
1. Normalisation: The Venture Capital industry should become more 
homogenous77 over time; 
2. Phasing: Venture Capital industry emergence will unfold in set of 
development phases;  
3. Incentivisation: The internal structure of the Venture Capital industry will 
reflect the incentives present in their economic environment;  
4. Shaping: The characteristics of the external environment for Venture 
Capital will change over time and at each stage will influence the shape 
of the industry;  
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 Over time funds will become more similar to each other but not necessarily more efficient 
(DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. 1983. The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and 
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. American Sociological Review, 48(2): 147-160.) 
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5. Adaptation: Venture Capital operating parameters will adjust to fit the 
specific environment encountered; 
6. Motivation: It will be necessary to understand the context of Venture 
Capital operations in order to understand its actions;  
7. Sense-making: The way Venture Capitalists will react to the changes to 
environment characteristics will depend on the interpretation processes 
of the top managers which will be culturally linked;  
 
6.3. Methodological contribution  
In order to identify elements of the Venture Capital environment which influence 
the performance of funds, and shape the industry, a literature review was 
completed. Based on the available empirical evidence, a template was then 
constructed78. The template reflected factors which influence the emergence 
and shape of a Venture Capital industry. It also served as a benchmark for 
further analysis of factors, which were specific to the context of transition 
economies.    
The primary data were collected via interviews. There were 15 semi structured, 
interviews, using open ended questions, conducted with different 
representatives of the industry. The participants represented Venture Capital 
firms, both private and public; entrepreneurs, managers of technology parks 
and technology transfer centres; representative of the Polish Private Equity and 
Venture Capital Association; an academic expert and a lawyer. The participants 
were selected by the researcher and both were recommended by other 
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 See the methodology chapter for the full template description  
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interviewees. The interviews were analysed and data grouped using the 
purpose designed template. The data collected through interviews were 
referred against available secondary data. The collection of secondary data was 
also guided by the template.  
The aim of the interviews was to allow participants to freely reveal factors that in 
their opinion, and based on their experiences, had the most effect on the 
contemporary shape of the Polish Venture Capital industry. Not all elements 
which were initially included in the template were indicated by participants. 
Those elements, when possible, were covered with the secondary data. Also 
some new factors emerged, but these were not added to the template and may 
be appropriate for follow on research. The following section presents and 
discusses the main findings. 
 
6.4. Findings  
The transformation process is complex and takes place at both the economic 
and social level. Depending on the strategy chosen, transformation may unfold 
as a set of gradually introduced reforms or take a form of a ‘shock therapy’ 
introduced by Leszek Balcerowicz and thus minimize the time to change the 
formal institutions. A strategy of ‘shock therapy’ took place in Poland. The 
detailed information on the kind of reforms implemented is provided in the 
context chapter. Nevertheless, although changes in formal regulations can be 
introduced ‘overnight’, economic and social changes need time to take place 
and to embed.  
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The research concentrated on the emergence and development of the Venture 
Capital industry in Poland. The early changes from a centrally planned economy 
to a market economy encouraged the first overseas funds to invest in Poland 
thus triggered the emergence of the industry. Although a Venture Capital 
industry would emerge naturally as a result of moving to a market economy, it is 
the existence and effectiveness of the entrepreneurial ecosystem which 
determines the pace of development of such an industry. The particulars of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem79 may accelerate or inhibit industry development, 
and specific environmental factors may act as either inhibitors or accelerants 
depending on the phase the industry is in. Acknowledging the moderating role 
of the environment, the research concentrated on identifying factors that had 
the most influence on the current shape and development trajectory of the 
Polish Venture Capital industry. These factors are now presented against the 
background of the Venture Capital process in the developed economies, with 
reference to each stage in the cycle. 
The regulatory framework establishes a common and agreed platform for 
exchanges between market participants in a particular country. The legal 
system is cited in the literature as an important indicator of Venture Capital 
performance. A transition economy, by definition, experiences a dramatic shift 
in this area. Creation of a stable system should be a priority. In the case of 
Poland one of the major problems indicated by industry stakeholders was the 
lack of stability and lack of clarity in the legal system. This affected the ability to 
plan for the long term and increased the risk related to running a business and 
reduced potential returns. The constant changes do not help to establish well 
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 Detailed discussion on determinants of entrepreneurial success can be found in Ahmad, N., & 
Hoffmann, A. 2008. A Framework for Addressing and Measuring Entrepreneurship, OECD 
Statistic Working Papers, Vol. STD/DOC(2008)/2. 
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understood routines which could later develop into wider industry practices or 
paradigm. Lack of appropriate regulation, such as a suitable legal structure for 
Venture Capital partnership or taxation, encouraged Venture Capital funds to 
undertake strategies which quite often operated at the edge of legality. Such 
behaviour was clearly common at the early stages, but with improvement of 
legal structures, and increased control, those practices are now less visible. The 
complexity of legal regulations generates further difficulties. Complexity of the 
rules and the large number of regulations results in inefficient execution, which 
was highlighted by respondents as a constraining factor. A lot of new law is 
generated simply to clarify the existing law. Of note, the data highlighted a lack 
of applied procedures for the cost-effectiveness assessment of proposed new 
regulations.  
Although Venture Capitalists are generally ambivalent about the extent of 
government involvement in the industry, the Western experience indicates that 
Venture Capital industries need at least some sort of assistance in order to 
emerge (Lerner, Moore, & Shepherd, 2005). The literature draws attention to 
the need to create a coherent set of policies that would support all aspects of 
the entrepreneurial process. The Polish experience shows only limited interest 
by government in policies targeted at Venture Capital. Unlike most western 
developed economies supporting Venture Capital, there are no tax incentives 
for Venture Capital or for Business Angel investments. The existing tax 
schemes dedicated to R&D initiatives are seen by users as inefficient.  
There are some government attempts to support the Venture Capital industry. 
However, actions usually concentrate on the supply of funds. The National 
Capital Fund may serve as an example of a successful attempt by government 
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to copy some of the mechanisms used by Western economies. Although the 
project is perceived as necessary and having positively influenced the industry, 
it shows weaknesses when deployed in the Polish context. The weaknesses 
arise because of lack of coherence between the specific elements of policy 
which have been ‘cherry-picked’ from western experience.  
Poland, similarly to all new members of the European Union, benefited from 
extensive pre-accession funds and later structural funds. The example of weak 
performance of current structural funds underlines the need for coordination 
and coherence while designing policies. The research showed that here was no 
consensus over the role of those funds among those interviewed. The 
entrepreneurs and other institutions perceived them as supporting 
entrepreneurship and therefore beneficial, although not free from procedural 
problems. The Venture Capitalists referred to them as ‘spoiling the market’ and 
pointed out the maldistribution of funds and the problem of ‘crowding out’ the 
private funds.  
The Venture Capitalists invest in innovative firms, which have a potential of high 
growth. Without an environment supporting the creation of innovation and its 
later commercialization Venture Capital firms have problems with creating 
portfolios allowing high returns capable of realising higher investment returns.  
Experience of European Countries such as the UK or the Nordic members 
illustrates that creation of an infrastructure for the creation and 
commercialisation of innovation requires a lot of time and effort. In the case of 
post communist countries, such as Poland, creation of such a system is even 
more challenging. The most natural sources of research such as universities 
and research institutions are frequently not interested in business activities. The 
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lack of interest arises from several factors. Historically universities have 
concentrated on research not development. This approach has not changed. 
Additionally, they were, and still are, very hierarchical institutions. Internal 
regulations serve the hierarchy. Passage through the bureaucracy takes a long 
time and involves dealing with many ‘gatekeepers’. There are no procedures 
which would allow, in a quick and efficient way, universities to share with 
investors innovations with potential to become valuable market products. 
Researchers, especially those from older generations, were not encouraged to 
verify their work through the market and do not want to follow that path. The 
current system is also not improving in terms of incentives. An academic career 
is possible without any engagement with business. Unless the universities 
change their attitudes cooperation will be difficult.  
The supply of public money resulted in growth in the number of organizations 
supporting entrepreneurship, such as business incubators, technology parks 
and technology transfer centres. Although the general idea followed the 
European model, according to Venture Capitalists those institutions do not 
serve as source of innovative young firms eligible for Venture Capital finance. 
Taking in account that the transformation process started less than 23 years 
ago and that entrepreneurship had to be rebuilt almost from scratch, the Polish 
government’s focus on supporting across all types of entrepreneurs is 
understandable. However, a more targeted focus will be needed in order to 
assure the future viability of a Venture Capital industry.  
Alongside the changes in the economic system, social changes have also to 
take place. The main challenge facing a Venture Capital industry in a transition 
economy is the lack of trust between members of the society. Business Angels 
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are afraid that entrepreneurs will behave opportunistically; entrepreneurs are 
anxious that Venture Capitalists will take over their business; and public 
authorities believe that market players will abuse all the rules. Members of the 
community are acting according to a scenario where the worse possible 
opportunistic human behaviours dominate actions and choices. Such behaviour 
is additionally supported by the natural tendency towards secrecy in the ‘private 
equity’ industry. The lack of trust between parties in the Venture Capital process 
increases the costs of agency through a need for increased control on behalf of 
all parties. Lack of trust accompanied by ineffective execution of laws creates 
hostile environment from the Venture Capital point of view.  
The reminders of the socialist system are still present. A feeling of ambivalence 
towards wealthy individuals might serve as an example. The commonly 
operating prejudice is that ‘the first million is usually stolen’. Another problem is 
related to achieve a proper separation between the individual and the company. 
Entrepreneurs who established companies with Venture Capital equity still treat 
the company as solely owned and therefore to be treated as their private 
property. This has governance issues with reference to limited partnerships and 
investors’ rights. Such behaviours are deeply rooted in the culture and will 
require education as well as time to change them.  
All Venture Capital funds require ability to liquidate the portfolio companies at 
the end of the nominated fund life. Without a successful exit Venture Capital 
firms do not gain the investment returns or reputation required to raise a new 
fund. Traditionally the most desired way to exit is though an IPO.  A transition 
economy faces more difficulties than a developed economy in providing an 
effective capital market. Whilst Poland was very efficient in creating the capital 
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market from scratch, the Warsaw Stock Exchange was opened only 2 years 
after the beginning of the process of transformation, it still struggles. In 2007 a 
New Connect market was established with the aim to provide a platform of 
exchange for young companies. Although, its condition is improving New 
Connect still suffers from low liquidity and limited liability.  
The capital markets are one of the options for liquidating the investment. 
However it has to be remembered that Venture Capital can serves as source of 
finance for companies at their early stages of development. The pre-seed 
phases and the later stages have to be covered through other forms of 
financing. Without those sources of follow on funding Venture Capital will not 
have chance to develop dynamically.  
Venture Capital, as a cyclical phenomenon, will, after completing each 
investment cycle (i.e. ‘cash to cash), be looking for new investor. Again the 
transition economies will create challenges in this respect. The communist 
period did not create enough wealthy individuals who could serve as individual 
investors. The new class is still developing and requires education and practice 
in this form of investment. The government with its lack of interest in long term 
policies toward Venture Capital does not provide adequate legislation to allow 
the pension funds and insurance funds to participate in the market. As result the 
Polish Venture Capital funds are in the majority funded with either public money 
or foreign funds.  
Despite the challenges generated by transitioning economies, Venture Capital 
funds can also find exceptional opportunities. The first Venture Capital funds 
investing in Poland had a ‘first mover’ advantage and during the first decade 
had an almost monopolistic position on the market. Nevertheless, those 
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investing later enjoyed a fruitful combination of a relatively stable political 
environment, fast economic growth and new markets.  
The features discussed above were in the template. Nevertheless some 
elements included in the template did not emerge during the interviews. These 
were accounting standards, bankruptcy law, labour regulations, the role of 
corporations as R&D providers, and the role of professional associations. 
Absence of those elements may suggest that they are not considered to be 
relevant at this stage of development of the industry, or at least are not of 
immediate concern to the interviewees. However, it may be that they are areas 
which are simply too sensitive for the interviewees to talk about, or that there 
was not enough time in the interview process to allow them to surface.  
An important factor which was not included in the template (which was derived 
from an examination of empirical findings in the literature), but which according 
to participants and secondary data played an important role in kick-starting and 
shaping the Polish Venture Capital industry, was the engagement of foreign 
public and private capital at the initial stage of industry creation.   
 
6.5. Theoretical contribution  
The research applied an organizational studies approach (the assumptions of 
which were discussed earlier in the chapter) based on which a set of predictions 
was generated.    
The following table compares our earlier theoretical predictions with the 
empirical research findings. The (+) or (-) signs reflect an assessment of the 
 268 
 
positive and the negative influences of the factor on the pace of development of 
the Venture Capital industry. 
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Table 8: Theoretical assumptions tested against empirical findings  
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EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Legal Framework  Other institutions  Market 
conditions  
Entrepreneurs  Venture Funds  Culture  
Normalisation   
industry should 
become more 
homogenous over 
time; 
Specific legal vehicles 
are now commonly used 
by funds  
(+) 
   Becoming 
homogenous, 
within groups  
(+) 
 
Phasing 
industry emergence 
will unfold in set of 
development phases 
Unification of the Polish 
legal system with 
European Union 
requirements  (1991 
onwards)  
(+) 
Supply of public 
money from pre-
accession and 
structural funds 
(1998 - 2004 –pre 
accession programs; 
2004  onwards – 
structural funds)  
(+) 
Creation of the 
National Capital 
fund (2005) 
(+) 
Creation of the 
New Connect 
market  (2007)  
(+) 
 
 
 
 
 
 History of 
Polish Venture 
Capital industry 
shows turning 
points usually 
related to 
external factors 
(+) 
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Incentivisation 
The internal 
structure of the 
Venture Capital 
industry will reflect 
the incentives 
present in their 
economic 
environment 
Lack of tax incentives for 
Business Angels/Venture 
Capital investment 
(-) 
Lack of long term 
policy toward 
Venture Capital 
(-) 
Official 
disparagement for 
investing into 
Venture type 
projects by public 
institutions  
(-) 
Lack of 
incentives for 
Universities to 
develop  
innovations that 
can be 
commercialised 
(-) 
  Negative 
connotations to 
personal wealth 
(-) 
 
Negative 
attitude toward 
risk and 
bankruptcy  
(-) 
Shaping 
The characteristics 
of the external 
environment for 
Venture Capital will 
change over time 
and at each stage 
will influence the 
shape of the 
industry 
Legal changes/tax 
regulation changes 
influenced behaviour 
both positively and 
negatively  
(+)(-) 
Presence of 
Business Angels 
(+) 
 
Structural funds not 
targeted 
(-) 
Organizations 
supporting 
entrepreneurship  
are inefficient 
(-) 
Growth of GDP 
(+) 
 
Development of 
capital market  
(+) 
Small 
percentage of 
entrepreneurial 
projects are 
innovative  
(-) 
 Lack of trust 
between all 
actors 
(-) 
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Adaptation 
It will be necessary 
to understand the 
context of Venture 
Capital operations in 
order to understand 
its actions;  
Tax avoidance 
techniques, using foreign 
legal structures  
Using personal 
connections  
 Substitution of 
Venture Capital 
expertise to 
overcome lack 
of skilled 
management  
Response to 
wider 
investment 
opportunities 
created by 
privatisation  
 
Motivation 
It will be necessary 
to understand the 
context of Venture 
Capital operations in 
order to understand 
its actions; 
 Political motivations 
dominate economic 
arguments  
(-) 
    
Sense-making 
The way Venture 
Capitalists will react 
to the changes to 
environment 
characteristics, will 
depend on the 
interpretation 
processes of the top 
managers and will 
be culturally linked; 
Preference not to engage 
with Polish structures 
 
‘Silo’ mentality 
(-) 
Generally 
supportive and 
engaged 
Arrogance and 
commensurate 
lack of mutual 
understanding 
and 
engagement 
Avoidance of 
government 
sponsored 
support other 
than funding 
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6.6. Practical contribution  
Considering the empirical findings, issues related to trust have the most 
frequently mentioned negative influence on the effective functioning of the 
Polish Venture Capital industry. Trust cannot be managed directly by 
government and requires an indirect approach. The research leads us to 
recommend that policies should be targeted on factors in the environment 
which build mutual trust between stakeholders. The three most important 
elements would be:  
• stability of the legal system; 
• specifically designed incentives; 
• transparent measurement of performance in terms of risk, innovation and 
reward. 
Stability of the legal system would allow planning and reduced uncertainty thus 
reduces overall risk to business outcomes. Moreover, such stability enhances 
trust in the state as the provider of formal rules, and reduces the risk of 
opportunistic behaviour among business partners. A coherent system of 
incentives targeted at all stakeholders of the Venture Capital industry would 
improve their individual performance as well as collectively improving the 
performance of the industry. The transparent measurement of performance 
against outcome-centred metrics would allow disciplined and exemplary 
evaluation of new initiatives in terms of their trade off between the risk, degree 
of innovation, and expected reward.  
Another major problem identified in the primary and secondary data related to 
the policy or even lack of policy facilitating Venture Capital industry and 
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supporting high-tech firms. It appears as there is a lack of comprehensiveness 
between different policies and programs in the entrepreneurship area, provided 
both by the national government and the European Union bodies. The 
recommendation would be to revise the existing policies and programs in terms 
of their coherences and compatibility. A good example of such a coordinated 
approach is in the UK, where efforts to encourage Business Angels investment, 
and university lead entrepreneurial activities, are followed by promoting Venture 
Capital finance at different stages of investment (United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe, 2007).  
An issue directly related to government programs supporting Venture Capital is 
sustainability. The majority of programs currently implemented in Poland are 
based on money provided by the EU structural funds. There is an urgent need 
to create a system that will allow alternative sources of money to finance these 
sort of initiatives.    
 
6.7. Further research  
The research proposed the application of an organizational lens, in particular a 
combination of Resource Dependence theory and Institutional theory, as an 
alternative framework for analysing emergence and development of Polish 
Venture Capital industry. The limitations in the research arise from the 
complexity of the researched subject. By providing the template it highlighted 
areas critical for the development of the industry. However, further analysis of 
each of the categories presented in the template would be useful for better 
understanding the whole process. In the light of the research findings, the 
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relationships between stakeholders involved directly into creation and 
commercialization of innovation should be investigated next.  
On the basis of the analysis of the particular case of Poland we may speculate 
that the other transitioning economies, which started out in the same condition 
as Poland, as former communist societies with centrally planned economies, 
and share the same social and economic goals, may go through more or less 
the same development path, unless there are significant differences in context. 
Such differences could be expected to be found most obviously in culture and 
law. Providing evidence to test this hypothesis will need further research. 
Based on the western experience, in all cases building an efficient Venture 
Capital industry will need time because there are two critical components to be 
grown from scratch: an infrastructure, and a population of suitably experienced 
actors, in all roles, in all parts of the process. 
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Appendix 1 
Historical context  
Pre-transformation period  
The turning point of Polish modern history was the proclamation of renewed 
independence in November 1918, after 123 years of partition between Russia, 
Prussia and Austria. The reconstituted country was highly differentiated due to 
the long period of division between three different monarchies with dissimilar 
political and economical systems. Thus the first challenging task for the new 
government was to create a homogeneous national economy. Within the first 
few years a set of reforms were implemented, such as introduction of free trade, 
setting up a central bank with a national currency backed by gold, and tax 
reforms. As a result the Polish financial institutions became compatible with an 
international economy; which accompanied by conservative fiscal policies, 
improved Polish external creditworthiness and encouraged foreign capital 
inflows (Landau & Tomaszewski, 1985; Slay, 1994). However, these policies did 
not survive the test of global crises in 1929. The global depression damaged 
the country’s economy seriously; the production rate fell further than the world 
average and the recovery was slower compared to countries of similar 
agriculture/industrial structures. In 1936 Poland reached 76% of its 1928 
production levels whereas Hungary reached 131% and Finland 122%. Even this 
relatively slow recovery in Poland required an increased role of the state in the 
economy (Landau & Tomaszewski, 1985; Slay, 1994).  
The mid war period of Polish economic history may be judged from two 
perspectives. On one hand, the immediate crises following the gaining of 
independence were overcome and the progress needed to become a 
sustainable economy was achieved. On the other hand, by the end of the 1930s 
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the Polish economy was still overwhelmingly rural in its character, and the role 
of the state in the economy was significant (Slay, 1994).  
With the beginning of World War II the effort to unite the previously partitioned 
territories collapsed. Poland was split up again, this time between Germany and 
the Soviet Union. The country was divided into two approximately similarly sized 
areas with the border line along the Bug River. The German occupied part was 
further divided into two territories separated with a frontier. The first part - 
embracing the most economically advanced parts of Poland - was directly 
incorporated into Germany forcing legal and economical unification. The second 
part was designed as provisional seat of the Polish population without any 
national rights (Landau & Tomaszewski, 1985). 
The consequences of World War II were devastating both for the economy and 
for human capital. German and Soviet occupation destroyed the Polish finance 
system and expropriated or destroyed most of the countries liquid assets (Slay, 
1994). Changes introduced by the occupiers in ownership, capital, production 
systems and co-operative relationships resulted in the loss of self sufficiency of 
the national industry. Damage to the national properties reached 38 percent 
(Landau & Tomaszewski, 1985). Much of the national intelligentsia was 
exterminated (67% of dentists, 58% of lawyers, 38% of doctors, 26% of 
professors and scholars) (Landau & Tomaszewski, 1985:151).  
The first post-World War II years (1944-1947) focused on industry recovery and 
determination of the political system. The emerging economy took the form of a 
multispectral system where state enterprises worked along with recovering pre-
war private and cooperative firms. The political scene was dominated by 
competition between the government-in-exile in London and the Soviet 
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sponsored Polish Committee of National Liberalization formed by Polish 
Workers Party (PPR) (Slay, 1994). In 1947 PPR won the election and formed a 
government, which quickly transformed into ‘fully-fledged’ Soviet style, one 
party state. The efficient power went into the hands of the PPR’s Political 
Bureau, to its First Secretary and to the privileged elite of the nomenklatura 
(Davies, 1986). 
PPR imposed Marxism – Leninism ideology, putting increased efforts into heavy 
industry (Davies, 1986) and reducing private property. Pricing, taxation and 
regulatory policy were turned against private initiatives. Entrepreneurs who 
failed to meet, often contradictory, regulations were subject to fines, a 5-year jail 
sentence and confiscation of property without compensation. Small 
cooperatives were forcibly incorporated into large units with management 
selected by PPR. Planning became centralized, compulsory and 
comprehensive. Currency convertibility was not re-established after the war 
period. Polish alignment with the Soviet Union was progressing along with its 
increasing isolation on the international scene. The Polish government refused 
aid from the Marshall Plan and withdrew from the International Monetary Fund 
(Slay, 1994). Instead, in 1955 Poland became a founding member of the 
Warsaw Pact – the Soviet bloc’s answer to NATO and the Council of Mutual 
Economic Assistance – the answer to the Common Market (Davies, 1986).  
During the communist period the government made two significant attempts to 
boost the national economy, the first in the 1970s and the second in the 1980s. 
Each of them failed in the long run, resulting in social unrest.  
In the 1970s the initial economic growth caused by earlier large scale 
investments into heavy industry, and  absorption of labour from the rural sector, 
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stalled. The government recognized the need for reforms and introduced the 
‘New Development Strategy’. The strategy aimed at modernizing industry and 
raising the level of living standards by obtaining western imports of investment 
and consumer goods. The expenses were covered mainly by credit provided by 
western banks and governments (Slay, 1994). The economy was unprepared to 
absorb the investments therefore the modernizing strategy led to a deep 
balance of payment crisis, exacerbated by reduced international demand for 
Polish products due to the mid 1970s world recession (Lipton & Sachs, 1990). 
As a result of necessary adjustments, real wages and consumption per capita 
fell sharply (Lipton & Sachs, 1990). The social response took the form of a wave 
of strikes across the country with the centre in the Shipyards of Gdansk. 
Strikers demanded political changes, including the right to form trade unions, 
freedom of speech, access to official media and the right to strike. The number 
of strikers (c. 20 000) and the overall society support for the strike forced the 
ruling party to sign the agreement documents on 31 of August 1980. The 
attitude of the chairman of the strike committee, Lech Wałęsa, and his team, 
who refused to call off the strikes until all other strikes had been satisfactorily 
resolved, proved that the monopoly of the ruling Party was under a siege by 
concentrated actions across the country (Davies, 2011). As a direct 
consequence of the signed agreement a new self-governing trade union 
“Solidarność’ emerged, this was an exception in the Soviet bloc at the time 
(Davies, 1986). Ten years later, “Solidarność’ played an even more significant 
role on the political scene.  
The economic situation was worsening constantly, during the period of 1978-
1982 the real net production fell by 24%, while retail prices rose by 185% (Lane, 
1992). There was a strong need for changes, to which the government 
 279 
 
answered with a reform aimed at creating an economy that would work ‘on the 
basis of central planning with usage of market mechanisms’ (Balcerowicz, 
1997). The reform took place in two phases: 1981-82 and 1987-1988. The 
implementation of the first stage of the reform was associated with two major 
issues. Firstly, even though the intended modifications in economic structure 
were far-reaching and ambitious they did not provide institutional guarantees 
that the central administration and the ruling party would obey its principles 
(Slay, 1994). Secondly, introduction of Martial law on December 13th, 1981, 
caused serious political and social disturbances. The new public order allowed 
for a night time curfew: curtailing all transport and travel, recording 
conversations, banning all social gatherings (Davies, 2011). The second stage 
was introduced because the first failed to meet the objectives (Lane, 1992). 
After implementing the second stage a moderate success was achieved. 
Enterprises were progressively given more autonomy over production 
decisions, as well as investments processes including the execution of projects. 
Some producer prices were released from central regulations. To improve the 
international trade and exchange system the government decided to reduce the 
overvaluation of national currency (złoty) and began to depreciate the official 
exchange rate. In practice however, the reform did not force discipline on the 
enterprises as intended, and, additionally, increased the bureaucracy (Lipton & 
Sachs, 1990). The reforms of the 1980s led to a situation where there was 
‘neither plan nor market’ thus creating an economy where enterprises were 
neither under the control of the central planner nor disciplined by a market 
(Lane, 1992). Although the reforms failed to meet their objectives they eased 
the later transformation processes in the 1990 (Balcerowicz, 1997; Lipton & 
Sachs, 1990). 
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Transformation  
The transformation process in Poland aimed to establish legal, economic, 
financial and administrative frameworks which would allow functioning of a 
market economy (Sachs & Lipton, 1990). The transformation shared common 
features with those taking place in other post communist countries. The scope 
of changes was very broad and included both the political and economic 
systems. Additionally those changes were interacting with a simultaneous 
reshaping of social structures (Balcerowicz, 1994a). The main challenge was to 
judge the proper sequencing of reforms. Whereas a pluralistic political system 
could be created in a short time, the institutional change and economic reforms 
required longer periods of time (Balcerowicz, 1994b; Sachs, 1992). Furthermore 
the success or failure of transformation relied on the initial conditions inherited 
after the old regime (Balcerowicz, 1994a).  
When starting the transformation process the Polish economy suffered from 
macroeconomic imbalance. The economy was dominated by state sector. The 
previous reforms run during the late 1980s did not change the ownership 
structure significantly and still over 90% of production was under state control. 
Manufacturing was dominated by heavy industry, at the same time production of 
consumer goods and services was neglected (Sachs & Lipton, 1990). State 
enterprises were financed by public expenditures both directly – by subsidiaries 
and – indirectly – by tax reliefs. In contrast to other socialist-bloc countries, 
Polish farming stayed mainly in private hands (Davies, 1986). Although reforms 
liberalizing policy toward the private sector were introduced, in 1988 competition 
virtually did not exist. Additionally, lack of a strict macroeconomic policy resulted 
in high inflation and shortages due to price control. Absence of market 
institutions created additional difficulties. A real central bank, real commercial 
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banks and real financial markets did not exist. Export relied mainly on Russia. 
Human capital was characterised by a high level of general education however 
there was a shortage of specialists in marketing and finances, and of well 
trained civil servants (Balcerowicz, 1997).  
The implementation of the reform program started in January 1990. It was 
designed as a shock therapy. The logic behind this approach came from the 
assumption that comprehensive and quick reforms would eliminate the 
uncertainty about the nature of the new economy (Sachs, 1992). This approach 
had both strong supporters and strong opponents. However as Jeffery Sachs 
indicated:  ‘With five years of experience of economic reform in Eastern Europe 
(...). The strategy seems to be winning the test of time.’ (Sachs, 1994).  
The introduced reforms embraced three broad categories of economic policy: 
macroeconomic stabilization, microeconomic stabilization, and fundamental 
institutional restructuring (Balcerowicz, 1994b) sometimes specified  in more 
detail as: macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization of economic functions, 
establishment of a legal environment to support private property, creation of an 
adequate ‘social security net’, mobilization of international financial assistance 
from the IMF, London and the Paris Club (Hunter & Ryan, 2008). As the first 
step ten new legal acts were implemented. They referred to state owned 
enterprises, a national bank and bank regulations, credit constraints, wage 
control through tax policy, tax regulation, foreign enterprises and trade and 
currency regulations.   
The results became apparent very quickly. Budget and monetary discipline 
resulted in a significant decrease in the inflation rate. Lower inflation and capital 
transfer from state owned enterprises, which were selling some of their assets, 
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allowed growth in the private sector. By the end of 1990 the budget deficit was 
covered with a 1.3 percent surplus. Polish currency became exchangeable. In 
1991 over 90% of prices were released from the state control thus currency 
became a more effective tool of exchange and saving (Balcerowicz, 1997 p372-
378; CIA, 2010).  
After 1990 the general environment for reforms was quite difficult due to 
frequent changes in the government, and rising populist ideas among parties. 
However, regardless of the political wing of the ruling government, the core 
policy was continued, and the goals were gradually achieved. The yearly GDP 
growth during the year 1995-1997 was on average 6.5%, two thirds of exports 
were sold to the European Union and inflation was below 10%,;investment and 
exports grew by 75% during 1994-1995. Within the structure of production the 
share of services grew; telecommunication, neglected during communist period, 
flourished. During the period of 1990-1993 over a million of new private 
enterprises were established. The financial system emerged. The supervision 
and regulation in banking system became more efficient. Poland managed to 
restore external creditworthiness and paid off in advance some of its debt to the 
IMF (Balcerowicz, 1997; Slay, 2000). The quality of the economy changed 
significantly (Balcerowicz, 1997 p 379).  
One of the integral parts of the transformation, which in practice turned out to 
be most challenging, was the privatisation process of state owned enterprises 
(Sachs, 1992). Privatisation was essential to reallocate public resources to 
participate in the financial support of introduced reforms (Rondinelli & 
Yurkiewicz, 1996). The first legislation was passed in 1990, this was the Act on 
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the Privatisation of State-Owned Enterprises (SOE)80. It was designed as a 
guiding document giving a general framework for privatisation that could be 
used in different strategies (Lipton, Sachs, & Summers, 1990). This was 
followed in 1996 by more detailed act on Commercialization and Privatisation81.  
Legislation allowed a multi – track privatization, which could take an indirect or 
direct form. The indirect privatisation, also called capital privatisation or 
commercialization, of the state owned enterprise (SOE) had two conditions. 
Firstly it required transformation of the SOE into a sole shareholder company 
either a joint stock or limited liability company, owned by the state treasury. The 
newly established company became a capital enterprise with a legal 
personality, acting under the rules of the commercial code. Prior to the second 
stage – making shares available to third parties – the state treasury was obliged 
to conduct economic and financial analyses of the enterprise in order to 
estimate its value as well as any need for organizational, economic or technical 
change. The outcomes of each such evaluation were publicly available. The 
second stage took form of the sale, transfer, or the right of lease of shares. 
Foreigners were allowed to purchase shares on general terms. The second 
form of privatisation – direct – was designed for small and medium size 
enterprises. It was accomplished through selling, merger or acquisition or lease 
of the company (Hunter & Ryan, 2008; Kruczalak-Jankowska & Kazimerz 
Kruczalak, 2003).  
The speed of privatization varied among enterprises. Unlike small enterprises, 
medium and large SOE had a very slow pace of privatization. By the end of 
                                                 
80
 Ustawa z dnia 13 lipca 1990 r. o prywatyzacji przedsiębiorstw państwowych (DzU 1990 nr 51, 
poz. 298) 
81
 Ustawa z dnia 30 sierpnia 1996 r.o komercjalizacji i prywatyzacji (DzU 1996 nr 171 poz. 
1397) 
 284 
 
1992 small privatization was almost completed with 82% of units: compared to 
22% of medium and large SOEs after six years of privatization (Nellis, 2002), 
and 70% by the end of 200982.  
The slow pace of privatisation in the early years resulted in the introduction of a 
Mass Privatisation Program (MPP). In 1994 the Ministry of Treasury established 
15 National Investment Funds (NIF). These funds were designed as a closed 
type of investment fund owned by the state treasury and intended to serve as 
industrialized participants on the securities market. At the same time 512 SOEs 
were commercialized. 60% of their shares were transferred to the NIF, 25% 
retained in the state treasury and the remaining 15% were reserved for the 
employees of the SOEs. Every eligible Pole could obtain, between November 
1995 and November 1996, a Universal Share Certificate, which later might be 
either sold or exchanged for shares in any of the created NIFs. The NIF 
themselves started trading on Warsaw stock exchange in June 1997 (Hunter & 
Ryan, 2008; Kruczalak-Jankowska & Kazimerz Kruczalak, 2003; Nellis, 2002). 
The initial concept of NFI funds was borrowed from the US Private Equity 
model. The newly established funds aimed to increase the value of their 
portfolios with the intention of later sale of shares on the capital market. The 
intended lifespan of those funds was 10 years. Among other economic activities 
allowed by law, NFIs targeted at improving management in the companies 
where they had a substantial shareholding, strengthening their market position 
and obtain new technologies (Kruczalak-Jankowska & Kazimerz Kruczalak, 
2003). However, in practice, about 40% of assigned portfolio companies were 
                                                 
82
 By the end of 2009; 5960 SOE were reconstructed either by commercialization, direct privatisation or 
liquidation from the m 8453 existing  in 1990 
http://prywatyzacja.msp.gov.pl/portal/pr/23/8731/Przeksztalcenia_wlasnosciowe_przedsiebiorst
w_panstwowych.html 
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generating losses, none of the funds had a full control over the portfolio 
company, and the majority of the funds’ management lacked experience in 
corporate governance as well as in operating on capital markets (Bitner, 2012). 
Most of the NFI funds which managed to stay on the market were later active in 
private equity type of investments, whereas only a few of them were interested 
in the venture capital type. They have changed their names and ownership 
frequently during the last ten years. Those changes, accompanied with lack of 
credible long term data, result in the current difficulties in tracing their market 
activities83.  
The 20th century contained major turning points in Polish history. The business 
environment was turbulent and the institutions inconsistent. For example: the 
constitution of 1921 ensured freedom of economic activities by highlighting that 
there is ‘freedom to choose any occupation and means of earning one’s living 
as well as the freedom to transfer one’s property to others.’ (Frankowski, 
2005:190). This concept was completely abandoned during the communist 
period (1945-1989) due to a shift in the economic doctrine. The supply-demand 
mechanism was rejected as factor regulating economic relationships and 
allocation of resources. The communist principle, in contradiction, assumed 
unity of state power and the economic system, which manifested itself in state 
ownership of the means of production, central economic planning and state 
management of the economy (Frankowski, 2005). The collapse of communism 
reintroduced the concept of economic freedom and protection of ownership.  
Considering Polish society, despite 40 years of Soviet domination Poland never 
lost its bonds with the West. The polish emigration in Europe and the US 
                                                 
83
 Interview with the expert  
 286 
 
outnumbered those from other Soviet bloc countries. Western goods were 
preferred over soviet manufactured, as well as in the arts and the science 
Poland kept closer social relationships with the West than the Soviet Union 
(Davies, 2011).  
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Appendix 2  
Summary of Polish ranks in the World Bank ‘Doing Business’ Report  
year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2012 
Rank (general)   54 75 74 76 72 70 62 
Starting a business    114 129 146 117 113 126 
Procedure/days/cost 12/31/20.3 10/31/20.6 10/31/22.2 10/31/21.4 10/31/21.2 10/31/18.8 6/32/17.9 6/32/17.5 6/32/17.3 
Dealing with licences     146 156     
Procedures/time(days)/cost 
(%of income per capita) 
  25/322/83.1 25/322/85.6 30/308/159.8     
Employing workers    49 78 82 76   
Difficulty of hiring index (0-
100) 
 11 11 0 11 11 11   
Difficulty of redundancy 
index (0-100) 
 30 40 40 40 40 30   
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Redundancy costs (weeks 
of salary) 
 25 25 13 13 13 13   
Registering property    86 81 84 88 86 89 
Procedures/days/cost (%of 
value)  
 7/204/1.6 6/197/1.6 6/197/2.0 6/197/0.5 6/197/0.5 6/197/0.5 6/152/0.4 6/152/0.4 
Getting credit    65 68 28 15 15 8 
Strength of legal rights (0-
10) 
 2 3 4 4 8 9 9 9 
Depth of credit information 
(0-6) 
  4 4 4 4 4 4 5 
Protecting investors    33 33 38 41 44 46 
Extant of disclosure index 
(0-10) 
 4 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Ease of shareholders suit 
index (0-9) 
  8 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Strength of investor 
protection index (0-10) 
  6.3 6 6 6 6 6 6 
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Paying Taxes    71 125 142 151 121 128 
Payment numbers per 
year/time in hours/tax rate % 
of profit  
  43/175/55.6 43/175/38.4 41/418/38.4 40/418/40.2 40/395/42.
5 
29/325/42.3 29/296/43.6 
Trading across borders    102 40 41 42 49 46 
Documents to 
export/time(days)/cost per 
container 
  6/19 6/19/2260 5/17/834 5/17/884 5/17/884 5/17/884 5/17/1050 
Documents to import 
/time(days)/cost per 
container 
  7/26 7/26/2260 5/27/834 5/27/884 5/25/884 5/25/884 5/16/1000 
Enforcing contracts    112 68 68 75 77 68 
Procedures/time(days)/cost 
(%of estate)/recovery rate 
(%of claim) 
18/1000/1
1.2 
41/1000/8.7 41/980/8.7 41/980/10 38/830/10 38/830/12 38/830/12 38/830/12.0/ 37/830/12.0 
Closing a business     85 88 82 85 81 87 
Time(years)/cost (%of 
estate)/recovery rate (cents 
on the dollar)  
1.5/18 1.4/18/68.2 1/22/64 3/22/27.9 3/22/27.8 3/20/29.8 3/20/29.8 3/20/31.3 3/15/31.5 
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